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Preface and Note on the Text
The title Martial Arts Studies may imply comprehensive or encyclo-paedic coverage. However, for reasons that will soon become clear, 
this work could never hope to be either encyclopaedic or comprehensive. 
Indeed, there has only been space to discuss some select moments in some 
scholarship on some aspects of some martial arts related to some wider 
issues in culture. In terms of ‘coverage’, then, only a few martial arts are 
even discussed in this book. Moreover, their treatment is always subordi-
nated to other concerns—academic, theoretical, cultural, political. Many 
martial arts receive no mention at all. Similarly, in terms of the themes that 
often organize scholarship on martial arts: some problematics are treated 
at length, while others receive barely a mention. Doubtless this reflects a 
definite bias—a bias that receives attention in the following pages. But 
at this stage it suffices to say that this work does not claim to be the first 
word on martial arts studies and it certainly does not seek to be the last. Its 
focus is on select questions and problematics of (and for) an emergent field, 
rather than focusing ‘directly’ on specific martial arts or specific common 
academic themes. As readers who move further into the main body of the 
book will quickly become aware, the focus of this work is on subterranean 
matters, matters that subtend ‘case studies’, ‘themes’, or ‘examples’, in the 
usual sense. Nonetheless, case studies, themes, and examples abound. The 
point is, I have not organized the book schematically, whether in terms of 
styles, schools, historical periods, geographical regions, or anything else. 
xii Preface
The book progresses organically via the developing explorations of emerg-
ing problematics.
That being said, readers may notice a greater attention to nominally 
 Chinese martial arts than others. However, the book is not a study of 
 Chinese martial arts. Rather, the specific studies within it—whether 
‘Chinese’ or otherwise—have been selected because their analysis relates 
to and can cast light upon wider issues, fields, contexts, and practices of 
martial arts and martial arts studies. Other texts and examples could have 
been selected—some will say ‘should have been’. It is my hope that they 
will be, and that the theoretical and analytical thrust that animates my 
analyses and discussions here will come to contribute to a diverse range of 
contributions to martial arts studies.
As for the Romanization of Chinese terms: some of the authors I quote 
from use the Wade-Giles system (so they write t’ai-chi ch’üan and chi) 
while others use pinyin (so they write taijiquan and qi). If someone has 
used Wade-Giles, I have not altered this, but other than in quotations I 
have used pinyin. As for the spellings of Asian terms, concepts, and martial 
arts names, I have either selected one conventional variant as opposed to 
another (so, escrima, even though it is equally common to read eskrima) 
or used the spelling related to the conventions of the context of its usage 
(so, for instance, ‘Japanese’ jujitsu or ‘Brazilian’ jiujitsu—although there 
are other variants, and spellings vary so much from context to context that 
it seems to matter little even to people who have clear accounts of why the 
variations occur).
I have italicized the first occurrence of words that may—according to 
certain conventional assumptions—be assumed to be unusual to Western 
readers, including all ‘Asian’ martial arts (even the American-born jeet 
kune do). However, I have elected never to interrupt the flow and devel-
opment of any discussion, analysis, or argument by attempting to insert a 
pithy definition of any martial art or related term, preferring instead to as-
sume that any reader willing to soldier through this book will either already 
know or have the wherewithal to find out quickly and sufficiently about any 
martial art or term mentioned. This is not a book of definitions. If anything, 
it is about their disruption.
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Martial Arts Studies  
as an Academic Field
introDuCtion: MartiaL arts stuDiEs:  
Disrupting DisCipLinary BounDariEs
The subtitle of this book is as important as the main title, if not more so. 
This is because the book is as much invested in Disrupting Disciplinary 
Boundaries as it is in Martial Arts Studies. What this means is that the book 
not only offers arguments about martial arts studies in terms of academic 
disciplines and their boundaries, but it also seeks to enact at least some of 
the disruption to disciplinary boundaries that it proposes. This gives the 
book a unique—some may say peculiar—character. It is about martial arts 
studies in terms of disciplinary boundaries, and it also disrupts certain dis-
ciplinary boundaries as a result of the ways it studies martial arts.
All of this may strike some people as odd, eccentric, or excessive. On 
the one hand, readers interested primarily in martial arts may wonder what 
kind of a book this is that appears, on first glance, to be about martial arts 
but that, on second glance, is actually about something called martial arts 
studies, and that for some reason feels the need to connect this with a proj-
ect of disrupting disciplinary boundaries. On the other hand, readers who 
may already be familiar with some of my other works—whether on matters 
of cultural studies, deconstruction, and theories of intervention and agency 
(Bowman 2007a, 2008a, 2008b, 2012, 2013b) or on the impact of Bruce 
Lee on global popular culture (Bowman 2010b, 2013a), for example—may 
2 Chapter 1
have different kinds of questions. For instance, such readers may notice that 
the title and subtitle appear to be at war with each other. First, the main title, 
Martial Arts Studies, seems to propose a (new) discipline or field. But upon 
the announcement of this, the subtitle immediately stipulates some kind of 
correlated disrupting of the very thing just proposed, namely disciplinary 
boundaries. On such a reading, the question would become one of whether 
the book is about the establishment of a new discipline or the disruption of 
the very possibility of stable disciplinary boundaries. These are very differ-
ent kinds of objectives—unless the disruption to disciplinary boundaries is 
one caused simply by the emergence of another discipline within an already 
overcrowded academic space. In other words, the questions may be posed 
like this: Is this about jostling for space, subverting the established alloca-
tion of space, or deconstructing the very idea of space?
Although this work does make certain claims and arguments about an 
emerging academic movement or discourse that has been called ‘martial 
arts studies’ (Farrer and Whalen-Bridge 2011a; Liu 2011), both as it is cur-
rently emerging and as it might develop, my agenda is not to stake out, map 
out, and measure a territory (a ‘field’), or to presume to make decisions 
about what is inside and what is outside or what is good and what is bad 
‘martial arts studies’. Rather, my agenda is to argue that the self-conscious 
elaboration of such a field that is currently taking place should proceed in 
full awareness of the stakes and critical potentials of such elaboration and 
construction. Martial arts studies need neither rely on nor ‘be like’ the dis-
ciplines and fields from which it is currently emerging. Its objects, topics, 
foci, and problematics, its approaches, methodologies, and ways of writing 
and discoursing, need neither mimic nor be beholden to the practices and 
protocols of other disciplines and fields. Rather, the objects of martial arts 
studies, the foci, the questions, and relations into which its studies engage 
may be constructed in ways that disrupt and reconfigure the fields from 
which martial arts studies emerged. As such, martial arts studies could 
constitute an intervention into more than its own space, an intervention that 
challenges established norms and proprieties in a range of fields. This may 
seem inconsequential, but in the pages and chapters that follow, I hope to 
demonstrate some of the ways in which academic discourses are political 
and consequential in some perhaps surprising ways.
The underpinnings or ingredients of this argument will not be obvious 
to all readers. Indeed, these few prefatory paragraphs may already have 
signalled to some that this is not likely to be a book for them. Neverthe-
less, to clarify this matter, in the following pages, I will introduce many of 
the main concerns that will be developed and explored more fully in the 
subsequent chapters.
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Readers who have managed to stomach these opening paragraphs may 
be inclined to read on. Other readers may put the book back on the shelf 
or leave the preview pages of the website on which they found them. This 
is undoubtedly not a book for everyone interested in martial arts. It is a 
book for those concerned with questions of the academic study of martial 
arts, and it seeks to persuade such a readership of the sometimes subtle 
but always present and active place and work of disciplinarity, and of the 
value and virtue of disrupting disciplinary boundaries. Of this, much more 
will be said. But first we should turn to the object evoked in the main title: 
martial arts studies.
MartiaL arts stuDiEs vErsus  
stuDiEs of MartiaL arts
In diverse geographical and disciplinary spaces, the phrase ‘martial arts 
studies’ is increasingly circulating as a term to describe a growing field 
of scholarly interest and academic activity. Indeed, many academic fields 
already engage with martial arts in their particular ways. But, halfway 
through the second decade of the twenty-first century, the term ‘martial 
arts studies’ is increasingly being used not only as a designation to refer 
to and connect work that is already being done in different disciplines but 
also as a question. The question might be phrased like this: Although there 
are various sorts of studies of martial arts, is there, or might there be, such 
a thing as a unique field of martial arts studies (Farrer and Whalen-Bridge 
2011b; Judkins 2012–; García and Spencer 2013)?
Studies of martial arts exist, in a wide variety of disciplines: in history, 
anthropology, psychology, area studies, sports studies, sociology, literary 
studies, peace studies, religious and philosophical studies, media studies, 
and film studies; even political economy and branches of medicine could 
be said to have a range of versions of martial arts studies. These fields are 
certainly hospitable to studies of martial arts, at least provided such studies 
are carried out in terms of relevant disciplinary concerns and methods. But 
the book you are currently reading is perhaps the first to engage directly 
and in a sustained manner with the discourse of ‘martial arts studies’ as 
such. This is so even though it may often seem to fly in the face of respect-
able disciplinary concerns and methods. But this is because respectable 
disciplinary concerns and methods are part of its focus. So, rather than 
following any one disciplinary approach, this book exists and operates in 
terms of a cultivated critical awareness of the multiplicity and heterogene-
ity of actual and possible approaches to martial arts studies. It is concerned 
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with the consequences of the often tacit decisions which police disciplinary 
borders, norms, proprieties, and conventions. So it explicitly and implicitly 
explores the orientations and limitations of existing approaches, in order to 
clarify the stakes and to make a case for the future directions in which mar-
tial arts studies might be elaborated, in order perhaps to grow into a unique 
field—perhaps a field disruptive of the idea of unique fields.
It does so because at its current stage of emergence and development, 
martial arts studies requires some work. If martial arts studies is to blossom 
into a field—a discrete field of academic study—this will not just happen, as 
if naturally. Rather, martial arts studies must be created. Establishing what it 
is requires something rather more than simply surveying all of the academic 
work done on martial arts in the different disciplines, and stringing it all 
together, so as to produce some kind of archive or encyclopaedia of shared 
knowledge. As illuminating as such a work might be, academic disciplines, 
en masse, don’t work like that. Different disciplines have very different ap-
proaches, even when they are approaching the ‘same’ thing. Each discipline 
is a foreign country to the others: they do things differently. This is so much 
so that it is not only their ‘approaches’ to martial arts that are different but 
also their very conceptualizations of ‘martial arts’, as well as their guiding 
questions and the sorts of concerns and values that animate them.
Accordingly, this study begins from the proposition that any effort to 
combine, organize, and synthesize the insights of all of the current schol-
arship on martial arts would not in itself produce evidence of a coherent 
field of martial arts studies. It may even be unhelpful, at this stage, in this 
study, to proceed in the manner of the textbook, the survey, or the literature 
review, by constructing a narrative or encyclopaedic account of something 
called ‘martial arts studies scholarship’—an account of all of the work on 
martial arts carried out all over the sciences, arts, humanities, and social 
sciences, all over the world. Such projects will always be interesting and 
stimulating in many ways. But for present purposes it is not the best ap-
proach. This is because, for all of their many merits and values as introduc-
tions and overviews, textbooks, surveys, and literature reviews are arguably 
obliged to overlook, ignore, or downplay considerations of the implications 
and consequences of the inevitable deep disagreements and incompatibili-
ties between the paradigms of disciplinary approaches. They are limited 
in their ability to explore or reflect upon the reasons for disciplinary dif-
ferences, as well as the significance and implications of such differences.
Engaging with questions of the field requires a different sort of focus: 
a kind of double-focus (Bowman 2008a). Indeed, my argument is that the 
development of martial arts studies requires a focus not just on ‘martial 
arts’ but also on the question of ‘studies’. One requirement of this is to 
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engage with the problems that spring up because of the differences between 
disciplinary paradigms, or disciplinary worlds (Lyotard 1984), and to en-
tertain the possibility that looking squarely at these issues could—but need 
not—lead to two equally unsatisfactory alternatives.
Alternative one. When different disciplines come face to face with each 
other, sometimes the encounter yields only mutual distaste. Think of the 
‘culture wars’, the ‘Sokal affair’, or the tendency of academics in one field 
to joke about other disciplines being ‘Mickey Mouse subjects’, for instance. 
So the first possible outcome of any kind of engagement with disciplinary 
difference involves fragmentation, or the moving of approaches away from 
each other. This is underpinned by a sense that, when it comes to differ-
ences between two disciplines, ‘never the twain shall meet’. This kind of 
splitting apart is based on disagreements about premises and methodologies, 
epistemologies, values, investments, and orientations, and a closure to what 
might be called ‘the otherness of the other’ or ‘the difference of the different’ 
(Lyotard 1988). In fact, this type of splitting amounts to little more than a 
demonstration and a consolidating reproduction of disciplinary demarcations.
Alternative two. The exposure of two different approaches to each other 
can culminate in the more or less explicit takeover or ‘hegemonization’ of 
one by the other. In this situation, the terms and concepts of both fields may 
appear to be preserved, but one paradigm will quietly rewrite and reconfig-
ure the meanings and statuses of the terms appropriated or ‘incorporated’ 
from the other. This will involve subtle processes of translation and dis-
placements of meaning, but it still amounts to a demonstration of the way 
disciplines work to preserve and strengthen themselves.
However, if martial arts studies is to amount to any kind of distinct field 
or a unique development, then it should remain vigilant to the possible 
consequences of following either of these common trajectories. The former 
would prevent martial arts studies from coalescing at all; the latter would 
ensure that martial arts studies always remained an expression or subsec-
tion of an existing discipline; and both of these options would amount to the 
same thing: that martial arts studies as such would not exist.
In order to work towards a new, unique or discrete mode of existence and 
operation, then, it is important to be sensitive to the slippery logic of disci-
plinarity (Mowitt 1992; Bowman 2007a). Of course, some academics, re-
searchers, and students interested in the questions of how and why to study 
martial arts may regard such a double focus as pointlessly or uselessly 
‘theoretical’ and ‘merely academic’ in the most pejorative and dismissive 
of senses. However, as I hope will become apparent, my argument through-
out Martial Arts Studies will be that a focus on the logic of disciplinarity 
is actually doubly relevant for any study of martial arts. This is because 
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martial arts are themselves scenes in which logics of disciplinarity, or disci-
plinary logics, are always in play. Martial arts are disciplines and contested 
scenes of disciplinarity. Questions of discipline and disciplinarity are either 
manifestly present and hotly contested, in all kinds of ways, in martial arts, 
or they are just a scratch below the surface away from flaring up.
Like martial arts themselves, then, martial arts studies must be at once 
theoretical and practical. All approaches to martial arts rely on a theory—
of what to do, and how to do it, and why. Similarly, martial arts studies 
cannot but be fundamentally theoretical, even if avowedly interested in 
matters deemed to be practical. Equally, just as all martial arts—no matter 
how avowedly ‘pure’ or ‘unique’ they may be—are always surely hybrid, 
so martial arts studies must navigate the fact of its own unique kind of 
impurity. As I have already suggested, if it ever wants to be more than the 
sum of the bits and pieces of the different disciplines that go into work on 
martial arts, then it needs to take seriously the question of how its many and 
varied ‘ingredients’ could genuinely produce something new and distinct.
Martial arts discourses of all kinds are arguably preoccupied with 
matters of purity, impurity, continuity, and change. They have a fraught 
relationship with ideas such as authenticity, tradition, and essence, on the 
one hand, and invention, innovation, revolution, and mixing, on the other. 
Many arts make sometimes incredible claims about improbably long un-
broken histories and have incredible origin myths. They make such claims 
in order to claim that from the outset the art was pure and complete. How-
ever, history invariably reveals complexity, chiasmus, divergence, hybrid-
ity, and even dislocation and discontinuity between now and then, here and 
there. Similarly, martial arts studies must be sensitive and attentive to its 
complex origins and contingent development. It can never pretend to have 
been born in the blink of an eye, out of nothing. It will always owe a debt 
to the other disciplines and discourses from which it emerged. Moreover, 
it will always remain in complex and ongoing relationships with these dis-
courses. However, my hope is that martial arts studies might come to be not 
only different to the disciplines and discourses that predated and in some 
sense produced it, but hopefully, it will be able to produce new insights and 
approaches that will then feed back into and modify the disciplines from 
which it as a field is currently emerging.
thE DouBLE foCus of MartiaL arts stuDiEs
Accordingly, this book approaches the study of martial arts in terms of a 
double focus. It all hinges on the theme of institutions. Two of its basic 
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premises are (1) that martial arts are best understood as institutions and (2) 
that the ways martial arts are thought about, known, discussed, and stud-
ied are also institutional—whether connected to institutions or productive 
of institutions. For these reasons, the book proposes that the concept of 
‘institution’ is fundamental to martial arts studies and that by approaching 
both martial arts ‘themselves’ and martial arts studies ‘itself’ in terms of a 
focus on ‘institution’ (understood as both noun and verb) we will be able 
to unlock unique insights into martial arts. But not only martial arts: also 
scholarship, pedagogy, history, subjectivity, ideology, knowledge produc-
tion, embodiment, and many other aspects of culture.
Another key proposition of this book is that media representations have 
long been a powerful force in martial arts discourse, at least (or most 
clearly) for the last half century. I mention this here because an acknowl-
edgement that film and media are often constitutive forces in martial arts 
theory and practice is something that is very often downplayed or even 
written out of studies of martial arts in culture and society. This book, 
however, seeks to redress the balance to some extent by frequently fore-
grounding the ways in which film, television, documentary, gaming, and 
other forms of representation/construction have an impact on martial arts 
discourses and practices. The fact that many academic approaches to mar-
tial arts either subordinate, fail to recognize, or appear unable to deal with 
‘media supplements’ to ‘real life’ is regarded as something of a royal road 
to the conscious and unconscious orientations of many studies.
An exhaustive study of this relation would require a volume or more in 
itself. However, rather than ignoring it, Martial Arts Studies argues that 
representation, mediation, and mediatization are not mere secondary or 
supplementary add-ons, to be ignored or discounted. Rather, it regards them 
as matters that fundamentally complicate and muddy the waters of martial 
arts culture and discourse, so much that the field cannot simply be organized 
by binaries and value systems organized by matters of truth, falsity, fact, 
and fiction (Chan 2000; Bowman 2010b, 2013a). Rather, such myth and 
media-related dimensions demand that martial arts studies be organized 
by paradigms, theories, methodologies, and orientations that engage with 
epistemological and ontological complexity, and specifically by paradigms 
that do not dismiss, subordinate, or remain blind to the problems and prob-
lematics involved in mediatization, representation, discourse, and ideology.
In setting out the stakes and putting forward a case for some of the kinds 
of orientations and approaches that the emerging field could encompass, 
Martial Arts Studies draws heavily on developments in the theoretical 
fields of poststructuralism, cultural studies, media studies, and postcolonial 
studies. It argues that martial arts studies cannot but be an interdisciplinary 
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field but argues more significantly that this means it may well have an 
antidisciplinary effect. This is an argument that may take quite some elabo-
ration. Its starting points are studies that have rigorously and critically en-
gaged with the topics of disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity. Stated baldly, 
Martial Arts Studies argues that ‘true’ interdisciplinarity is never a simple 
pick-n-mix process. It is rather a minefield, and a battlefield.
This may seem to be an excessively theoretical and academic argument. 
However, it relates to matters that are not confined to academia. As I have 
already proposed, interdisciplinarity in academia is not dissimilar to inter-
disciplinarity in martial arts: in both realms, one cannot merely add to or 
subtract from an institution without the institution changing as a result. As 
a consequence, there will always be deep-seated resistances to interdisci-
plinarity qua change. Adding, altering, or subtracting always threatens to 
transform the institution, so all manner of resistances spring up in response 
to interdisciplinary work (Barthes 1977; Weber 1987; Mowitt 2003). Put 
differently: any study, any approach, always involves stakes, allegiances, 
values, and consequences. Wherever there are significant processes of add-
ing, subtracting, combining, or recombining in interdisciplinary ways, there 
will always be disciplinary resistances, hurdles, and obstacles to tackle.
In awareness of these issues, and engaging with them in terms of the 
problems of academic interdisciplinarity and in terms of related matters in 
martial arts ‘innovations’), Martial Arts Studies makes a case for construct-
ing the field of martial arts studies according to the terms of problematics 
drawn from poststructuralism, cultural studies, media studies, and postcolo-
nial studies. My argument is that these coordinates can be regarded as key 
because of the lessons that each of these approaches incorporated into its 
own emergence. In a sense, I treat these ‘approaches’ as complex responses 
to perceived problems of institutions, hierarchies, and status quos (Chow 
1993; Morris and Hjort 2012). In other words, I regard them as nonstan-
dard disciplines, at least to the extent that they involve explicit critiques of 
disciplinarity. As such, these fields involve perspectives on and critiques of 
institutions, critiques that have gone on to institute viewpoints that I argue 
are highly relevant for martial arts studies.
As nonstandard or even ‘antidisciplinary’ approaches, these coordinates 
are also to be understood as both disruptive of approaches in other dis-
ciplines and productive of a potentially unique landscape of martial arts 
studies. In this way, Martial Arts Studies proposes a field that both emerges 
out of and yet differs from many disciplinary locations, and which has the 
critical potential to feed back into and transform those disciplines.
From one perspective, this may seem to be very little, almost noth-
ing—at best a shadow of the kinds of claims made for certain disciplinary 
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innovations in the past—of the order: ‘We are currently witnessing the 
emergence of a new field of study, one that will challenge established 
knowledge, transform the academic disciplines, and reconfigure conven-
tional modes of knowledge production’. How many times have academics 
read statements like this? Such sentences may strike some readers as excit-
ing and engaging. But to others they will sound formulaic and familiar, 
possibly to the point of being tedious. This is because nowadays the dec-
laration that a new subject is going to be ‘radical’ and ‘transformative’ is 
very passé. This situation has come about because we are now arguably at 
the tail end of at least half a century of precisely this sort of ‘revolution-
ary’ transformation of the university disciplines—a transformation carried 
out in large part through the emergence of ever more new disciplines, new 
fields, and new interdisciplinary explorations.
In the UK, for instance—but in a way that moved far beyond the shores 
of the UK—the main cycle of the ‘revolutionary transformation’ of the arts, 
humanities, and social sciences was arguably kicked off by the foundation 
of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at Birmingham University 
in 1964 (Hall 1992; Bowman 2007a, 2008b, 2013c). The ensuing period of 
transformation has been characterized by the institution of more and more 
new subject areas, defined through use of the suffix ‘studies’. Cultural 
studies, media studies, women’s studies, queer studies, disability studies, 
television studies, peace studies, migration studies—even business stud-
ies, sports studies, science studies, tourism and management studies; you 
name it—all of these and more can be said to have blazed the trail and 
paved the way for the emergence of as many ‘studies’-suffix subjects as 
can be conceived and as can produce articles, books, journals, and degree 
courses (During 2011). Certainly, many of the ‘new’ subjects and fields 
have indeed radically challenged and transformed established knowledge, 
established academic disciplines, and conventional modes of knowledge 
production (Bowman 2008a). But inevitably, over time, claims about the 
radical potential of this or that new ‘studies-suffix subject’ have come to 
seem narcissistic and overblown.
In this context, a pertinent question about something called ‘martial 
arts studies’ might be: Whereabouts in this continuum of possibilities—
stretching from radical transformation to business as usual—might such a 
subject, field, or discipline be situated? Could we make grand claims for 
it, as something truly new and transformative (and if so, ‘transformative’ 
of what)? And why? Such questions deserve to be addressed to martial 
arts studies—if it can even be said to exist. And does martial arts studies 
really exist? Is it one thing? Or is such a proposition really just fanciful 
thinking? Are we, rather, merely talking about a miscellaneous smattering 
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of disparate books and articles, produced here and there by unconnected 
thinkers working on diverse topics with diverse orientations and conceptu-
alizations? If it does not yet exist fully or properly, should it be invented, 
and if so, as what sort of a field or discipline? Tackling such questions 
requires some sense of what it means for anything to be regarded as a dis-
cipline, subject area, or field. Only in light of establishing a sense of this 
will it be time to ask about what sort of a discipline, subject area, or field 
martial arts studies might be or become—whether somehow radical and 
transformative or whether merely novel or niche. The form of the answers 
to all of this will depend upon what aims, objects, and methods such a new 
field might involve, and to what ends.
As for the question of whether martial arts studies already exists: In the 
institutional world of university degree courses, martial arts studies defi-
nitely does exist. There are university institutions with established degrees 
named ‘martial arts studies’, and others where students can major or minor 
in martial arts studies (Wile 2014: 8). In other words, under this and other 
names, the academic, physical, cultural, philosophical, and vocational 
study of martial arts exists in different sorts of degree programmes all over 
the world. In this literal though limited empirical institutional sense, martial 
arts studies clearly exists. However, on closer inspection, the martial arts 
studies degree programmes and the treatment of martial arts within subject 
areas related to sports studies, health and fitness, and so on overwhelmingly 
tend to approach the object according to the concerns either of established 
disciplinary concerns (such as those of history, anthropology, area studies, 
psychology, physical education, sports science, management, business, 
etc.) or according to a vocational agenda: The advertising for martial arts 
studies degrees typically suggests that they are orientated towards produc-
ing graduates qualified for jobs such as teacher of physical education, 
health and fitness consultant, sport and leisure manager, or even bodyguard 
or government security operative. The website of the University of Bridge-
port degree program in martial arts studies, for instance, suggests: 
Students may choose one of several career tracks in criminal justice, health 
sciences, or business and may go on to pursue careers in the medical sciences, 
business, psychology, human services, or media. Students may also choose 
to pursue graduate study in areas such as global development or international 
law. (Bridgeport n.d.-a)
The same page then lists the following ‘career tracks’: martial arts in-
structor, business owner, sports psychologist, therapist, journalist, media 
teacher or college professor, criminologist, DEA agent, FBI agent, INS 
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agent, probation officer, secret service agent, nutritionist, recreation thera-
pist. The major syllabus itself is made up of modules titled The History of 
Martial Arts, Martial Arts and East Asian Thought, Psychosocial Aspects 
of Martial Arts, Martial Arts School Development, The Dao of Business, 
Martial Arts and Research Methods, Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism, 
Survey of the Martial Arts, Communication and the Martial Arts, Image 
and Reality in the Martial Arts, Internship, and Senior Thesis/Presenta-
tion. Then there is a Taekwondo Track, involving Issues in Taekwondo, 
Self-Defence, Taekwondo I, II, and III; a Japanese Martial Arts Track, 
involving Issues in Japanese Martial Arts, Judo, Karate, Kobudo Practica, 
Kata/Kumite Conditioning; and a Taiji Track, involving Issues in Chinese 
Martial Arts, Taiji Practice, and Qigong Training (Bridgeport n.d.-b). Thus, 
one might propose that, although one cannot entirely gauge the full nature 
of the content of each module within the degree course and although one 
cannot presume to know in advance exactly what the ‘issues’ in taekwondo, 
taiji, and so on may be deemed to be, and just as that content can and most 
likely will vary and change over time, this looks to be a distinctly practical 
course, in two senses: first in the sense of being focused on practical dimen-
sions of martial arts, and second in the sense of being vocational.
Now, to the extent that any instituted version of martial arts studies 
marches to the beat of a pre-established agenda (such as being consigned 
to being ‘case studies’ in sports science or psychology, or knowledge of 
native cultures in anthropology or area studies, or ‘how to get a job’ in one 
or more branch of the ‘martial arts industries’), one might question whether 
we are dealing with anything truly new or distinct at all. For, to be truly 
‘new’, one might expect a subject area or discipline logically to involve a 
fairly large dose of difference—specifically, difference from what is done 
in existing disciplines. 
What this means can be illustrated by a quick (but crucial) consideration 
of one interesting case of academic ‘newness’ to be found in the history of 
the evolution of the university: namely, the case of cultural studies, as it 
blossomed during the 1980s and 1990s. Born in the 1960s, cultural stud-
ies was institutionalized as a ‘subject area’ or ‘field’ within universities. 
Its key mouthpieces have always steadfastly refused the designation of 
cultural studies as a ‘discipline’. So it was overwhelmingly thought of by 
cultural studies theorists themselves as being characterized by or establish-
ing a kind of shared identity more by way of its shared problematics, or 
sets of gnawing problems, themes, and issues, than by a shared ‘object’ 
(Hall 1992). Thus, the term ‘cultural studies’ specified first and foremost 
a problematic or set of problematics. This was (or these were) inextricably 
related to agency, power, and (in)equality; and such problematics were 
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initially explored and elaborated under the headings of gender, race, and 
class questions (McRobbie 1992). Soon, ever more areas, such as those 
related to place, identity, technology, and other types of symbolic structure 
and forms of power, entered into its purview (Birchall and Hall 2006). At 
the same time, cultural studies was characterized by an openness to the 
other, to the different, the un- or under-examined (Hall 2002). It was hospi-
table to experimental approaches and to unexpected objects of study. In this 
regard, at least, the very possibility of the easy emergence of martial arts 
studies today cannot be dissociated from a certain indebtedness to the trail-
blazing work of cultural studies as a field which forged ahead in the study 
of new objects and practices in new ways and thereby attracted the flak of 
academic disapproval and even occasional media scandal (Hall 1992). The 
loosening of disciplinarity forged by ‘scandalous’ innovations in cultural 
studies in some sense blazed the trail that enables martial arts studies and 
other new fields to emerge.
During the first major period of taking stock of what cultural studies 
was, had become, and might go on to become, John Storey noted that a 
‘proper’ academic discipline might be defined by a collective sharing of 
‘the object of study[,] the basic assumptions which underpin the method(s) 
of approach to the object of study [and] the history of the discipline itself’ 
(Storey 1996: 1). Of course, the vast—potentially infinite—field of ‘cul-
ture’ always meant that cultural studies could not have one shared object of 
study. And therefore there might never be a shared ‘method’ or ‘approach’ 
to anything. But, to cut a long (and multiple) story short, one might propose 
that cultural studies was organized into a kind of identity with a kind of 
shared disciplinary history to the extent that it involved a shared commit-
ment to what might be called cultural politics (Bowman 2013b).
Arguably, cultural studies was a unique and challenging field, one that 
did substantially transform the academy (Mowitt 2003). Yet, clearly, a lot 
of the ‘ingredients’ that went into cultural studies had neither been born in 
cultural studies, nor would they stay in cultural studies. No one can claim 
a monopoly on attention to issues of race, class, gender, sexuality, margin-
alization, exclusion, and so on. Accordingly, the development of ‘cultural 
studies’ went hand in hand with events that might be regarded either as 
the disciplinary fragmentations and divisions of cultural studies or as the 
increased generation and institutionalization of ever more subjects like cul-
tural studies. In either interpretation, what is clear is that all such ‘studies’ 
subjects were elaborated under the sign of the political: their paradigms 
were organized by questions of the political dimensions and ramifications 
of x, y, or z (Young 1992; Bowman 2008a). On the other hand, at the same 
time as this was taking place, numerous other ‘studies’ subjects emerged 
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that were clearly not organized by anything like a ‘new’ paradigm. Busi-
ness studies would exemplify this equivalent (even if apparently politically 
or ideologically opposite)1 countertendency.
In the context of this discussion: Where might ‘martial arts studies’ come 
to be placed? Will it involve a disciplinary agreement about the object of 
study (‘martial arts’)? Will enquirers share ‘basic assumptions’, that will 
come to ‘underpin’ the method(s) of approach to the object of study’? Will 
it come to have an agreed, shared history? Will it matter? After all, aca-
demic fields are not renowned for being sites of agreement. Nevertheless, 
an important question is this: Even if martial arts studies is elaborated as a 
field of disagreement vis-à-vis all of these things, will it be organized by 
something like a shared problematic or paradigm? Will this problematic 
be unique to martial arts studies or borrowed from and shared with other 
academic disciplines and fields? If so, which ones, and why? This is an 
open matter, a matter to be decided and determined by the orientation of 
research into martial arts.
Research into martial arts is primary because any possible degree 
courses in martial arts studies will ultimately come to be organized by 
research publications on the range of topics regarded as defining the field. 
However, because the object ‘martial arts’ will be conceptualized and ap-
proached very differently depending on the context and orientation of the 
formulation of the term, the publications selected to organize the field will 
be determined more by implicit or explicit disciplinary affiliation than by 
anything necessary or inherent in the term ‘martial arts’. It is clear, for 
example, that the definitions constructed, the sets of questions asked, and 
the methodologies used to explore them will be more than likely to differ 
fundamentally between sciences, arts, sociology, theology, and philoso-
phy. The philosophical questions posed by some Western approaches to 
taijiquan, for instance, which relate to cosmology and ideology, and so on 
(Raposa 2003), could hardly be said to be pertinent to the various kinds of 
Western studies of taijiquan in relation to matters such as knee function, 
ageing, injury, or postoperative convalescence in and around the field of 
medicine (Zetaruk et al. 2005). But equally, more subtle but no less sig-
nificant differences arise because of the different sorts of focus that are 
possible within even related fields: Assunção’s historical treatment of the 
Brazilian martial art of capoeira, for instance (Assunção 2005), is nota-
bly different to Downey’s anthropological treatment of the ‘same’ topic 
(Downey 2005), which focuses very much on questions of the body and 
pedagogy, rather than history. Then, Downey’s treatment of the body dif-
fers again from Adam Frank’s focus on it in his study of taijiquan (Frank 
2006). The implications of the potential consequences of the orientation 
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of individual research become clear when we consider the fact that García 
and Spencer went as far as to organize a collection on martial arts in which 
all of the contributions were required to be organized by Loïc Wacquant’s 
(re)formulation of Bourdieu’s conceptualization of ‘habitus’ (García and 
Spencer 2013). Such a project has been clearly designed to push the ap-
proach of Wacquant’s ‘carnal sociology’, and with it, therefore, a certain 
kind of sociological materialist phenomenology. This is not necessarily a 
‘bad thing’. But it is crucially important to be alert to the stakes and con-
sequences of methodological or disciplinary choices, and the effects they 
have on determining what may become regarded as proper and good and, 
reciprocally, improper and bad.
Other than in the terms of work in extant disciplines, the birth of martial 
arts studies as a subject area or field was perhaps announced most clearly 
in the editors’ introduction to a 2011 collection, Martial Arts as Embodied 
Knowledge: Asian Traditions in a Transnational World. In their editorial 
introduction, Douglas Farrer and John Whalen-Bridge put it like this: ‘The 
outlines of a newly emerging field—martial arts studies—appear in the es-
says collected here’ (Farrer and Whalen-Bridge 2011a: 1). Thereupon, they 
offer a reflection on the problems and possibilities of one possible type of 
martial arts studies—namely, that which would be organized by a focus on 
embodiment (hence the book’s title). As they propose, at the outset, some 
scholars may eye such a project with suspicion: ‘the subject of martial 
arts studies may cause some readers to pause’ (Farrer and Whalen-Bridge 
2011a: 2). To their mind this is because the very proposition of studying 
martial arts within and even as a field ‘invokes a series of disturbing dialec-
tical linkages’, or associations, ‘between philosophy, religion and violence, 
self-defense and aggression, Buddhism and brutality’ (2). In other words, 
many academics, inculcated with certain sorts of cultural value combined 
with what one can only assume to be media stereotypes about martial arts 
philosophy and violence, such as those furnished by many films and televi-
sion programmes since the 1970s, will be ill inclined to take seriously the 
proposition that martial arts could be a serious field of study.
To this we might add that, along with the likelihood of a suspicion 
about the validity of ‘martial arts studies’ arising because of the effect and 
influence of mediated ‘kung fu connotations’, suspicion and resistance is 
likely to be compounded by a rather older ‘Western’ prejudice: namely, a 
tradition of prejudice against the body itself in Western theology and phi-
losophy (Gilbert and Pearson 1999). A Western prejudice against the body 
has often been discussed and diagnosed in academic circles, at least since 
Max Weber in the 1930s (Weber 2002). It arises arguably as a consequence 
of Christianity’s fear of sins of the flesh. This yielded a general distrust of 
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the body per se (Gilbert and Pearson 1999; Wile 2014). Moreover, Jacques 
Derrida’s influential approach to questions of the values and orientations 
of ‘the West’ strongly suggests that the exclusion or subordination of ‘the 
body’ in Western scholarship is the flipside of the overwhelming Western 
philosophical and theological tendency to privilege matters of the mind and 
the word—what Derrida called the West’s ‘logocentricity’ (Derrida 1976).
Thus, Farrer and Whalen-Bridge propose: ‘In Western academe, pre-
cisely because martial arts seem like an awkward pretender to “knowl-
edge”, the problems associated with embodied knowledge and scholarly 
resistance to it are apparent’. Chief among these, they suggest, is that ‘the 
growth of martial arts studies has almost certainly been stunted by one of 
the paradoxes of postcolonialism’. This ‘paradox’ involves the problem 
of difference and legitimation—a problem that may be explained as fol-
lows: established approaches to knowledge are sceptical of and resistant 
to different approaches to knowledge (Lyotard 1984, 1988). Accordingly, 
established forms of knowledge cannot easily countenance ‘different 
knowledges’, and cannot easily deal with propositions relating to different 
scholarly knowledges of knowledge, different academic discourses about 
it, different academic understandings of understanding, and so on (Bow-
man 2007a). Established approaches and established bodies of knowledge 
are what they are because they conform to more or less agreed processes of 
verification, validation, and legitimation. Anything that falls outside of es-
tablished processes of verification and legitimation cannot but be regarded 
as invalid and illegitimate. Thus, ‘different knowledges’, ‘alternative 
knowledges’, and so forth, in all realms, are always and already suspect. 
Such are the problems of difference.
However, rather than championing difference and different approaches 
as being necessarily virtuous, Farrer and Whalen-Bridge propose that what 
might be regarded as yet another version of the ‘legitimation crisis in 
knowledge’ (Lyotard 1984) is not helped when ‘the conceptual apparatus 
of embodied thinking, in its reflexive effort to liberate the body from its 
role as mind’s subordinate other, too often goes too far in the direction 
of what Spivak has called “strategic essentialism”’ (Farrer and Whalen-
Bridge 2011a: 2). With this, what is introduced is the idea that there is—
paradoxically, and ironically—a risk of essentialism entering into studies 
that seek to champion the complexity of ‘the body’. Essentialism here can 
take the form of hypostatizing and reifying ‘the body’—as if ‘the body’ 
were one fixed and unified knowable thing.
Of course, studies of the body take many forms and have a range of 
traditions, including studies of body technologies (Foucault 1977), tech-
niques of the body (Mauss 1992), bodies’ propensities and capacities, and 
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so on. Thinkers like Foucault (1977), Bourdieu (1977), Mauss (1992), and 
Csordas (1994), as well as Butler (1990), have inspired a great deal of 
scholarship in their wake. Nevertheless, it is important to heed Farrer and 
Whalen-Bridge’s warning that essentialism might even enter into fields as 
complex and nuanced as studies of body-knowledge. But, it is clearly im-
portant to be aware that essentialism is something that is constantly threat-
ening to return, to plague thinking and skew and bias it in what Derrida 
would call ‘metaphysical’ (uncritical, unthinking, habitual, or reflex) ways.
Essentialism has been the primary target in many ethically and po-
litically inflected kinds of cultural and postcolonial studies for several 
decades. Such studies have long singled out and attacked the circulation of 
essentialisms (generalizations, stereotypes, etc.) about race, gender, class, 
and so on (Hall et al. 1980; Laclau and Mouffe 1985). The problematics 
and vicissitudes of essentialism are particularly keenly felt in postcolo-
nial contexts, in which—for example—the establishment of postcolonial 
national identities does often seem to require at best ‘strategic’, at worst 
‘reflex’, essentialism about ‘us’ versus ‘them’ (Fanon 1968). This is why 
Farrer and Whalen-Bridge seek to alert any nascent martial arts studies 
to beware of essentialist thinking in developing its concepts, orientations, 
and elaborations.
One problem, however, is that essentialism may already have entered—
in the form of any attempt to specify the object of study itself. For instance, 
just think of terms—or potential topics, objects, and foci—such as karate, 
kung fu, capoeira, escrima, silat, and so on. Once we so name them, argu-
ably the door has already been opened, and essentialism has already been 
invited in. This is because the types of formulation that naming invites tend 
all too easily to imply a fixed and frozen object of study, one fixed in time, 
place, and often nation and ethnicity. The invitation to essentialism is made 
as soon as one constructs any statement of the form ‘x is (essentially) y’—
such as, say, ‘karate is . . .’, ‘kung fu is . . .’, ‘silat is . . .’. In other words, 
‘essentialisms’ can and do enter and abound, through conceptual confla-
tions and displacements that can emerge simply by attempting to specify 
and define an object. Karate is essentialized as Japanese, kung fu as Chi-
nese, silat as Indonesian, and so on. Geographical/nationalistic associations 
threaten to overwhelm or overpower our thinking. We may very easily and 
acceptingly think of this or that style of martial art according to simplifica-
tions about place, nation, and ethnicity. As Farrer and Whalen-Bridge note,
Martial arts, meaning the things done to make the study of fighting appear 
refined enough to survive elite social prohibitions, has never been exclusively 
an Asian matter, but martial arts discourse, meaning the expectations that 
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help order the texts and images of martial bodily training and its entourage of 
cultural side effects, remains predominantly projected onto the Asian body. In 
Western representation martial arts are powerfully associated with specifically 
Asian traditions and practices. The association of particular physical skills 
with particular kinds of socialization gathers even more complexity when we 
figure in the role of Orientalist fantasy. (Farrer and Whalen-Bridge 2011a: 2)
These are some of what Farrer and Whalen-Bridge call the ‘built-in con-
ceptual problems’ of martial arts studies (3). Accordingly, they contend, 
whichever way it is approached, the object ‘martial arts’ constitutes ‘a 
rapidly changing, ambiguous, contradictory, and paradoxical quarry’ (3). 
It will be defined, related to, and treated in contingent and conventional 
ways, all of which will reciprocally help to determine what is ‘discovered’ 
or ‘learned’. For instance, Farrer and Whalen-Bridge suggest that some 
studies have used arguments about Asian martial arts to try to show that 
there are discourses other than orientalism available to Westerners when 
thinking about Asia. However, although such arguments may be motivated 
by admirable desires to reduce generalizations, simplifications, and stereo-
types about Asia, they may still unwittingly feed into them. They observe:
The term ‘martial arts’ signifies ‘Eastern’ and can be accessed to champion, as 
a counterdiscourse to effeminizing Orientalist clichés, the contemporary para-
digmatic image of the Asian-yet-masculine martial arts icon (think of Bruce 
Lee). To the degree that this reactionary response is highly predictable, so 
does the cumulative effect of Asian martial arts discourse serve, in spite of its 
advocates’ best intentions, to reify and falsely unify the notion of a centered, 
stable, objective Asian culture. (Farrer and Whalen-Bridge 2011a: 2)
With such arguments, Farrer and Whalen-Bridge begin to set out some 
of the problematics that the emergent field of martial arts studies must in-
evitably encounter, navigate, and negotiate: entrenched prejudices against 
different registers of ‘knowledge’ (or, as I will argue, ‘orders of dis-
course’); the status of the practices involved; problems of conceptualizing, 
articulating, and expressing nonverbal and nonlogocentric knowledges; 
the problems of condensation, conflation, and displacement around even 
such foundational and definitional a term as ‘martial arts’ itself; and so on. 
Any serious approach to martial arts as a complex processual field requires 
that such matters be noticed and tackled. This is why Farrer and Whalen-
Bridge argue that martial arts studies must be organized by a sensitive, 
self-reflexive ethos and be both theoretically and methodologically literate:
The concept of martial arts studies that we propose de-essentializes the ‘how 
to’ approach in favor of a more theoretically informed strategy grounded in 
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serious contemporary scholarship that questions the practice of martial arts 
in their social, cultural, aesthetic, ideological, and transnational embodiment. 
(Farrer and Whalen-Bridge 2011a: 8)
They go on to give a list of (so to speak) ‘approved’ approaches to 
martial arts studies, as they envisage it—namely, a selection of works or-
ganized by challenging questions and problematics:
Cutting-edge work in what we are calling martial arts studies investigates 
discourses of power, body, self, and identity (Zarrilli 1998); gender, sexuality, 
health, colonialism, and nationalism (Alter 1992, 2000; Schmieg 2005); com-
bat, ritual, and performance (Jones 2002); violence and the emotions (Rashid 
1990); cults, war magic, and warrior religion (Elliot 1998; Farrer 2009; Shahar 
2008). (Farrer and Whalen-Bridge 2011a: 9)
However, to some, this explicit advocation of what are arguably ulti-
mately ‘theoretical’ approaches to martial arts studies may be received as 
disappointing, or even disturbing. This is because one typical complaint 
against ‘theoretical’ studies is that the object of study itself is somehow 
lost or transgressed and replaced with a soup of impenetrable jargon. It is 
often said that in ‘cultural theory’–type approaches to any topic, any real 
concern with the real object of study is subordinated to concerns that are 
‘merely academic’. However, as will be discussed further in due course, it 
is possible to argue and to show (via a range of different sorts of evidence) 
that this always happens anyway—that no matter what style of scholarship 
one adopts, the object of study is transformed into something else.
Still, one might ask, are there certain sorts of approaches to martial arts 
studies that might not transform ‘martial arts’ into something other than 
what they ‘really’ are? I will argue that the answer to this question is no, 
and that no matter how ‘true’ one strives to be to ‘the thing itself’, any 
study always involves, in a sense, transgressing it and reconfiguring it. 
After making this argument, I will explore the reciprocal obverse question: 
If transformation is inevitable, even in the most basic and ‘no frills’ ap-
proaches to the subject(s), then what sorts of approaches might martial arts 
studies embrace in order to ‘reveal’ martial arts ‘otherwise’? 
Lost in transLation?  
thE suBjECt anD oBjECt of stuDy
To assess the originality, significance, difference, uniqueness, specific at-
tributes, and potential impact of a new field called ‘martial arts studies’, 
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it is important to bear in mind two fundamental but easily overlooked di-
mensions to any study of any thing; namely, the complex but fundamental 
relationship between subjects and objects. Here, the term ‘subject’ refers to 
the ‘academic subject’, the ‘academic field’, and its associated conceptual, 
terminological, and methodological approaches to ‘objects’. Accordingly, 
‘object’ refers simply to ‘the thing studied’. Academic subjects study ob-
jects. This is the first point to note. However, the second point to note is 
this: different academic subjects conceive of, construe, and construct ob-
jects differently. Even objects that have the same name will be understood 
differently—and will therefore effectively be different things—within the 
conceptual universes of different subjects. To illustrate, just imagine the 
different conceptualizations and treatments of something like ‘love’ within 
different subjects, from literature to psychology to history to sociology, 
chemistry, biology, theology, anthropology, business studies, philosophy, 
and so on. Any of these subjects could take love as an object of study, 
but the conceptualization and construction of the object (what each thinks 
the object ‘is’ and ‘does’, plus how it is thought to appear, exist, operate, 
function, with what significance, consequences, relations, and so on) will 
be very different in each disciplinary context. The key point to note is that 
a strange alchemy occurs in the combining of any object (any thing or 
practice that exists or seems to exist in the world) with any way of studying 
it (any style of approach). By ‘alchemy’ I mean this: that in the meeting 
of an object and a subject, the object always becomes something else. In 
other words, the object always becomes what John Mowitt has termed 
a ‘disciplinary object’ (Mowitt 1992). A disciplinary object is an object 
produced by a discipline. It is ‘produced’ by being conceptualized, looked 
at, discussed, and written about in certain ways (and not others); by being 
defined, delimited, and demarcated in certain ways (and not others); by 
being analysed in certain ways (and not others); by being thought through, 
associated with, or placed in relation to certain ideas (and not others); and 
by being associated with certain contexts, institutions, locations, traditions, 
and groups (and not others).
When it comes to approaching martial arts, Stanley Henning’s ground-
breaking essay ‘Academia Encounters the Chinese Martial Arts’ (Hen-
ning 1999a) offers example after example that can ultimately be taken to 
illustrate the significance and effects of this alchemy—or, that is, ‘what 
happens’ when a subject ‘takes’ an object. This reading of his essay is 
possible even though Henning himself is motivated merely by the desire to 
establish truth in the realm of historical knowledge about Chinese martial 
arts. He is not at all invested in ‘theory’. Rather, he wants both to deepen 
and to foreground the importance of Chinese martial arts, not least because 
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he contends that all the evidence suggests that martial arts are as ancient 
as—and coeval with—Chinese culture and civilization itself, having been 
intertwined with its development for millennia. Accordingly, for scholars 
to ignore, overlook, marginalize, or misconstrue Chinese martial arts will 
matter and will have consequences for the establishment of any historical 
knowledge of China. In other words, in Henning’s view, misunderstanding 
the place of martial arts within Chinese history is not merely to misunder-
stand Chinese martial arts; it will also help to (dis)orientate (mis)under-
standings of Chinese history per se.
This is why Henning himself is chiefly concerned to set the historical 
record straight. He does so primarily by seeking to point out and correct 
certain literal and metaphorical mistranslations because he believes these 
to have led scholars to make incorrect arguments and to draw incorrect 
conclusions on a wide range of matters. Thus, Henning’s essay (like many 
of his writings) is full of discussions carried out according to the follow-
ing basic structure: First he points to a modern (usually Western) scholar’s 
argument about Chinese martial arts—or even to something that the scholar 
does not recognize as being a matter of martial arts. Then he turns both to 
original Chinese texts and to the relevant translation (or the other sorts of 
source that the scholar is either directly or indirectly drawing on). Most 
commonly, Henning traces arguments about Chinese martial arts back to 
one of the editions of Joseph Needham’s multivolume study Science and 
Civilisation in China (Needham and Wang 1954, 1956, 1959; Needham, 
Wang, and Lu 1971; Needham and Tsien 1985; Needham, Sivin, and Lu 
2000; Needham, Harbsmeier, and Robinson 1998; Needham, Robinson, 
and Huang 2004). Thereupon, he isolates a mistranslation or historical 
misunderstanding (or both), one that has skewed subsequent thinking. Then 
he proposes a different translation, one that would lead to a very different 
interpretation, not just of the martial arts themselves, but also of the sur-
rounding cultural, social, ideological, and political contexts that they both 
inform and are informed by.
This form of ‘correction’ is Henning’s primary work. It is self-evidently a 
very important endeavour. However, I am focusing on it here not because 
I want to engage with the matter of what is right and what is wrong on 
this or that point of interpretation, but rather for two different sorts of 
reason. The first is to point out that Henning’s acts of correction (and also 
what he elsewhere calls ‘demystification’ (Henning 1995, 1999a, 1999b)) 
clearly illustrate some of the ways in which academic disciplinary objects 
and ‘knowledge’ can differ from the real object in the real world. Hen-
ning shows time and again how scholars have misread, misinterpreted, 
misconstrued, and misrepresented things—and moreover that they have 
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done so because their reading position or their viewpoint is such that 
they are led to interpret things in one sort of a way (and not another). 
As he contends repeatedly, some scholars have failed even to recognize 
the presence of discussions of martial arts in Chinese texts and contexts, 
while still others have been led to ignore or downplay salient details in 
their discussion and hence to misconstrue not only martial arts but (there-
fore) also the wider social and cultural context. Consider the following 
passage, for example:
Had Joseph Needham and his associates heeded Jin Bang’s advice and care-
fully read Ge Hong’s autobiographical sketch (wherein he admits that he 
studied several martial arts, including boxing, but does not count them among 
his Taoist pursuits), rather than depend so heavily on a single secondary 
source, a 1906 Adversaria Sinica article by Herbert A. Giles titled ‘The Home 
of Jiujitsu’, one cannot help but feel that they would not have arrived at the 
conclusion in Science and Civilisation in China that Chinese boxing ‘probably 
originated as a department of Taoist physical exercises’. On the other hand, 
it appears that Needham may have been attempting to force Chinese boxing 
into a preconceived notion of the role of Taoism in Chinese culture. (Henning 
1999a: 320)
With this and many other equivalent examples, Henning illustrates what 
we might regard as some of the micrological workings of what Edward 
Said calls ‘orientalism’ (Said 1995). For, as we see in this example, Hen-
ning proposes an ‘and/or’ situation in which scholars have either blindly 
followed an already ‘biased’ or skewed text (so as to interpret all Chinese 
martial arts as being associated with Taoism) and/or operated according 
to their own conscious or unconscious convictions or assumptions that all 
Chinese martial arts must be in some sense associated with Taoism. This 
can be called ‘orientalism’ insofar as it conforms to Said’s contention that 
Western scholars have long been influenced by often tacit preconceptions, 
stereotypes, simplifications, and generalizations about immensely—almost 
unimaginably—complex geopolitical assemblages (such as the infinitely 
complex multiplicity that is reduced to the word ‘China’). Such influences 
overwhelmingly lead them to read and interpret things not on the basis of 
material evidence but rather according to the lenses and optics provided by 
a limited and limiting set of preconceptions, stereotypes, simplifications, 
and generalizations (about, say, ‘China’).
Of course, Henning also knows that even so-called orientalism can be 
a two-way street. For instance, elsewhere he considers the fact that even 
Chinese martial artists in China will often hold beliefs about martial arts 
histories, lineages, and doctrines that would be scoffed at and denounced 
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as orientalist were they uttered by a Westerner. (We may think of beliefs 
in myths about unbroken martial lineages stretching back to Bodhidharma 
or Zhang Sanfeng, for instance.) Indeed, self-orientalization might be 
regarded as something close to a quasi-official policy of Chinese state 
bureaux of film and tourism, focusing as they do on permeating what has 
been called the ‘soft power’ of constructing and exporting an exotic and 
appealing ‘public image’ of China around the world (Eperjesi 2004), one 
which also and at the same time is used to construct and reinforce a sense 
of national identity and collective belonging within China itself (Anderson 
1991). Consequently, Henning is vociferously against any kind of ‘politi-
cally correct’ or ‘culturally sensitive’ treatment of subject matter by aca-
demics. He writes:
There is a rising trend in the ‘Occidental’ world of ‘Oriental’ martial arts—the 
number of ‘scholars’ who, in spite of making pretences to upholding ‘aca-
demic standards’, are displaying no small amount of intellectual compromise 
by acting as apologists for the myths surrounding the Chinese martial arts. 
They do this in a manner which gives one the impression that they somehow 
feel that to expose these myths is an irreverent act, harming the sensitivities 
of the Chinese people and insulting to pseudo-intellectual Occidentals seek-
ing a New Age refuge in Oriental mysticism or, worse yet, causing them to 
lose interest in a subject about which these ‘scholars’ delight in composing 
involved, ambiguous treatises. (Henning 1995)
Henning’s strident and principled insistence of the need for intimate 
and intricate analysis and academic rigour is admirable. However, the 
second main reason for focusing on Henning’s work here is to draw 
another, more slippery set of problems into focus. The first of these 
problems is this: where Henning might see a spectrum of interpretation 
ranging from totally correct to totally false, a poststructuralist position 
would propose that this ‘traditional’ perspective (which sees truth on the 
one hand and error on the other, ‘and never the twain shall meet’) ought 
to be replaced by a perspective which sees instead a discursive continuum 
of interpretation (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Weber 1987). In other words, 
not a perspective which sees truth versus falsity or error, but which sees 
interpretation versus interpretation, in a sea of interpretation, on the basis 
of the observation that all ‘knowledge’ is conditional and provisional 
and ultimately based on a limited, contingent, positioned viewpoint in-
formed by partial (limited and incomplete) information. This might be 
supplemented further, with the premise that no ‘information’ is neutral or 
simply ‘discovered’; rather information is something that is always and 
already ‘produced’ by both theory and interpretation and according to a 
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method (Barry 2001). In other words, much, if not all of the ‘informa-
tion’ and ‘evidence’ upon which any interpretation is to be based must 
also be regarded as related to, produced by, and illustrative of yet another 
interpretation.
This kind of argument has often been called ‘relativist’ and ‘postmod-
ernist’ and has been caricatured as being one in which there is a spurious 
belief that ‘nothing is true’, or that ‘everything is relative’, or that ‘there 
is no reality’, and so on. However, while there may well have been theo-
rists, artists, philosophers, writers, and academics to have apparently made 
such contentions, the caricature is really only that—a caricature. For, in 
fact, poststructuralist epistemologies and ontologies tend primarily to be 
organized by an attentive awareness of the inescapable facts and acts of 
processes of reading and interpretation in order to construct arguments 
and to make claims about reality. In other words, it is not that there is no 
reality; it is rather that knowledge of reality is endlessly contestable and 
contested—up for grabs, open to interpretation, indeed endlessly calling for 
interpretation. There is no single uncontested way to interpret. There is no 
one single repository of evidence. All sorts of evidence can be used to sup-
port all sorts of processes of interpretation, argumentation, and verification. 
And each can be contested or put into question by others.
Put differently, Henning’s ‘corrections’ should rather be viewed as re-
interpretations of interpretations. And although Henning firmly believes 
that his works’ interventions are purely and simply organized by the aim 
of correcting errors, it seems more circumspect to regard his intervention 
as illustrating something very important about the significance and effects 
of any and all interpretation. Namely: academic interpretations feed both 
from and back into wider cultural discourses (Gramsci 1971; Althusser 
1977; Bowman 2008a).
thE truth of DisCoursE
According to Henning, in the passage quoted above, academic interpre-
tations should not be based on cultural discourses, whether ‘common 
knowledge’, ‘common sense’, or ‘reasonable assumptions’. Nor should 
scho lar ship pander to other types of cultural discourse, such as ‘politically 
correct’ ideas of ‘heritage’ or ‘tradition’, and so on. Rather, scholarly work 
on martial arts should be based on an intimate knowledge, made up of both 
close textual familiarity and broad and deep historical knowledge, plus, 
where necessary (as Henning’s work demonstrates amply), advanced lin-
guistic and translation skills. As we have already seen, Henning’s linguistic 
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and historical knowledge constitutes his primary toolkit. He retranslates 
mistranslations according to his particularly lucid awareness of martial arts 
in Chinese culture and society, in order to reconfigure our understanding. In 
other words, precision and correctness in translation is one of his primary 
‘tools’ or ‘weapons’.
Even so, there is no escaping the fact that, in Farrer and Whalen-Bridge’s 
words, ‘martial arts historiography poses formidable challenges’ (Farrer 
and Whalen-Bridge 2011a: 8). Problems in understanding and in establish-
ing ‘legitimate’ interpretations cannot simply be resolved by throwing ever 
more linguistic and historical knowledge at the situation. Adding ever more 
‘knowledge’ of a ‘context’ can in many situations work to exacerbate the 
possibility of coming up with a univocal or unequivocal interpretation. To 
start and end from such a viewpoint, without tackling epistemological prob-
lems head on is to hold not only a very traditional, but also an unnecessarily 
limited and unnecessarily limiting, view both of academic practice and of 
what ‘knowledge’ and ‘scholarship’ are. This is not to say that scholarship 
cannot be concerned with the establishment of facts and figures, names 
and dates, valid and invalid claims about connections and causalities, and 
so forth, in the quest for more robust interpretations. It is rather to suggest 
that, as important as such projects are, if they proceed in ignorance of or 
indifference to the hermeneutic and epistemological problems raised in 
such realms as literary theory, cultural theory, translation theory, and so on, 
then they are in more than one sense ‘living in the past’. Stated differently, 
one might say that the sort of orientation to martial arts studies that Hen-
ning’s project exemplifies is a very traditional orientation, in its adherence 
not only to clear dichotomies and absolute value differences between truth 
and falsity but also—more radically put—to the very idea that there is one 
single truth.
The proposition that there is one single truth implies a belief in a social 
whole that is unified in its viewpoint and in its relations to, within, across, 
and throughout itself. However, wherever there is difference (of position, 
perspective, viewpoint, status, background, education, and so on), there 
will already be a conflict of interpretations. This means that even within 
a given historical moment—even ‘at the time’—there will be dispute and 
dissensus about what the situation is and what its meaning may be (Laclau 
and Mouffe 1985; Bowman 2007a). Needless to say, the problems of es-
tablishing ‘the’ reality and ‘the’ interpretation cannot but be compounded 
or may even be constitutively impossible when it comes to historical and 
cross-cultural interpretations. For these change: the meaning and status of 
events changes, depending more on the context of each one’s assessment 
than on ‘new facts’ about it.
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Some thinkers have made large epistemological claims about the 
‘untranslatability’ of one epoch to another, and one culture to another 
(Heidegger 1971). In a subtle engagement with this problematic, Walter 
Benjamin proposed that one always translates historical texts in terms of 
current concerns, the outlooks of the current time and place, and current 
ways of thinking (Benjamin 1999). This implies that our interpretive ‘ac-
cess’ to other times and places is in a sense cut off, simply because we 
are from here and not there. Michel Foucault more than once strongly 
suggested that different historical epochs were, equally, cut off from each 
other by their very difference from (or alien-ness to) each other (Foucault 
1970). And Martin Heidegger contended that Eastern and Western world-
views were ‘essentially’ alien and untranslatable to each other—although 
he worried that the spread of ‘Western’ technologies like film and media 
was reducing the difference, albeit not by allowing cross-cultural commu-
nication but rather by eradicating the true ‘East Asian lifeworld’ altogether 
and replacing it with a technologized ‘Western’ lifeworld (Heidegger 1971; 
Sandford 2003).
However hyperbolic and problematic such positions may seem when 
stated so starkly, some evidence for the validity of their essential thrust 
may be proposed when one considers the regular ‘need’ for new transla-
tions of historical texts, whether they be the Bible, the Tao Te Ching (Dao 
dejing), the I-Ching (Yijing), or whatever. Such works are retranslated for 
any number of reasons, but most reasons given will refer to the fact that as 
time marches on, translations of such texts come to seem dated, distant, and 
increasingly impenetrable.
To bring this back to martial arts studies: there are lessons to be drawn 
from the inevitability of difference, change, and transformation. One is 
that martial arts studies has no absolutely clear referent and no necessary 
preprogrammed or preordained direction or mode of elaboration. What it 
will become will be determined by the way it is invented. It will always be 
a kind of academic writing first of all and, as such, will always differ from 
and be likely to disappoint or attract the disapproval of practitioners and 
fans of this or that martial art. Indeed, it is just as likely to elicit the same 
reactions from people involved in more traditional academic disciplines. 
It will never simply be the ‘direct’ study of this or that martial art. Every 
study will be guided and structured by a supplementary set of concerns. 
This is because every study of every subject is always initiated, orientated, 
and organized by a particular set of questions.
Farrer and Whalen-Bridge point to existing works of martial arts studies 
and characterize them in terms of their guiding questions and organizing 
problematics—problematics of ‘power, body, self, and identity’; those of 
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‘gender, sexuality, health, colonialism, and nationalism’; ‘combat, ritual, 
and performance’; ‘violence and the emotions’; and those of ‘cults, war 
magic, and warrior religion’ (Farrer and Whalen-Bridge 2011a: 9). To this 
list we might want to add studies of martial arts and/as experience (Spen-
cer 2011; Downey 2005), as ethnic political cultural dynamic (Kato 2007; 
Brown 1997), as cinematically disseminated engine of cultural transfor-
mation (Bowman 2010b, 2013a), as forces and loci of cultural translation 
(Bowman 2010a), and so on and so forth. None of these studies and none 
of their significance rely on proving or disproving truth and falsity. All are 
constituted by the posing of different questions, the shining of different 
lights and looking through different lenses at what these different acts of 
enquiry and exploration themselves produce as the object of martial arts 
studies. There are many ways to do this, then, and each way of proceed-
ing is likely to have disciplinary consequences. In the following, we will 
discuss just some of these.
DisCipLinary DEMarCations anD DECisions
A recent review article, ‘Exploring Embodiment through Martial Arts and 
Combat Sports: A Review of Empirical Research’ (Channon and Jennings 
2014), gives an overview of work published in the field of what the authors 
configure as ‘martial arts and combat sports’ (MACS). The article purports 
to give a review of the breadth of research in the field(s), but it also claims 
that the authors cannot—and do not intend to—attempt to review every-
thing published in the realms of academic work on martial arts in English. 
As they note, there is no distinct database for logging or retrieving research 
in martial arts and combat sports research, and works in the field of martial 
arts and combat studies are not necessarily telegraphically signposted as 
being such, so they had to rely on a range of search methods, which es-
sentially boil down to a double-pronged methodology of doing their best 
and asking around.
At the same time as embracing incompleteness by acknowledging that 
they cannot be expected to find everything relevant, the authors also make 
two further gestures. These are represented as attempts to delineate and 
demarcate the field, but they also amount to what I will characterize as 
exclusionary gestures. The first gesture acknowledges their deliberate de-
cision regarding what to exclude, and why. Thus, they mention a range of 
fields they have not ventured into at all. The second gesture is hierarchiz-
ing: they say they focus only on texts that they deem to be most important 
or significant. In their words:
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Our framework is not without limitations; the boundaries between these topi-
cal themes are in fact blurred in the reality of the social practice of MACS, 
while several other categories might have been instructive and may have seen 
the inclusion of other notable studies. Nevertheless, we focused on works 
which we felt were the most significant and instructive to issues pertaining to 
practitioners’ embodiment, a key topic within the sociology of sport and cog-
nate disciplines. For example, we omitted a large body of writing on MACS 
films, typically composed by media scholars (with the majority of studies ana-
lysing the representation rather than the action and experience of the body), 
and did not account for a large number of psychological studies of MACS. 
Finally, we have focused on works available in English, which limits the 
scope of our analysis, thereby inviting future contributions of this type from 
multi-lingual researchers around the world. (Channon and Jennings 2014: 15)
They also draw some inclusionary/exclusionary lines that appear to 
be somewhat less immediately intelligible. That is to say, they go on to 
draw distinctions that are not obvious distinctions between disciplines. 
For instance, on the one hand, it may be reasonable to note that empirical 
sociological work on embodiment might clearly and uncontroversially be 
differentiated from film studies work on embodiment. On the other hand, 
however, the authors also make certain far less clear distinctions between 
different kinds of sociological/empirical work:
From the outset, it must be clearly stated that this review is concerned with 
work on embodiment, which we define as research centred on the living, mov-
ing and feeling social experiences of human beings. This approach is different 
to the sociology of the body, for instance, which primarily sets out to explore 
and test social theory as applied to the body. (Channon and Jennings 2014: 3)
Now, to be clear: such directness about selection criteria is all part of 
good academic form, and it registers an important awareness of disciplinary 
orientation as being constitutive of what is seen and done. However, there 
are nonetheless some significant problems involved in such taxonomical 
labours as these. These problems include, but are not limited to, those 
caused by the authors’ decision effectively to elevate a kind of disciplinary 
myopia to the status of a disciplinary virtue. The term ‘disciplinary myopia’ 
may seem harsh and excessive—and I am deliberately being provocative or 
hyperbolical here. But I am putting it in stark terms for important reasons. 
What I mean by this is clarified by Ben Judkins, who also zoned in on 
what I am characterizing as the principled disciplinary myopia at work in 
Channon and Jennings’s article. Judkins writes, in response to the authors’ 
list of supposedly under-researched areas that are supposedly lacking and 
calling out for further work,
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My first reaction was to note that many of the items that the authors wished to 
see discussed had been addressed (sometimes quite well) in the various chap-
ters of Farrer and Whalen-Bridge’s 2011 volume Martial Arts as Embodied 
Knowledge (Farrer and Whalen-Bridge 2011b). Given that this is a recent uni-
versity press volume dedicated exclusively to [the] authors’ topic of interest, 
one would have expected it to play an important role in this review. It did not. 
Aside from a single cursory mention in their introduction, neither this volume 
nor the studies offered by its authors are ever mentioned.
Channon and Jennings are admirably up front about what they are exclud-
ing and why. This is actually somewhat refreshing as not all literature reviews 
are. Specifically, they state that they have sought to restrict their work to 
empirical studies of the actual embodied experiences of martial artists and as 
a result they decided to exclude the more ‘interpretive’ and ‘critical’ contribu-
tions of cultural theorists and media scholars.
The crux of the issue is that Farrer and Whalen-Bridge (who have done as 
much old-school ethnographic research as anyone else in field) argue that this 
division is artificial and hard to maintain. In fact, their work was a conscious 
attempt to bridge this divide. So in excluding these arguments Channon and 
Jennings were not simply following the obvious and unquestioned contours of 
the field. They were in effect advancing their own argument about the proper 
shape of the literature and what constitutes research ‘worthy’ of engagement.
In some ways the picture of martial studies that Channon and Jennings 
paint is remarkably interdisciplinary. Ethnographic and sociological studies 
sit comfortably next to discussions of what role martial arts instruction should 
play in the development of grade school physical education curriculum. [But] 
while they have shown themselves willing to reach across disciplinary lines, 
their approach to theory seems a bit more conservative. (Judkins 2014)
To Judkins’s astute assessment, it is important to add some further points 
related to disciplinarity. Channon and Jennings’s approach is, in a sense, 
not simply their own—even if it is indeed ‘not simply following the obvious 
and unquestioned contours of the field’. Rather, their article is their own 
performative interpretation of how to carry out a proper review of proper 
empirical work. (For a discussion of ‘performative elaboration’, see Der-
rida 1994.) Their approach ultimately reflects what might be called their 
disciplinary decision. The relative success or failure of their attempt to live 
up to the disciplinary protocols that they are valuing here is of less inter-
est to me than a reflection on those implicit protocols themselves. On this 
showing, it seems that the disciplinary protocols being valued involve what 
I would propose to call a constitutive drive towards taxonomies. That is, 
they construe ‘the field’ as if it is a physical space, which they want to map, 
so as to put everything in its proper place, ordered, labelled and maybe even 
hierarchized. Reciprocally, they want to exclude anything from one area 
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from intruding into other areas. According to some thinkers, such is the 
orientation of a great deal of social science (Rancière 2004).
Nevertheless, what is evinced in various ways is that the drive to establish 
clear distinctions that I am (provocatively and again deliberately hyperboli-
cally) representing as a drive to taxonomical mapping is met by a kind of 
impossibility. The categories can never be pure and truly separate because 
construing approaches as (if) singular, self-contained, and self-identical is 
an ex post facto attribution. The categories cannot contain the categorized. 
In this article, then, much of what they seek and claim to exclude—because 
that’s not what they are looking at or looking for—is included anyway. This 
actual inclusion of the avowed exclusion occurs for lots of reasons. One 
reason is that the empirical is always both theoretically and rhetorically 
defined. Empirical work is carried out according to theorized parameters 
(exclusions), and methodologies are the performative elaboration of theo-
retical frameworks. Moreover, even empirical work always seeks to be ‘in-
terpretive’ or ‘critical’.2 Passages such as the following are populated with 
works that are not only supplemented by theoretical conceptions but that 
are far from simply empirical in any understanding of the term:
While other research has explored various phenomena linked to the effects 
of culture on the body, such as Kohn’s studies of identity formation and 
corporeal discipline in Aikido practice, perhaps the most prevalent themes in 
this area have concerned the transmission and transformation of the ‘original’ 
cultural meanings of today’s ‘globalized’ MACS, which forms the second 
principal research area on body cultures. Beginning with Back and Kim’s 
largely theoretical discussion of the changing nature of Eastern martial arts 
in the Western (and particularly North American) world during the late 20th 
century, several authors have investigated how such arts, when disembedded 
from their ‘home’ settings, have been appropriated and altered by practitioners 
in different nations. For example, Krug considered the changes in Okinawan 
Karate following its integration into American body culture; Assunção ex-
plored the development of Capoeira from African tribal arts to today’s global, 
cosmopolitan, Brazilian phenomenon; and Ryan explored the hybridization of 
Taijiquan upon its introduction to Britain. (Channon and Jennings 2014: 6)
The key point I want to draw out of all of this here relates to the perfor-
mance of disciplinarity. As Judkins puts it, ‘the basic issue comes down to 
how the authors have defined the scope of the relevant literature, and in a 
more subtle way, what they have implied about the boundaries of the field’. 
Even something as apparently innocuous as a literature review involves ‘an 
either implicit or explicit assessment of what “good work” looks like and 
where exactly the boundaries of the disciplinary conversation [lie]’. This 
is why ‘it is just as important to consider what has been excluded from the 
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conversation as what has been included’ (Judkins 2014). Judkins goes on 
to refute the necessity or even validity of many of the operative distinc-
tions that Channon and Jennings use—or claim to use—to structure their 
review. On the one hand, he deconstructs their taxonomies (revealing their 
reasonable-sounding distinctions to have a strangely impossible status), and 
on the other hand, he points to the significant omissions that their disciplin-
ary gaze produces:
After all, there already seem to be a number of interesting studies on the role 
of the mass media in promoting certain views of gender, violence and ethnic-
ity in the martial arts. And it is not hard to point to studies on the experience 
of the martial arts in multicultural societies. I have reviewed a number of them 
here at Kung Fu Tea. So what exactly is going on here? (Judkins 2014)
There are two main books that Judkins cannot believe Channon and 
Jennings could have omitted. One is Farrer and Whalen-Bridge’s Martial 
Arts As Embodied Knowledge (Farrer and Whalen-Bridge 2011b). The 
other is Adam Frank’s Taijiquan and the Search for the Little Old Chinese 
Man: Understanding Identity through Martial Arts (Frank 2006).3 Turn-
ing our attention to the orientation of these books may help us to answer 
Judkins’s question.
DisCipLinary MovEs
If Channon and Jennings could be said to have made a move that has larger 
ramifications than having merely omitted work worthy of inclusion within 
their literature review, I think that it boils down to a ‘mistake’ of the order 
of a disciplinary decision. To reiterate, in order to be fair to them, they 
make only modest claims for their ambitions, and they acknowledge that 
they could have made different decisions. But it should be clear by now that 
both Judkins and I, at least, believe that they should have moved beyond 
making acknowledgements about limitations and made a move into the 
realm of overcoming some of them by making different disciplinary deci-
sions and taking different steps.
Indeed, it is ironic, from this sense, that Channon and Jennings omit 
Adam Frank’s book Taijiquan and the Search for the Little Old Chinese 
Man: Understanding Identity through Martial Arts (Frank 2006). This is 
not least because Frank begins the book with a reflection on theoretical, 
methodological, and disciplinary choices, one that Channon and Jennings 
could have done worse than to heed, and that are of importance to our dis-
cussion of martial arts studies. Frank writes:
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This book attempts to contribute to the development of phenomenological eth-
nography by focusing on the twilight zone where theory meets methodology, 
taking a kind of quantum approach to culture that considers the contributions 
that Marxism, feminism, postcolonialism, critical race theory, and poststruc-
turalism have made to our attempt to understand who we are as individuals 
versus who we are in social context. At the same time, I make a modest effort 
to move beyond ideology-centered frameworks. The postmodernist moment 
in anthropology began quasi-officially in 1986 with the publication of Writ-
ing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography (Clifford and Marcus 
1986), a book that had the positive effect of demanding that anthropologists 
reflect upon their positionality in the writing of ethnography—in effect, that 
they treat ethnography as literature. This book opened a space for subaltern 
perspectives to move from the fringes to the center and, as Katz and Csordas 
(2003) note, created room for phenomenological ethnography. After Writing 
Culture, ‘culture’ as a given, useful concept for anthropologists ceased to 
exist for a time, and dire predictions arose as to the imminent demise of the 
discipline. Well into the 1990s and early 2000s, this situation had the effect 
of creating a contentious atmosphere in which the various isms competed 
with one another in journals and within departments. It was not merely a fight 
between the old and the new, but also a fight between contending pictures of 
the new. One largely unsatisfactory response to this state of affairs has been 
to pretend that those irritating isms never happened at all and return instead to 
a kind of modified, anachronistic empiricism. (Frank 2006: 14–15)
This reflection on the history of a key disciplinary antagonism indicates 
the kinds of convulsions, reactions, and reformations that can take place in 
disciplinary contexts when paradigm revolutions erupt. Frank continues:
The book is partly an outgrowth of my dissatisfaction with both the narrow-
ness of the isms and the wholesale rejection of them that seems more attached 
to conservative victories in the culture wars than to the search for understand-
ing that is still anthropology’s disciplinary hallmark. Nor was I satisfied with 
unqualified deconstruction, the ‘I have no position’ position, which, I believe, 
has grown out of narrow interpretations of French poststructuralists such as 
Derrida, Deleuze, and Lacan. (15)
Uncritical, absolute, or knee-jerk reflex extremes of position are equally 
to be avoided in the ‘search for understanding’, of whatever kind, suggests 
Frank. Ultimately then, his
response is a modest proposal for reconstitution, an approach that asks us not 
just to acknowledge multiple perspectives but also to apply these perspectives 
at appropriate moments to appropriate situations, then reconstitute them into an 
interpretation of sorts. My hope is that the method of understanding a particular 
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practice in terms of constant shifts between multiple levels of analysis—in this 
case, in terms of the intersubjectivity of body, city, nation-state, imagination, 
and transnation—is applicable beyond the current work. (15)
In this way, Frank proposes methodological sophistication, responsive-
ness, and even a kind of dilatoriness—with focus expanding and contract-
ing, going forward, backward, in and out, depending on the nature of the 
particular question and phenomenon under consideration. Indeed, Frank’s 
methodological frames mirror, mimic, derive from, and replay aspects 
of his object of study itself, taijiquan. Accordingly, Frank deliberately 
chooses to construct a theoretical, analytical, methodological, and con-
ceptual framework out of a ‘thinking through’ of the ‘logic’ of the taiji 
symbol—the yin/yang or taiji tu. As he states, his ‘fundamental proposition 
can be expressed in two words: identity moves’ (Frank 2006: 4). This is 
because, in his view, ‘the interaction of the self with the world might be 
modeled as an ever-changing, yet changeless, process’ (18)—exactly like 
the logic of the taiji tu or yin/yang.
From this subtle taiji-like paradigm, Frank is able to develop a work in 
which ‘martial arts, as conduits for the mutually constitutive construction 
and experience of identity’, are shown to ‘move transnationally through 
people, media, kung fu movies, novels, and martial arts tournaments’, and 
he is able to explore ‘how they function both personally and socially in the 
very different contexts of urban China and the global diaspora of Chinese 
people and public culture’ (Frank 2006: 4).
There is an awful lot more to be said about Frank’s work, and its signifi-
cance for the development of martial arts studies. I return to it repeatedly 
throughout this book. But, at this stage, what I want to emphasize are the 
differences between the approaches of Channon and Jennings, on the one 
hand, and Adam Frank, on the other. These can be taken to illustrate the 
extent to which a disciplinary approach is both a decision and an imposi-
tion, a reflection of a prior order and the constitution of a new one. In what 
follows we will pick up, amplify, and explore the potential ramifications of 
this for martial arts studies as a field.
thEorEtiCaL nECEssity
In light of the foregoing, it seems reasonable to propose that, in order to 
elaborate martial arts studies, theory is necessary. As will be apparent 
by now, the necessity of theory is a central component of my arguments 
about martial arts studies. However, although my argument is that theory is 
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‘necessary’, I want to insist that it is not necessary just for its own sake. In 
fact, like many, I have little patience with theory for theory’s sake. I need 
to know why I am reading it, what work it is doing, and to what ends.
What we call ‘theory’ is itself a movement that arose for a variety of 
reasons. When it is given a capital t, and called ‘Theory’, this term des-
ignates the outcome of a moment in the encounter between the discourses 
of Continental Philosophy and Anglophone Literary Theory (Hall 2002). 
This encounter was ‘useful’, in ways to which I will return below. But my 
contention at this point is merely that theory is necessary for trying to flesh 
out whether, to what extent, how, and why there might be a discrete or 
unique field that might be called ‘martial arts studies’, a field that would be 
different from, for example, the many examples of, say, martial history that 
abound. I hasten to add that I have no problem with the discipline of his-
tory, as such. But, the point is that martial arts studies—if it is anything—is 
not simply the discipline of history. There can be historical studies of many 
things related to martial arts. But are these works martial arts studies? Do 
historical studies define or demarcate the field? To attempt any answer to 
this requires and relies on some kind of reflection on what it is to be an 
academic study. And if we think that to be an academic study of something 
means to be a historical study, then that means that we equate ‘proper’ 
academic work with the discipline of history.
Put differently, although a formulation like ‘what it is to be an academic 
study’ implies that ‘academic study’ is singular, it is not. Academia is plu-
ral. Academic disciplines and fields are different to each other. Disciplines 
are often fundamentally at odds with each other. They each have different 
and discrete systems of values. For instance, history does not necessarily 
speak to or with or cross-fertilize anthropology or psychology or philoso-
phy—and vice versa. Sometimes there are cross-fertilizations, and these 
are to be admired. But to believe that disciplines necessarily speak to each 
other is to idealize. Disciplines are apparatuses or assemblages that are 
actually surprisingly good at ignoring each other and belittling each other’s 
values and efforts. Given the forces of internal cross-referencing, stabiliz-
ing, and self-legitimation, it is very easy for scholars who see themselves 
as working in one field to remain blind to, and to ignore, anyone working 
in what they regard as a different field.
As already mentioned, the production of a new academic discursive 
field will necessarily disappoint stalwarts or zealots of other forms of 
disciplinary propriety. They are likely to be inclined to view any new in-
terdisciplinary effort as ‘improper’ or as a ‘failure’—much as the merging 
and intermingling of martial arts styles offends purists within this or that 
‘proper’ lineage. Reciprocally, disciplinary disappointment can arise from 
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the other direction: for instance, when I read many styles of scholarship, I 
can find them interesting, but I also often feel that they’ve missed some-
thing. For example, when reading history or sociology, I often feel that 
they are missing something that either film, media studies, visual studies, 
or cultural studies might be able to offer. But, by the same token, when I 
read film studies of martial arts films, I often feel that they too are simply 
not moving into the really interesting terrain—which would encompass 
that of the impact of film and media on martial arts practices themselves. 
At such moments, I want film studies to become ethnography or sociology 
. . . which, of course, it won’t. Film scholars are film scholars. Historians 
are historians. Ethnographers are ethnographers. All of these constituencies 
tend to disappoint each other, in a disciplinary sense—just as academic 
work tout court might be expected to tend to disappoint the nonacademic 
practitioner reader.
Martial arts studies, in performatively elaborating itself, has an obliga-
tion to engage with these disciplinary questions. This is not just because 
we are dealing with the emergence of something like a new discipline or 
interdiscipline but also because problems of disciplinarity and institution, 
what is proper and what is improper, are so central to so much martial arts 
discourse itself. The academic, disciplinary concern refers directly back, or 
is mirrored in the practical, disciplinary realm. Look at any example from 
any area of martial arts practice and consider what people discuss there: 
What is the best approach, what is the proper approach, what is the best 
way; are hybrids and cross-training styles ‘proper’; are they improvements 
on or regressions away from the proper?
Peter Lorge’s history of Chinese martial arts confirms this double-
pronged ‘theoretical’ point. Lorge notes that the very first discourse about 
martial ‘styles’ in China was a discourse organized by the question of 
which is best—which is the best approach—and why. Of the very first lists 
and taxonomies of martial styles, Lorge writes:
Qi Jiguang and other authors were not just assembling these lists of styles 
out of mere curiosity; they were attempting to find the most functional skills 
available. Qi complained about the incompleteness of many styles, that they 
were only good in parts and lacked a comprehensive set of techniques. Most 
of the authors were also concerned with what they called ‘Flowery Boxing 
花拳’, ineffective and overly elaborate styles that only looked nice. Indeed, 
one of the central issues of the discussion of boxing styles was effectiveness. 
There was a constant comparison between styles, or anecdotes recounting how 
someone practiced an ineffective or flawed style. These flowery styles had 
lost the foundation of boxing and strayed very far from some presumably sim-
ple and effective original form. Although boxing styles varied widely across 
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China, and indeed the terminology for boxing was similarly varied, there was 
perceived to be a core of effective techniques. Unarmed fighting was not as ef-
fective in combat as armed fighting, and that is perhaps why boxing was listed 
last on the reformulated Ming period list of ‘Eighteen Martial Arts’. From the 
military standpoint, boxing was not a real battlefield skill. For Qi Jiguang and 
Mao Yuanyi, boxing was the beginning skill for martial arts training before 
one took up weapons. It was also useful for developing overall agility with the 
hands and feet. Anyone expecting to fight on the battlefield would have to be 
better trained and properly armed. Boxing was recognized as a developmental 
rather than a functional skill in the army, and Qi dropped it from the later 
edition of his manual. To practice boxing was therefore more about training 
the body and mind, despite the quest for practical boxing skills. The practical 
skills were the genuine or true roots of the art, and thus by definition, more 
effective in developing the body and mind. (Lorge 2012: loc 3506)
This kind of historical point suggests fascinating parallels with the pres-
ent. It suggests equivalences between discourses on ancient Chinese martial 
arts and contemporary discourses about effectiveness and ineffectiveness in 
martial arts. Furthermore it suggests that contemporary concerns with the 
question of the best approach may actually be regarded as originary. More-
over, as demonstrated by my use of Lorge here, I hope it is clear that I am 
not saying martial arts studies cannot be historical. What I would prefer to 
say (again) is that it should not simply be hegemonized by any discipline, 
at least without first theorizing the consequences of this for the kind of 
work that will be produced, and the effects it will have on the orientation. 
As Timothy Bahti once put it:
For all the activity devoted to historical knowledge—by which I mean the 
courses, the examinations, the papers and dissertations and submitted manu-
scripts—there would be the repeated occasion, on each such occasion, for 
these small and simple questions: How? Why? So what? That is, the pres-
ent distribution which, for some century and a half, has favored historical 
knowledge over its philosophic judgement, need not be revamped or done 
away with (which is hardly realistic anyway), so much as used as the fulcrum 
for the corresponding questions of how and why one knows such knowledge, 
questions weakened to muteness but thereby given voice by virtue of their 
very other. My sense of injury within the ‘humanities’ leads me to insist, 
quietly but firmly, that all historical knowledge without an accompanying 
rationale for its constitution and existence is counterintellectual, and ulti-
mately counterrational. My sense of a possible therapy suggests that each bit 
of historical knowledge, each occasion for its articulation and transmission, 
should become the occasion for inquiry into its methodology and teleology. 
Even to acknowledge, and to insist upon the acknowledgement, that history 
has a history, and that the history ‘known’ is not a substantial object but a 
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subjectively constructed cognition, can be critical in this context. Put more 
polemically: no history of literature, no history of art, no history of society, 
without a philosophy of history, a method of historiography, an internal and 
external accounting. (Bahti 1992: 72–73)
There are many possible answers to the question of what our orienta-
tions should be, and why. This is something that those involved in martial 
arts studies must keep talking about. But, again, let me be clear that I am 
not insisting on univocality or consensus. The terrain is multiple, diverse, 
rich, and ripe. But it is crucial to reflect on why academic orientations in a 
sense speak past each other, in order to be able to establish a kind of disci-
plinary self-awareness that might enable exchanges and communications. 
Indeed, this is another way in which ‘Theory’ is helpful. The lingua franca 
of ‘Theory’ which could be said to hegemonize a lot of disciplinary spaces 
is valuable if only for this reason: that it enables people working in differ-
ent worlds to articulate their connections and their differences. And this is 
the first stage of any ‘communication’, crucial to any collective effort to 
produce a new space of and for critical, self-reflexive, intellectual martial 
arts discourse.
What KinD of thEory?
There is a very great range of things that can be grouped into the general 
designation ‘theory’. What kinds of approach seem pertinent—or maybe 
even central—to martial arts studies? The term ‘theory’ is often used as 
a synonym of ‘poststructuralism’, which was one of the main branches of 
theory and philosophy that came to dominate arts, humanities, and social 
sciences approaches to most—if not all—subjects increasingly from the 
1970s to the 1990s, and still makes its presence felt today. In its most literal 
sense ‘post-structuralism’ means ‘after structuralism’. However, the term 
also strongly implies some kind of connection with or debt to structuralism. 
Accordingly, some scholars draw a distinction between ‘post-structuralism’ 
(with a hyphen) and ‘poststructuralism’ (with no hyphen). The former can 
be taken to mean anything ‘after’ or ‘in the wake of structuralism’. On the 
other hand, the unhyphenated term ‘poststructuralism’ is often used to refer 
to a distinct body of work with distinct sorts of shared premises, hypoth-
eses, arguments, procedures, and even writing styles.
A similar use has been made of the hyphen to distinguish between certain 
other terms too: for instance, ‘post-colonialism’ (historical-geographical 
situations after colonialism) and ‘postcolonialism’ (the body of scholarship 
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that sprung up to theorize and study such historical situations); as well as 
‘post-modernity’ (a historical period and its associated ‘cultural condi-
tion’), ‘post-modernism’ (after modernism) and ‘postmodernism’ (a style 
of artistic, cultural, and academic practice). In fact, these examples are all 
slightly related, and it has not been uncommon for people to confuse and 
conflate them. However, they are distinct.
Poststructuralism is perhaps the most controversial of these three terms. 
It has certainly been received with the most perplexity—and hostility. In 
terms of a possible connection with martial arts studies, there will already 
be readers wondering why I am focusing on poststructuralism when there 
would seem to be much more apt theoretical fields and problematics to ex-
plore first. Poststructuralism is notoriously ‘textual’ and ‘wordy’. Its con-
cerns do not seem directly connected with matters of physical activity and 
the body. Indeed, most famously, or infamously, the arch-poststructuralist 
Jacques Derrida once argued that ‘there is nothing outside the text’ (Der-
rida 1976: 163). This argument seemed to some to be a denial of ‘reality’ 
or physicality, or a strange contention that only books or written words 
exist. However, in actual fact, Derrida’s arguments were the expression 
of an eminently reasonable series of arguments about how perception, 
knowledge, and understandings of reality are established. But in any case, 
I choose to begin this reflection on ‘which theory’ with an engagement with 
poststructuralism because, although it may not at first seem like an obvious 
place to begin, I believe it will prove fertile and productive for martial arts 
studies theory.
Derrida’s deconstruction of terms such as ‘reality’ and ‘experience’ 
amounts to the proposition that we relate to all aspects of the world (includ-
ing ourselves) in a way that is ultimately little different from the way that 
we relate to any written text (Derrida 1982: 307–30). In other words, any-
thing and everything calls out for interpretation, and hence we ‘read’ the 
world. Some readings are given to us, or insisted upon, and reinforced by 
social institutions. Think, for example, of the ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ ways 
to read (interpret) religious texts, such as the Bible. Different religious 
communities will have different readings of their key sacred texts, and any 
deviation from these readings will be regarded as heretical.
Indeed, the consideration of different ‘readings’ of religious texts can be 
used to show us a number of things relevant to understanding Derridean 
deconstruction—perhaps the exemplary example of poststructuralism. The 
first point is that ‘meaning’ is neither natural nor fixed forever. The ‘same’ 
text will be read in different ways by different communities, and even by 
‘the same’ community at different times. A poststructuralist way of saying 
this is that there is ‘no final signified’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). There 
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is no permanently fixed meaning for anything. Meanings that seem to be 
‘natural’ or ‘permanent’ can be said to be deeply conventional (Hall 1980). 
But they will change.
A second point to be taken from the example of the different ways that 
different people read the ‘same’ text is that, as deconstruction holds, there 
is no single meaning ‘in’ texts. The meaning of a text is always something 
to be produced in the encounter between the reader and the text (Derrida 
1992: 21–23). This is quite a controversial proposition because it reverses 
and displaces the normal view of the relationship between readers and 
texts, in which readers go to a text and look for its meaning, which they 
‘get out’ of it. Poststructuralism argues that readers bring a lot to texts and 
that what they ‘get out’ of texts is in many ways determined or influenced 
by what they ‘bring to’ them. And we must remember that, although the 
poststructuralists often or primarily discussed written texts, they did not 
limit what they meant by the word ‘text’ to written text. Anything and ev-
erything is a text—even a punch, kick, lock, throw, or hold. What a punch 
‘means’ to you will change.
Roland Barthes took delight in the realization that the meaning of texts 
was not set, and he argued that readers should become ‘active’ and not 
‘passive’: readers should actively produce interpretations, rather than look 
for some fixed, final, or single meaning. He argued that we have been 
taught to believe a few things about reading that are both unnecessary and 
actually culturally/politically disabling: The first is that an ‘author’ is a 
creative genius who knows all of the possible meanings of his or her text 
because he or she ‘put them there’. The second is that we need experts, like 
university professors and school teachers, to teach these meanings to us. 
However, Barthes contended that rather than this, an author’s work is inevi-
tably full of ingredients and possible meanings that they could not possibly 
be, or have been, completely aware of because what ‘goes into’ the writing 
or production of any text is never anything other than already culturally cir-
culating material—words, phrases, techniques, styles, and conventions—
none of which are unique to an individual and in fact only exist and ‘work’ 
because they are part of the fabric of communication, community, and dis-
course. Barthes calls this ‘textuality’. Communication of all kind works on 
the basis of what Julia Kristeva went on to call ‘intertextuality’. Works are 
stitched together from existing cultural material (words, signs). New works 
are produced from the recombination of existing matter. They are not born 
from nothing or out of the mind of an individual creative genius. They are 
always, as both Derrida and Barthes variously argued, essentially forms of 
citation, allusion, reiteration, and quotation. Although these terms sound 
very literary, they will prove to be enormously helpful when we come to 
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think about the ‘creation’ or ‘invention’ of martial arts styles. This is be-
cause the poststructuralist deconstruction of the terms used for discussing 
literature can be transposed or translated into the ways we think about any 
kind of cultural creation, including that of martial arts.
Barthes deconstructs the idea of ‘author’ (as individual genius) and also 
the idea that there is a realm of ‘great art’ on the one hand that is clearly 
and necessarily separated from ‘non-art’ on the other. To Barthes, there 
are language and sign systems and the infinite potential for their combina-
tion and recombination into new texts. We might say the same about the 
potentials for martial arts creation. However, in his own work, Barthes 
was in a sense elaborating a poststructuralist theory of communication. 
His argument about textuality was immensely popular with the artists and 
architects of postmodernist thought—because, in a sense, it provided the 
theoretical justification for what they were already doing anyway (Jameson 
1991). Postmodernists argued that since the 1950s, consumer societies have 
been in a period of post-modernity, in which cultures are increasingly ‘frag-
mented’ because of the proliferation of choice, increasingly commodified, 
exposed to globalization, and, if not ‘homogenized’ by all of this, then at 
least increasingly technologically mediated.
However, Barthes (and Derrida) were never simply writing about textu-
ality for textuality’s sake, or advocating the ‘free play’ of signifiers purely 
for the sake of emphasizing the possibilities of their artistic or interpretative 
recombination. In fact, the basic target of Barthesian and Derridean post-
structuralism is the social and political power of institutions (Weber 1987). 
In his essays ‘From Work to Text’ and ‘The Death of The Author’ (Barthes 
1977), Barthes’s primary target is clearly the power held by the institutions 
that people so often (needlessly) believe in and turn to: the professors and 
teachers who ‘tell’ or ‘teach’ us how to read ‘properly’. For Barthes, if we 
subordinate ourselves to the authority of these ‘experts’ we are maintaining 
the status quo in many ways. (The implicit ethical and political argument 
about the equality of all readers that underpins Barthes’s argument here 
anticipates the one developed by Jacques Rancière in The Ignorant School-
master (Rancière 1991), to which I will be turning in due course. There 
are also strong resonances with the sentiments expressed in Bruce Lee’s 
influential essay ‘Liberate Yourself From Classical Karate’ (Lee 1971), as 
I have argued elsewhere (Bowman 2010b, 2013a).)
Both Barthesian textuality and Derrida’s deconstruction involve a post-
structuralist engagement with the (largely invisible institutional) processes 
by which meanings are established, set, reiterated, modified, and con-
trolled. In his early work, Derrida read the work of influential philosophers 
and followed doggedly the connections, associations, and logical steps they 
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took in their argumentations. His first intervention would be to ask why 
a philosopher would make a certain connection, association, or declara-
tion. Then he would show the ways in which the steps that philosophers 
often took in constructing arguments were not quite as ‘logical’ or ‘neces-
sary’ as they would seem (or want) to think. Upon demonstrating this, he 
would go on to consider the cultural preconceptions and biases that were 
operating on and orientating their reading, thinking, arguments, values, 
and judgments. Because of this, during the 1960s and 1970s, Derridean 
deconstruction was tremendously exciting to certain readers because they 
could see the profound political implications that it seemed to hold (Mowitt 
1992). However, these implications were far from obvious to many other 
sorts of reader, and Derrida’s work—along with that of other (in)famous 
poststructuralists writing at the time, such as Barthes and Kristeva—was 
greeted with confusion and hostility. This was not least because Anglo-
phone scholars working outside of fields like comparative literature and 
Continental Philosophy could not understand what some literary scholars 
and philosophers found so fascinating with all of this difficult and appar-
ently gratuitously ‘wordy’ new ‘French theory’.
Overwhelmingly, poststructuralism became associated with words and 
wordiness. Its relevance for the study of something so bodily as martial 
arts may then seem dubious. But of course, ‘poststructuralism’ is not one 
thing. It has many variants and dimensions. For instance, people have often 
lumped together ‘Foucault and Derrida’ as if they wrote about the same 
sorts of things or made the same sorts of arguments. However, although 
Michel Foucault was one of Jacques Derrida’s teachers, the two had some 
serious disagreements about many issues (such as the reading of Descartes 
and the understanding of ‘madness’). Yet, as far as most readers will be 
concerned, the fundamental difference between Derrida and Foucault is 
that where Derrida focuses on words and institutions, Foucault focuses 
on bodies and institutions. Indeed, despite its many internal differences, a 
first tenet of poststructuralism is arguably this: institutions form subjects. 
Michel Foucault picked up the baton of his colleague Louis Althusser, who 
argued in the influential essay ‘Ideology and Ideological State Appara-
tuses’ (Althusser 1977) that social institutions ‘call’, mould, and make indi-
viduals into ‘subjects’. Foucault deepened and developed this argument in 
a series of book-long studies of the ways institutions produce ‘knowledge’ 
(about ‘subjects’) and then accrue a kind of ‘power’ over them. His primary 
example would be psychiatrists, who on the one hand merely ‘study’ and 
try to ‘help’ or ‘cure’ patients but who on the other hand examine people 
and can incarcerate them or release them, can deem people to be fit or 
unfit, and who are nowadays often utilized as expert witnesses, integral to 
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making judgments about whether someone is ‘criminal’ or ‘insane’ (Fou-
cault 1973).
In other words, Foucault shows time and again how the establishment of 
knowledge is institutional, how that institutional knowledge becomes insti-
tutional power, and how that complex of power/knowledge acts on people’s 
minds and bodies (Foucault 1977, 1978, 1980). Foucault’s method is pri-
marily historical. He explores the emergence of new institutions and their 
new vocabularies and fields of knowledge, and in this way, shows how 
many of the terms we feel are natural or inevitable are in fact not necessary 
but rather historical. For instance, consider the key categories that we as-
sociate with sexuality—heterosexual, bisexual, homosexual, and so forth. 
Nowadays we believe that these are essential descriptions of pre-existing 
categories. But Foucault’s work shows that they were terms that were born 
in academic and medical discourse that were then applied to people who 
became ‘subject types’ and who over time came to be treated accordingly 
and who acted accordingly (Foucault 1978).
Foucault’s work has many dimensions and ramifications. Like all post-
structuralist scholarship, it is subtle, wide-ranging, and complex. However, 
one of the most prominent and enduringly influential uses of Foucault’s 
approach to ‘discourse’ and ‘power/knowledge’ took the form of Edward 
Said’s 1978 book Orientalism (Said 1995), which many regard as a found-
ing text of postcolonialism. The subtitle of Said’s book is Western Concep-
tions of the Orient, and its primary argument is that Western ‘discourse’ 
about Asia has long been organized by a small set of stereotypical ideas—
myths and fantasies about what ‘the Orient’ is like—but which bear no nec-
essary relation to reality. Thus, there is a European intellectual and artistic 
discourse about ‘the Orient’, one that is produced and reproduced in schol-
arship, art, and high and low culture. It is based on simplistic stereotypes 
about ‘what the East is like’ and ‘what Orientals are like’. And it comes to 
pass for ‘knowledge’, even though it is of a highly dubious (both formulaic 
and even sometimes crypto-racist) status: Scholars in many fields (media, 
communication, cultural studies, and so on) have shown that ‘orientalist’ 
ideas about ‘Asians’ (or ‘Blacks’, and so on) continue to have effects in 
all sorts of areas of Western culture and society. Stereotypes circulate, 
and people are judged and treated accordingly. Thus, ideas circulated in 
‘discourse’ can impose themselves as ‘knowledge’ and can exert ‘power’ 
in diverse ways in dispersed contexts.
The many matters of the power of institutions and their conventions 
and the power effects they generate and sustain is a primary focus of both 
poststructuralism and postcolonialism (as distinct from postmodernism), 
and these intellectual approaches have fed into an enormous range of 
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academic disciplines: literary studies, sociology, anthropology, cultural 
studies, history, media and communications, architecture, and beyond. 
The impulses associated with poststructuralism had an immense impact on 
late twentieth-century thought in all sorts of areas of the university, to the 
extent that even though in the twenty-first-century poststructuralism seems 
to have receded from the forefront of attention and controversy, one can 
easily feel its effects on all sorts of academic theory and methodology. Of 
course, poststructuralism has diverse continuing legacies, traditions, and 
many other dimensions, key figures, and key terms not discussed here, but 
the ripples, waves, and transformations produced by the work of the figures 
introduced here are perhaps the most dispersed and sustained.
Other key points on the academic constellation include phenomenologi-
cal and ethnographical approaches, which explore experience via differ-
ent routes. Some of these approaches involve strong implicit and explicit 
critiques of poststructuralism—normally taking issue with its overly 
textualist orientation. Against this backdrop, Loïc Wacquant’s recent re-
flections on his own use of Bourdieu’s notion of ‘habitus’ to structure his 
ethnographic study of boxing in the Chicago ghetto (Wacquant 2004) are 
interesting in many ways. First, this is because of his robust defence of the 
Bourdieuian notion of habitus in the face of its critics. Secondly, because 
of his critique of poststructuralist and postmodern approaches to sociol-
ogy, anthropology, and ethnography (‘auto-ethnography’)—which relate 
to deconstruction and also to Derrida’s critique of Bourdieuian sociology. 
And thirdly, because Wacquant makes some comments that might recast 
certain disagreements that circulate between ethnography and poststruc-
turalism, such as those voiced by Rancière about Bourdieu’s orientations 
and investments.
This is pertinent here because of the growing centrality of Bourdieu-
inspired approaches to the study of martial arts. In this field, Bourdieu-
inspired approaches are often adopted, sometimes apparently uncritically, 
by scholars keen to get down and dirty with their object of study—the ev-
eryday practices of martial arts, their rituals, belief systems and ideologies, 
and so on. However, both Derrida and Rancière historically offered cri-
tiques of Bourdieuian sociology. Rancière’s is perhaps currently the most 
well known in poststructuralist circles, if not beyond (Rancière 1991); but 
Derrida’s critique of Bourdieu certainly deserves recapitulating (Derrida 
2002). Derrida basically takes issue with the philosophical or theoretical 
stance of Bourdieu, which purports to be anti-philosophical—and which, 
in disidentifying with philosophy, identifies instead with ‘objectivity’. 
Specifically, Derrida challenges what he calls the Bourdieuian ‘interpreta-
tion of truth as “objectivity”’ (Derrida 2002: 63), taking issue with the idea 
 Martial Arts Studies as an Academic Field 43
that ‘the value of scientific statement, its truth, is in effect determined by 
its “objectivity”’ (64).
It is important to note that Derrida’s critique of Bourdieuian sociology 
begins with a very direct challenge to the kind of work that Wacquant would 
go on to develop in his studies of boxing—an approach that is proving to 
be increasingly influential (García and Spencer 2013). For, in a sense, what 
Wacquant wants to do is to get access to the truth of a particular nexus, chi-
asmus, or conjuncture, organized by working class and sub-working class 
(‘proletarian’) male, black boxing life in the Chicago ghetto. Put polemi-
cally, Wacquant could be said to want to get to ‘things themselves’ by virtue 
of an immersion course that removes the distance between the ivory tower 
and the object of its knowledge. Now, although I have planted the words 
‘things themselves’ on Wacquant without his permission in order perhaps 
to entrap him unfairly, I think that the contrast between the type of ‘Bour-
dieuian’ knowledge that Wacquant seeks to construct and the problematics 
that Derrida could be said to anticipate here deserves attention.
In the essay in which he takes issue with Bourdieu’s approach, Derrida 
writes:
Certain people are always impatient to access-the-things-themselves-directly-
and-reach-right-away-without-waiting-the-true-content-of-the-urgent-and-
serious-problems-that-face-us-all-etc. Thus, they will no doubt judge an 
analysis that deploys this range of meanings and possible sentences playful, 
precious, and formal, indeed futile: ‘Why be so slow and self-indulgent? Why 
these linguistic stages? Why not go right to the things themselves?’ Of course, 
one can share this impatience and nonetheless think, as I do, that not only do 
we gain nothing by immediately giving in to it, but that this lure has a history, 
interest, and a sort of hypocritical structure, and that one would always be 
better off to begin by acknowledging it by giving oneself the time for a detour 
and analysis. (Derrida 2002: 3–4)
There are two salient issues in this Derridean argument: the first is the 
problem of ‘access to things themselves’; the second is what Derrida calls 
the ‘hypocritical structure’ of academic work that does not stop to think 
about the (linguistic and/or aesthetic, etc.) forms and structures of our 
way of ‘accessing’ (or constructing in discourse) ‘things themselves’. In 
other words, for Derrida, the subject is always a barred subject because 
of the unavoidable intrusion of language in between and in the way of 
everything. Thus, to think that you have got at the ‘truth’ is always going 
to be a problem for Derrida because what you have got at is a linguistic 
discursive construct, one that is being engaged in and through one or an-
other style of language.
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Derrida’s questions and critiques were formulated at a relatively early 
stage of the elaboration of Bourdieu’s approach to sociology—around the 
time that those approaches could be said to have been gaining a kind of he-
gemony in France, in terms of growing connections between Bourdieu and 
French educational and sociological policy makers. And it is not unusual 
for critical thinkers to worry about everything that is gaining power. (As 
Derrida once put it, the future should be regarded as a kind of monstros-
ity.) But if we regard Wacquant as the current heir to the Bourdieuian ap-
proach to a sociology that seeks to bypass or beat the ‘problem of writing’, 
we can ask: Were Derrida’s worries founded? How does Wacquant’s work 
fare in relation to the Derridean critique of its Bourdieuian orientation? 
And what does it say in response? We will turn to these matters soon. 
But first, we should also set out Rancière’s critique of Bourdieu, as these 
debates are intertwined.
The Rancièrean critique of Bourdieu is slightly different. It is orga-
nized not so much by questions and problems of language—at least, not 
directly—as by those of the presumption of inequality. To introduce it 
quickly, Rancière argues that Bourdieuian sociology’s stated aim of re-
ducing or even eradicating class-based inequality in French society via 
interventions into the educational system is not only doomed to fail but is 
doomed to fail because it, at best, reproduces and, at worst, intensifies the 
inequality it seeks to redress. This is because it is based on what Rancière 
calls a ‘presumption of inequality’.
Through a series of direct and indirect readings of Bourdieu’s work, such 
as in The Philosopher and His Poor (Rancière 2004) as well as the earlier 
oblique work The Ignorant Schoolmaster (Rancière 1991), and indeed 
throughout his entire critical corpus, Rancière takes issue with what he 
construes as the presumption of inequality wherever he discerns it. And he 
discerns it everywhere: in the political presumption that ‘the people’ need 
‘leaders’ or ‘educators’, in the aristocratic presumption that some people 
deserve to be socially superior to others, and in the pedagogical presump-
tion that children need teachers, and so on. There are different versions of 
this that Rancière regularly returns to; most famously his preferred story 
of the proletarian workers who are often treated by academics ‘as work-
ers’—that is, as definitely not writers, intellectuals, artists or, scholars. 
However, archival research reveals that ‘the workers’ very often had all 
sorts of philosophical and aesthetic aspirations and engaged in practices 
that most scholars could not accept. Accordingly, scholars and activists 
have tried to ‘police’ such ‘aberrations’ back into their proper place: work-
ers who indulged in art and literature have been regarded, even by Marxist 
and communist intellectuals, as ‘class traitors’.
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Rancière’s work often identifies these moments where writers and think-
ers betray their prejudices—their belief in the superiority of some groups 
over others—such as whenever they cannot accept that workers might be 
philosophers or artists or where they cannot accept that children might not 
need teachers. All of this is also present in Rancière’s book on politics, 
Disagreement (Rancière 1999), in which he reveals the extent to which 
political thinkers use what he calls a ‘geometrical phantasy’ or model of 
society: each ‘class’ is presumed to have their proper place, and anyone 
who moves out of place should be policed back into it. Which is where 
Bourdieu and ‘habitus’ comes in. Rancière argues that Bourdieu repeats 
the aristocratic perspective of presuming that the superior class (the so-
ciologists) will always know more and know better than their object (the 
people). The people will never understand themselves fully, properly, or 
even adequately because, for them to be able to do so, they would have 
to go through the universities and learn from the sociologists themselves. 
Thus, argues Rancière, Bourdieu works for the maintenance of the class 
hierarchies he claims to want to remove.
Now, there does seem to be a certain amount of post-Bourdieuian so-
ciological work which seems to confirm the Rancièrean critique perfectly, 
in reproducing the inegalitarian view that any kind of ‘emancipation’ from 
this or that habitus (construed as a kind of force of ‘determination’) means, 
in a sense, struggling to move upward (Hilgers 2009). In such work, the 
lower classes—say, Wacquant’s ghetto boxers—are (or should be) aspiring 
to ‘escape’ from the subjugation/determination of their place in the social 
order. The implication here is that those who are most free are those who 
are higher up. But does Wacquant’s recent work accord with this?
Wacquant gives two contributions to the collection Fighting Scholars 
(García and Spencer 2013). The first is positioned as the first chapter of the 
book (Wacquant 2013a). The second is the epilogue to the book (Wacquant 
2013b). As such, by bookending the collection, Wacquant’s work is clearly 
marked as central. At the very end of his epilogue, Wacquant provides a 
brief account of what drove him ‘to study boxers in the first place’:
I was not motivated to spend three years in a boxing gym just to plumb the 
idiosyncratic features of the Manly Art. Aside from the sheer pleasure of be-
ing enwrapped in a gripping sensual and moral universe, I ploughed ahead in 
my journey among pugs because I held—and I still hold—that the ring offers 
an especially propitious experimental setting to show how social competency 
is fabricated and membership bestowed (Wacquant 2005a). I am keenly aware 
of the objection that practices vary in their ‘physicality’, or in their reliance 
on discursive reason, such that a prizefighter would seem to differ radically 
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on that count from, say, a philosophy professor. For this objection was raised 
forcefully and rather intimidatingly by none other than John Searle after I 
presented the theoretical implications of Body and Soul to his Workshop on 
Social Ontology at Berkeley in April of 2010. While Searle agrees that some 
notion much like habitus, which he calls ‘the Background’, is needed to ac-
count for social action, he considers that there is a ‘dramatic difference’ (his 
words) between an athletic and an intellectual craft, one that renders transfer-
ring knowledge gained about the one to the other too risky if not invalid. He 
would advise to study ‘intermediate cases’, such as that of the soldier (in his 
response to my argument, he drew on the experiences of his son as a tank of-
ficer in a US Army battalion stationed in Germany). (Wacquant 2013b: 198)
It is interesting that the staunch critic of Wacquant’s argument (that what 
he learned about identity, membership, and ghetto life might be translated 
into all sorts of realms) is none other than John Searle—who is most fa-
mously known in the fields of poststructuralism as the staunch critic of Der-
rida’s essay ‘Signature, Event, Context’ (Derrida 1982). Searle’s reply to 
Derrida prompted Derrida to write the long rejoinder that became Limited 
Inc. (Derrida 1988). And one way of characterizing the disagreement be-
tween them boiled down to Derrida’s desire to radicalize and expand some 
aspects of the theory of speech acts as developed by Searle’s mentor, Aus-
tin. However, Searle disagreed with Derrida’s reading, which ‘radicalized’ 
Austin’s theory, and Searle argued that one should focus on, so to speak, 
‘intermediate cases’ and move far away from the grey areas of borderline 
and extreme cases—which is precisely where Derrida wanted most to push 
and explore. Like Derrida, Wacquant too is not prepared to stay away from 
the supposedly clear borders and boundaries between supposed realms. He 
continues immediately:
I am not convinced. I take the difference between pugilists and philosophers to 
be one of degree and not one of kind. The existential situation of the generic, 
run-of-the-mill agent is not ontologically different from that of the fighter and 
of the fighting scholar: like them, she is a sentient being of flesh and blood, 
bound to a particular point in physical space and tied to a given moment in 
time by virtue of her incarnation in a fragile organism. This porous, mortal or-
ganism exposes her to the world and thus to the risk of pain (emotional as well 
as physical) and injury (symbolic as well as material); but it also propels her 
onto the stage of social life, where she evolves in practice the visceral know-
how and prediscursive skills that form the bedrock of social competency. 
Though carnal sociology is particularly apt for studying social extremes, its 
principles and techniques apply across all social institutions, for carnality is 
not a specific domain of practices but a fundamental constituent of the human 
condition and thus a necessary ingredient of all action. For this reason, and 
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until this methodological strategy is practically invalidated, I would urge so-
cial analysts to start from the assumption that, pace Searle, we are all martial 
artists of one sort or another. (198)
In a sense, then, Wacquant’s thinking of ‘habitus’ might be related to 
Derrida’s thinking of Austin’s ‘performatives’. In Derrida what becomes 
undecidable is the line between what is constative (or fixed and stable) and 
what is performative. He finds performativity active in even the most basic 
constative statement. Similarly, Wacquant is adamant that the habitus is 
not a field of determination, but a signifier of the logics of agency: ‘habi-
tus alone never spawns a definite practice’, writes Wacquant, ‘it takes the 
conjunction of disposition and position, subjective capacity and objective 
possibility, habitus and social space (or field) to produce a given conduct 
or expression’ (194). Thus, it is not a kind of determinism. Rather, habitus 
always involves a ‘meeting between skilled agent and pregnant world’, and 
the nature of such an encounter or process ‘spans the gamut from felici-
tous to strained, smooth to rough, fertile to futile’ (194). The key point of 
Wacquant’s approach is that habitus ‘must be studied in its actual forma-
tion and extant manifestations, and not stipulated by analytic fiat’ (194). 
Accordingly,
far from being [as certain critics deemed ‘habitus’ to be] a ‘theoretical deus ex 
machina’ . . . that keeps us locked in conceptual obscurity, habitus is a stand-
ing invitation to investigate the social constitution of the agent. It is not an 
answer to the conundrum of action—lately rephrased by invoking the equally 
enigmatic category of ‘agency’—but a question or, better yet, an empirical 
prompt: an arrow pointing to the need to methodically historicize the concrete 
agent embedded in a concrete situation by reconstituting the set of durable 
and transposable dispositions that sculpt and steer her thoughts, feelings and 
conduct. (194)
So far so good. Wacquant’s work does not seem to elaborate itself ac-
cording to Rancière’s prophesies about Bourdieuian inequality inscribing 
itself everywhere. This is perhaps because Rancière’s critique of Bourdieu 
in this sense may only be germane to Bourdieu’s work on class and educa-
tion. Indeed, Wacquant, as we have seen, although faithful to Bourdieu, 
actually goes on to regard the lessons he learned about habitus in the box-
ing club as generalizable everywhere—including to the figure of the phi-
losophy professor. (Of course, given the long-running historical disputes 
between sociology and philosophy, there is a certain predictability to the 
example of ‘an academic’ given by a sociologist being the figure of the 
philosopher. This is because, as the battles between Derrida, Rancière, and 
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Bourdieu suggest, the ultimate target of the sociologist is often the philoso-
pher, and vice versa.)
But what of the problem of language? Readers of Derrida will know 
that for Derrida there’s really no getting past it. (Rancière, however, has 
never had much patience for the Derridean/deconstructive multiplication 
of words and wordiness—what Rey Chow calls the ‘primary strategy of 
deconstruction’: to make things more complicated.) In his contributions to 
Fighting Scholars, Wacquant seems more than a little surly in the face of 
anything that might relate to the deconstructive turn in sociology, anthro-
pology, and ethnography. Indeed, according to him, ‘the notion [of habitus 
was] intended to overcome the antinomy between an objectivism that 
reduces practice to the mechanical precipitate of structural necessities and 
a subjectivism that confuses the personal will and intentions of the agent 
with the spring of her action’ (24). Wacquant states that he decided upon 
his own research methodology in the following way:
The idea that guided me here was to push the logic of participant observation 
to the point where it becomes inverted and turns into observant participation. 
In the Anglo-American tradition, when anthropology students first go into 
the field, they are cautioned, ‘Don’t go native!’ In the French tradition, radi-
cal immersion is admissible—think of Jeanne Favret-Saada’s ([1978] 1980) 
Deadly Words—but only on condition that it is coupled with a subjectivist 
epistemology that gets us lost in the inner depths of the anthropologist-subject. 
My position, on the contrary, is to say, ‘go native’ but go native armed, that is, 
equipped with your theoretical and methodological tools, with the full store of 
problematics inherited from your discipline, with your capacity for reflexivity 
and analysis, and guided by a constant effort, once you have passed the ordeal 
of initiation, to objectivize this experience and construct the object, instead 
of allowing yourself to be naively embraced and constructed by it. (27–28)
Thus, ‘theory and method are joined to the point of fusion in the very 
empirical object whose elaboration they make possible’ (28). But, here’s 
the sting:
Body and Soul is not an exercise in reflexive anthropology in the sense 
intended by what is called ‘poststructuralist’ or ‘postmodern’ anthropology, 
for which the return of the analytic gaze is directed either onto the knowing 
subject in her personal intimacy or onto the text that she delivers to her peers 
and the circuits of power-knowledge in which it travels, in a contradictory 
and self-destructive embrace of relativism (Hastrup 1995; Marcus 1998). 
Those forms of reflexivity, narcissistic and discursive, are rather superficial; 
they certainly constitute a useful moment in a research undertaking by help-
ing to curb the play of the crudest biases (rooted in one’s identity and trajec-
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tory, affects, rhetorical effects, etc.). But they stop the movement of critique 
at the very point where it should start, through the constant questioning of 
the categories and techniques of sociological analysis and of the relation-
ship to the world these presuppose. It is this return onto the instruments of 
construction of the object, as opposed to the subject of objectivation, which 
is the hallmark of what one may call epistemic reflexivity (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992, 36–46; Bourdieu 2002a). And here is another difference 
with the ‘egological’ or textual reflexivity of the subjectivist anthropolo-
gists: epistemic reflexivity is deployed not at the end of the project, ex post, 
when it comes to drafting the final research report, but durante, at every 
stage in the investigation. It targets the totality of the most routine research 
operations, from the selection of the site and the recruitment of informants 
to the choice of questions to pose or to avoid, as well as the engagement of 
theoretic schema, methodological tools and display techniques, at the mo-
ment when they are implemented. (30)
Wacquant’s ‘target’ here is perhaps wider and more far-reaching than his 
own account suggests. Its object is not a few postmodernists or poststruc-
turalists. Rather, it relates to a rift in the fields of sociology and anthropol-
ogy caused by the eruption of the poststructuralist textual paradigm—as we 
heard earlier from Adam Frank, in his discussion of the textualizing effects 
of Clifford’s 1986 work, Writing Culture (Frank 2006: 14–15).
Wacquant’s picture of ‘the new’ is clearly one in which the body and 
agency are to be brought into visibility by way of a paradigm to be cre-
ated by thinking and looking for habitus in embodied research. As such, it 
seems likely that, on this account, Rancièrean readers may, after all, have 
some problems identifying ‘a problem’ with Wacquant’s orientation. It 
does not appear to proceed according to the terms of Rancière’s critique 
of Bourdieu. But what of Derridean or deconstructive readers? It seems 
likely that Derridean poststructuralists could still have a field day, pulling 
to pieces Wacquant’s ‘position’. This is because there do seem to be loose 
threads, to be picked up and pulled out—and doing precisely this is the 
bread and butter of deconstructive readings. For instance, as Wacquant 
says, immediately after attacking so-called narcissistic postmodern ap-
proaches to sociology, ‘Body and Soul is written against subjectivism, 
against the narcissism and irrationalism that undergird so-called “post-
modern” literary theory, but that does not mean that we should for that 
deprive ourselves of the literary techniques and instruments of dramatic 
exposition that this tradition gives us’ (31). In other words, as a Derridean 
reading might point out, not unlike Searle, Wacquant too would seem to 
prefer to keep things in their safe and proper place. For him, language is 
something to be ‘used’. It is a helpful ‘tool’. Accordingly, he approves of 
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the use of language in two ways: first, we can use the insights of ‘literary 
theory’ to become ‘reflexive’, all the way through—but not too much. 
Second, even the ‘objective’ sociologist must find ways to write their 
objectivity. Body and Soul (Wacquant 2004) has three distinct voices, for 
three distinct sections, Wacquant informs us. In other words, language is 
not a problem as long as it is properly constrained. Accordingly, language 
is indeed what Derrida once called ‘that dangerous supplement’. And, 
to supplement Derrida with Rancière, writing is something that must be 
policed. Otherwise, ‘habitus’, just like ‘the constative’, cannot become 
anything other than absolutely opaque and undecidable.
To such a challenge, the carnal sociologist would most likely merely re-
iterate that Wacquant spent three years training in a boxing gym on Chica-
go’s South Side. This immersion is the guarantee of his ability to describe 
and discuss its habitus. Indeed, as Wacquant notes elsewhere, initially he 
regarded the gym merely as a way ‘in’ to the local community: an entry 
point, viewing station, or vantage point from which to stage a different 
research project. However, he quickly became sucked wholeheartedly into 
the lifestyle, the pleasures, the pains, the aims, aspirations, and everything 
to do with the life of boxing that he was involved in. Accordingly, habitus 
became his central concept and tool.
However, there are at least two senses in which his deployment of 
habitus differs from the negative sense of habitus as invoked by the Ran-
cièrean critique of Bourdieu. Wacquant explains in an interview published 
in 2009:
The question of whether or not to do fieldwork never presented itself to me 
in terms of a methodological avocation. Rather, it is the method that came to 
me as the best suited for resolving the concrete research problem I confronted 
which, in Chicago, was not just to ‘get closer’ to the ghetto to acquire a practi-
cal and lived knowledge of it from within, but also to gain an instrument for 
the deconstruction of the categories through which America’s Black Belt was 
then perceived and portrayed in the scholarly and policy debate. My initial 
intention was to rely on an ethnography of the urban scene of the South Side to 
pierce through the double screen formed, first, by the prefabricated discourse 
on the ghetto as a site of social disorganization—a space of violence, devi-
ance, and void, characterized by absence and lack—flowing from the exter-
nalist and exoticizing point of view adopted by conventional sociology, and, 
second, by the academic tale of the ‘underclass’, that fearsome and loathsome 
category that crystallized in the 1980s in the social and scientific imaginary 
of America to explain in perfectly tautological fashion the breakdown of the 
black ghetto by the ‘anti-social behavior’ of its residents. (Wacquant 2009: 
115–16)
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In other words, Wacquant’s project was organized in part by the aim of 
piercing the key terms of journalistic, media, political, and ‘folk’ discourse 
about ‘the ghetto’. It was, in other words, orientated in such a way as to 
deconstruct and complicate received categories of discourse in order to 
challenge the problematic media and political analyses and diagnoses based 
on stereotypes and wrong assumptions about ‘the ghetto’ and its ‘types’, 
or stereotypes:
I wanted to quickly find a direct observation post inside the ghetto because 
the existing literature on the topic was the product of a ‘gaze from afar’ that 
seemed to me fundamentally biased if not blind. That literature was dominated 
by the statistical approach, deployed from on high, by researchers who most 
often had no first-hand or even second-hand knowledge of what makes the 
ordinary reality of the dispossessed neighborhoods of the Black Belt, and 
who fill this gap with stereotypes drawn from common sense, journalistic or 
academic. I wanted to reconstruct the question of the ghetto from the ground 
up, based on a precise observation of the everyday activities and relations 
of the residents of that terra non grata and for this very reason incognita. 
(Wacquant 2009: 107)
In the terms of Rancière’s critique, it seems that at most Wacquant’s con-
ceptualization of ‘the poor’ might be regarded as double. For he is explicit 
that his aim was to deconstruct the falsities and hence put pressure on the 
moralistic or panic discourse constructed around folk devils by offering a 
counterdiscourse about the ghetto. So, he wants to explode the myth of ‘the 
poor’—the poor of the media, of moral entrepreneurs and of the political/
interventionist discourse of the time:
I deemed it epistemologically and morally impossible to do research on the 
ghetto without gaining serious first-hand knowledge of it, because it was right 
there, literally at my doorstep (in the summertime, you could hear gunfire 
going off at night on the other side of the street) and because the established 
works seemed to me to be full of implausible or pernicious academic notions, 
such as the scholarly myth of the ‘underclass’ which was a veritable intellec-
tual cottage industry in those years. (Wacquant 2009: 107)
The potential double status of this myth-busting project derives from the 
possibility that although Wacquant may be deconstructing the dominant 
figures of the poor, he may be doing so in the name of his own figure of 
the poor. This would be a slippery accusation to make, and one which boils 
down to the necessity for some kind of predicative or signifying stability 
(the specification of an object), even while seeking to put that object into 
question. In other words, it is perhaps an accusation that could be levelled 
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at anyone who is required to structure their discourse by way of a term that 
they may ultimately seek to complicate or even reject—just think of the 
problematic status of ‘woman’ in poststructuralist feminism, for instance, 
‘the text’ in deconstruction, ‘the native’ or ‘the nation’ in postcolonial 
theory, and so on.
According to the logic of Rancière’s critique, one might expect the 
status of ‘the poor’ in Wacquant’s Bourdieuian ethnographic sociology to 
be established in and through the discussion of ‘their habitus’—with ‘habi-
tus’ constructed and depicted via the sociologist’s ‘tautology’, mentioned 
earlier. However, a slightly complicating factor in this regard is the way 
in which the focus of Body and Soul, while diverse and shared out across 
many figures—the boxers, the trainers, and also, crucially, Wacquant him-
self, as the ‘apprentice boxer’ undergoing a transformative process—is not 
simply a person or a group of people; rather, the focus of Body and Soul is 
the gym itself, as a material institution—as a ‘machine’, which produces 
boxers. Thus, says Wacquant:
In fact, theory and method are joined to the point of fusion in the very em-
pirical object whose elaboration they make possible. Body and Soul is an 
experimental ethnography in the originary meaning of the term, in that the 
researcher is one of the socialized bodies thrown into the sociomoral and 
sensuous alembic of the boxing gym, one of bodies-in-action whose transmu-
tation will be traced to penetrate the alchemy by which boxers are fabricated. 
Apprenticeship is here the means of acquiring a practical mastery, a visceral 
knowledge of the universe under scrutiny, a way of elucidating the praxeol-
ogy of the agents under examination—and not the means of entering into the 
subjectivity of the researcher. It is absolutely not a fall into the bottomless 
well of subjectivism into which ‘autoethnography’ joyfully throws itself, quite 
the opposite: it relies on the most intimate experience, that of the desiring and 
suffering body, to grasp in vivo the collective manufacturing of the schemata 
of pugilistic perception, appreciation, and action that are shared, to vary-
ing degrees, by all boxers, whatever their origins, their trajectory, and their 
standing in the sporting hierarchy. The central character of the story is neither 
‘Busy’ Louie, nor this or that boxer, and not even DeeDee the old coach, in 
spite of his position as conductor: it is the gym as a social and moral forge. 
The intellectual model here is not Carlos Castañeda and his Yaquí sorcerers 
but the Gaston Bachelard of Applied Rationalism and of the materialist poetics 
of space, time, and fire. (120)
This orientation and approach clearly differs from the statistical and 
questionnaire-based approach of Bourdieu about which Rancière complains 
in The Philosopher and His Poor. Indeed, as we have already seen, Wac-
quant himself is highly critical of precisely such approaches, as they involve 
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a gaze from outside and ‘from afar’. Moreover, it can even be said to be a 
clear advance on the ‘go-and-play-them-some-classical-music-on-a-piano-
and-see-if-they-like-it’ approach that Rancière proposes as an alternative to 
the Bourdieuian distribution of questionnaires about musical taste.
Wacquant’s methodological approach inverts and displaces many fea-
tures of the oft-stereotyped sociological or anthropological orientation. 
The object is not ‘othered’, is not hypostatized, is not fixed in time or place 
(Fabian 1983). The sociologist is not ‘supposed to know’, does not pretend 
to ‘know’, and in fact has his ‘ignorance’ impressed upon him during every 
workout. Rather than in terms of fixities, habitus is approached as a mate-
rial process of becoming (as it is now so easy to say, in the wake of ‘Hur-
ricane’ Deleuze). The material conditions of production, development, and 
maintenance of the boxing habitus include factors such as relatively stable 
domestic situations and certain moral and ethical dispositions deriving 
from this, and then, once within the boxing gym itself, the pulls, pushes, 
pleasures, and pains of the internal workings of its own technical, aesthetic, 
ideological, and ethical rhythms and processes. In other words, habitus is 
construed as material and relational, rather than relating to ‘identity’ con-
strued as some kind of fixed, essential, or produced property.
Indeed, the discourse of ‘identity’ is studiously avoided by Wacquant. 
As he writes elsewhere:
Body and Soul is moreover written against the grain of postmodernism and at 
crosscurrent with the narcissistic irrationalism that has informed auto-ethno-
graphic efforts of the past decade. It firmly grounds its subjects in an objective 
social structure of material forces and symbolic relations. It studiously shuns 
the hoary notion of identity and sidesteps the issues of ‘voice and authenticity, 
and of cultural displacement’ and ‘resistance’ that have preoccupied contribu-
tors to that current to the point of obsession. (Wacquant 2005: 470)
The ethnographic method that emerged not only from his immersion in 
a context and a lifeworld but also from his status as novice and apprentice 
led him, writes Wacquant, ‘to effect a double rupture, with the dominant 
journalistic-cum-political representation as well as with the current schol-
arly common sense, itself heavily contaminated by the national doxa’ 
(Wacquant 2009: 116). Ethnography, then, becomes an ‘instrument of 
rupture with the political and intellectual doxa . . . and as tool for theoreti-
cal construction’ (116). Thus, the focus is not simply on ‘the others’—the 
sociologist’s ‘poor’—but rather on a surprising range of problematics. 
These problematics stem from those of constructing the object of enquiry 
or knowledge itself to that of writing about bodily knowledge, and out to 
problematics of macro-scale governmentality.
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Wacquant indicates much of this range and scope in the interview from 
which I have already been quoting, ‘The Body, The Ghetto, and The Penal 
State’. In it, the problematic becomes that of engaging with, thinking about, 
and conveying—in language—bodily knowledge and skill:
How to go from the guts to the intellect, from the comprehension of the flesh 
to the knowledge of the text? Here is a real problem of concrete epistemol-
ogy about which we have not sufficiently reflected, and which for a long 
time seemed to me irresolvable. To restitute the carnal dimension of ordinary 
existence and the bodily anchoring of the practical knowledge constitutive of 
pugilism—but also of every practice, even the least ‘bodily’ in appearance—
requires indeed a complete overhaul of our way of writing social science. 
(Wacquant 2009: 122)
It is to these questions that we shall turn in the next chapter.
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❖ ❖
Writing Martial Arts Studies
Body, History, (Trans)Nation,  
and Narration
Writing thE BoDy of KnoWLEDgE
Loïc Wacquant proposes that to ‘restitute the carnal dimension of ordinary 
existence and the bodily anchoring of the practical knowledge constitutive 
of pugilism—but also of every practice, even the least “bodily” in appear-
ance—requires . . . a complete overhaul of our way of writing’ (Wacquant 
2009: 122). The objects and topics of martial arts studies will certainly 
partake of many dimensions of the problematics that Wacquant evokes in 
his discussion of boxing; but it will also encounter others unique to it.
Certainly, Wacquant identifies a widely generalizable problematic, cen-
tral to many fields, when he asks: ‘How to go from the guts to the intellect, 
from the comprehension of the flesh to the knowledge of the text?’ This is a 
problematic immanent to many fields; yet it is, in his words, ‘a real problem 
of concrete epistemology about which we have not sufficiently reflected’ 
(122). The problem, thus formulated, is one of how to enact the translation 
from lived sensuous experience to intellection and analysis or even discus-
sion in scholarly contexts. This is a problematic that is—or should be—
shared by any academic study of the carnal, the sensual, the experiential, 
and the embodied. Put like this, it becomes a challenge of and for writing: 
how we as academics move from ‘the guts to the intellect’ relies entirely 
on metaphors, analogies, styles of discourse, and translations in building 
concepts and categories of predication, signification, and communication.
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There are already concepts and conventions for discoursing on the body. 
Practices themselves have their language games and what Spivak would 
call their ‘concept-metaphors’. The teaching and learning of many skilled 
and embodied practices involves styles of discourse replete with their own 
tropes, images, and terminologies. Taijiquan, for instance, which is a prac-
tice based on ever more nuanced refinements of sensitivity to one’s own 
and others’ body positions, movements, and interactions, is saturated with 
analogies that try to capture and communicate the feelings one is looking 
for. (It ‘should feel as if the top of your head is hanging from a thread’; 
doing the form ‘should be like swimming on dry land’; push-hands ‘should 
be like pedalling a bicycle or using a two-man saw’, and so on.)
Within academic discourses, the analogies and metaphors used in prac-
titioner language games are often quoted, but the practices themselves are 
discussed in other terms. Academic discourse does not operate within the 
same language game as practitioner discourse. It is not a natural extension 
of the practitioner discourse. Rather, academic discourse typically holds up 
practitioner discourse to analysis and explores it, but in different terms and 
according to different considerations, questions, values, and investments. 
The matter for martial arts studies to consider is what these questions, val-
ues, and investments should be. As introduced in the previous chapter, dif-
ferent disciplines have different foci and conventions. They construct and 
handle objects, ‘information’, ‘material’, ‘data’, ‘evidence’, and so on, very 
differently. So, one question for martial arts studies would be, how should 
the field be written? As an art, literature, humanities, social science, or hard 
science? What are the stakes? To broach these questions, we will begin 
from a consideration of discourse on and knowledge of (or about) taijiquan.
history anD iDEoLogy
Johannes Fabian offers the term ‘allochronism’ to describe one tendency 
involved in certain manners of thinking about other cultures (Fabian 1983). 
Allochronism involves projecting a fantasy about the unchanging charac-
ter of the other culture back and forward through time. What this means 
is illustrated by an example given by Jean Baudrillard: Baudrillard draws 
attention to the fantasies that it is still easy for Westerners to hold about 
Amazonian tribes. These fantasies take the form of an image of such na-
tives as primitives. They are based on photographs taken at the moment of 
first contact between Westerners and tribespeople (Krug 2001). Of course, 
after the moment of first contact, a great deal will have changed. The pho-
tographs that capture the moment of contact are in a strong sense capturing 
 Writing Martial Arts Studies 57
the moment of the demise of a former state. However, such images produce 
and circulate allochronic fantasies to the extent that people continue to proj-
ect fantasies about primitivism onto such peoples, regardless of the fact that 
they have had increasing contact and interaction with the modern world for 
decades or even centuries since then.
In other words, allochronism is a kind of essentialism—a belief in the 
unchanging essence of an ethnic group. This is not divorced from Said-
ian orientalism (Said 1995). Both allochronism and orientalism produce 
nostalgia for fantasies such as ‘a more innocent time’, or a time before the 
‘corruption’ of a more ‘pure’ culture; before its ‘contamination’ by con-
tact with the West. As Rey Chow demonstrates, one predictable practical 
consequence of this is that any natives who do not live up to this fantasy 
structure—any ‘natives’ who are ‘contaminated’ by Westernization or 
modernization—are all too often regarded as impure, inferior, corrupt, or 
inauthentic—by both Westerners/others and by guardians of ‘their own’ 
ethnic/native culture (Chow 1995, 2002).
Chow focuses on the effects of ethnic allochronism in academic contexts 
and its effects on academic subjects—that is, on actual people—actual 
ethnic academics. Her focus is on the ways such subjects are prodded and 
poked, cajoled and coerced to behave in a ‘proper’ manner—that is, an 
expected manner, in accordance with this or that stereotype of what this 
sort of ethnic subject should be ‘into’ and how they should act. This leads 
her to propose the existence and operation of what she calls ‘coercive 
mimeticism’. Coercive mimeticism refers to all of the micro and macro 
forces that act on an ethnic or gendered subject and which give guidance or 
coercion about how, where, and why to be, act, think, and discourse (like). 
An awareness of the risks of falling into allochronic thinking and contribut-
ing to either orientalism or coercive mimeticism is extremely pertinent to 
martial arts studies. Its relevance extends beyond providing insights into 
the effects of such structures on individuals, and into the matter of the cir-
culation of discourses (Frank 2006; Iwamura 2005).
A consideration of the martial art of taijiquan will prove illustrative. 
Douglas Wile points to Wu Wen-han’s observation that ‘in the past, 
students of the development of t’ai-chi ch’üan have ignored historical, 
economic, and political conditions and have focused narrowly on the art 
itself and a small number of masters’ (quoted by Wile 1996: 3). Taijiquan 
is indeed all too frequently denied a history. Instead of a more sophis-
ticated sense of the historical development of taijiquan, all we are often 
given is a simplistic mythology. Within this mythology, multiple levels 
of allochronism, orientalism, and even self-orientalization are at work. 
This includes Western ahistorical or allochronic conceptions of ‘ancient 
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China’, conceptions complicated by the tendency within Chinese martial 
arts  themselves to claim an often preposterously ancient lineage, in order 
to confer legitimacy, authenticity, and superiority on a currently existing 
martial art. However, Wile notes that many of the ‘classic’ texts of taijiquan 
can only actually be traced back to the nineteenth century, and specifically 
to the writers Yang Lu-ch’an and the Wu and Li brothers. The ‘internal’ 
mythologizing of taijiquan by its own practitioners (the claim that it is 
ancient to the extent of being virtually timeless) is compounded by the fact 
that, for Westerners:
Anything earlier than the Republican period (1911–49) tends to slip into the 
mist of ‘ancient China’, and we often overlook the fact that Yang Lu-ch’an 
and the Wu brothers were of the same generation as Darwin and Marx, and 
that the Li brothers were contemporaries of Einstein, Freud, and Gandhi. 
Railroads, telegraph, and missionary schools were already part of the Chinese 
landscape, and Chinese armies (and rebels) sometimes carried modern West-
ern rifles. How often have we stopped to reflect that Yang Lu-ch’an was prob-
ably in Beijing in 1860 when British and French troops stormed the capital 
and the Manchu Emperor took flight. (Wile 1996: 3)
With this evocation of the historical and political context of the times and 
places of the figures who were key in the articulation and constitution of 
taijiquan as a certain kind of Chinese martial art, Wile sets the scene for a 
non-allochronic and more complex understanding of the cultural, ideologi-
cal, and political context of the emergence and development of taijiquan. 
Indeed, Wile’s explicit proposition is that this ‘watershed period in the 
evolution of the art and theory of t’ai-chi ch’üan did not take place in spite 
of larger social and historical events but somehow in response to them’. He 
continues by noting that even though the classic texts of taijiquan ‘have a 
timeless, art-for-art’s-sake tone, this should not prevent us from asking who 
were the Ch’ens, Yangs, Wus, and Lis, why did they involve themselves 
in the martial arts, and why did they create this kind of martial art?’ (Wile 
1996: 3–4)
Wile’s work is ‘archaeological’, in the sense that he studies the classics 
of taijiquan in relation to a reconstruction of what we currently know of 
their origin and composition. This contextual or conjunctural approach 
leads him to argue that the textual formalization of the theory and phi-
losophy of taijiquan that took place during the nineteenth century was 
something quite context specific and far from ideologically neutral. In 
fact, argues Wile, during the nineteenth century, Chinese intellectuals and 
thinkers felt increasingly besieged by foreign forces. These were not just 
the military challenges of former times, but also intellectual, scientific, 
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religious, and cultural onslaughts. Thus, China saw many ‘anti-foreign’ up-
risings, culminating in the Boxer Uprising of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries (Esherick 1987). The intellectual elaboration, codifi-
cation, and popularization of a self-consciously and deliberately Chinese 
practice of taijiquan, with explicitly Taoist principles, can be regarded as a 
very particular kind of ‘response’ to the Western invasion.
Elsewhere, Wile has undertaken a genealogical study that looked for the 
‘ancestors’ of modern taijiquan (Wile 1999). Like others who have under-
taken such studies (Kennedy and Guo 2005), Wile’s studies suggest that 
the principles central to internal martial arts like taijiquan are eminently 
discoverable: anyone in any time or place could ‘discover’ or activate the 
training principles characteristic of taijiquan—principles such as slowness 
(mental or psychological slowness, rather than simply physical slowness), 
sensitivity, yielding, redirection, ‘roundness’, and so on. However, the 
reasons these caught on and developed in China were historical in a very 
precise causal sense. As indicated above, on Wile’s reading, the first mo-
dality of the emergence and growth of taijiquan was as a kind of symptom-
atic ideological response to Western cultural, ideological, and intellectual 
forces. Taijiquan was in a sense a defensive retreat—a search for something 
‘essentially Chinese’. Taoism was one cultural resource, being as it was a 
set of ideas and practices alien to the West. The intellectual elaboration 
of certain ‘internal’ martial arts practices became another. In other words, 
although some thing(s) related to taijiquan had existed in different forms 
and under different names in China for quite some time, it emerged in its 
modern form because of a series of significant cultural, political, and eco-
nomic processes. In Wile’s words:
The shapers of modern t’ai-chi ch’üan thus witnessed repeated military defeat 
and reduction of the empire to semicolonial status. T’ai-chi ch’üan as we 
know it today rose from the ashes of a collapsing empire. With roots that 
clearly reach back farther than the nineteenth century, t’ai-chi’s association 
with national revival did not become explicit until the twentieth. China’s 
anti-imperialist struggles began in the nineteenth century, yet t’ai-chi writings 
from this period do not yet show self-conscious patriotic sentiments. Succeed-
ing sections of this chapter will explore t’ai-chi ch’üan as a cultural response 
to China’s political predicament. (Wile 1996: 5)
Wile proposes that taijiquan in the nineteenth century ‘may be seen as a 
psychological defence against Western cultural imperialism, a clinging to 
chivalry in the face of modernity’ (26). At the same time, it was not just ‘mo-
dernity’ that was causing cultural identity crises. It was specifically a West-
ern or Westernizing modernity. Thus, Wile proposes, against this backdrop, 
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the development of taijiquan as a practice underpinned by a strong ideology 
or philosophy suggests it can be understood as an ‘attempt to create a space 
where purely Chinese values and worldview could survive’ (27):
Thus, as China’s political body was losing control (sovereignty), t’ai-chi 
ch’üan became a way to maintain a measure of autonomy in the practitioner’s 
body. It must have been clear to China’s elites in the second half of the nine-
teenth century that the West could not be beaten at their own game. They were 
thus thrown back on their own bodies, the microcosm where traditional Taoist 
self-cultivation sought to discover and become attuned to the tao. This was to 
pursue a Chinese brand of strength. (Wile 1996: 27)
Wile proposes that the semiotic structure of Western domination im-
posed an immanent femininity upon any discourse of essential Chineseness 
(27). Thus, it was not simply or solely that Western orientalism constructed 
Chineseness as the feminine to the West’s masculine, as a Saidian approach 
might have it. It is also that, in the face of the ‘rational’, ‘intellectual’, ‘rea-
sonable’, ‘powerful’ imperial, and economic encroachments, there was, in 
a sense, very little semiotic room for manoeuvre. Accordingly, rather than 
championing progress and technology, a defensive and nostalgic response 
to forces of change would champion nature. Indeed, Wile notes, ‘Late-
eighteenth and early-nineteenth-century European romanticism suggests 
some interesting parallels with the t’ai-chi movement in nineteenth century 
China’ (27). For European Romanticism ‘advocates returning the body to 
nature’, and ‘t’ai-chi advocates returning to nature in the body’ (27–28): 
Nature is the setting in which man is beautiful and powerful, the stage on 
which Greek mythology is acted out. The Chinese literati in the nineteenth 
century faced an external but similar culture shock, and the effect, of course, 
was even more alienating. Disaffected young European aristocrats created a 
romantic subculture and took refuge in the arts as a realm of personal perfect-
ability. The shapers of t’ai-chi ch’üan also project a vision of personal perfect-
ability, or mastery, through the martial arts. As opposed to all other pursuits in 
their lives, which were overtly familial or political, t’ai-chi was an individual 
and interior quest. The almost religious solace that men like Goethe, Byron, 
Swinburne, Flaubert, Valery, Poe, and Brooke found in swimming, a subset 
of Chinese intellectuals found in t’ai-chi ch’üan. It may be no coincidence 
that Cheng Man-ch’ing called t’ai-chi ch’üan ‘swimming on dry land’. Both 
feature physical effort against a mythological backdrop: for one it was Greek 
mythology and for the other Taoist hagiography. (28)
Wile goes on to argue that while ‘rejecting Westernization and with-
drawing into nativist roots might appear to be merely a reactionary reflex’, 
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in a sense it can be argued that such types of ‘nativism’ may be regarded, 
in retrospect, as ‘the healing that prepares the way for modern nation 
building in the twentieth century’ (29). This is because, as a process which 
articulates a strong sense of Chineseness—both in the present (in the body, 
in the mind, in the physical and mental dispositions acquired through train-
ing) and in terms of a notion of an elongated mythological history—the 
discourse of taijiquan is part of larger nationalist and nationalizing pro-
cesses, such as the ‘invention of tradition’ (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983) 
and indeed the very invention of the sense of a nation (Anderson 1991). 
Wile observes: ‘Selective celebration of tradition thus helps to consolidate 
Chinese identity, and in this sense it is “complicit” with the task of modern 
nation building rather than antagonistic to it’ (Wile 1996: 29). Of course, it 
would be wrong to conclude from this that the emergence and elaboration 
of taijiquan in any context is simply nationalist, or, similarly, orientalist. 
Wile proposes: 
Only a secure sense of national self could permit China to change and adapt to 
a new international environment. By consolidating and retaining firm control 
over the spiritual sphere, it becomes easier to compromise with modernity. 
If t’ai-chi ch’üan in the West today represents a reaching out from within 
modernity to embrace a foreign and traditional practice, in nineteenth-century 
China it may have been a recoiling from modernity and withdrawing into 
native roots, but in both cases an attempt to make modernity tolerable. (29)
This idea of taijiquan as a cultural and physical activity emerging and 
functioning so as to ‘make modernity tolerable’ for both Easterners and 
Westerners chimes with Slavoj Žižek’s argument that ‘Western Buddhism’ 
and ‘Western Taoism’ eventually came to be what he regards as the exem-
plary forms of ideology in contemporary global capitalism (Žižek 2001; 
Bowman 2007b). On Žižek’s account, all such practices are therefore im-
plicitly politically negative because they do not ‘combat’ or militate against 
modern and postmodern capitalism—they do not politicize or antagonize; 
rather they depoliticize and actually enable the spread of the ideology and 
of the political system that they would seem to be opposed to (Bowman 
2007b, 2010b). However, Wile’s focus on the nation and its attendant ide-
ologies is probably more pertinent than Žižek’s focus on ‘global ideology’, 
at least here. This is because taijiquan certainly functioned throughout the 
latter half of the twentieth century as part of the project of achieving China 
through the development of Chineseness (see also Frank 2006). 
Taijiquan, as most people think of it now—with reference to images 
of large groups of Chinese people performing forms in Chinese city 
parks—came into its present form in Mainland China, first thanks to early 
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twentieth-century modernizing movements, and also thanks to certain 
aspects of Maoism. Maoism championed taijiquan because it was collec-
tive, communal, synchronized, coordinated, non-Western, physical, non-
sporting, and non-individualistic. It became a part of the material ideology 
of state communism. It could be regarded as forward looking and nation 
building much more easily than certain meditative practices, such as qi-
gong, which had unclear connections with religion and mysticism. Never-
theless, even qigong—a heterogeneous realm of meditative practices—has 
at various times been recruited for ideological purposes (Palmer 2007). 
Qigong, like taijiquan, is another Chinese tradition that is often regarded as 
being timeless and unchanging—an enduring tradition, stretching back in 
an unbroken lineage through the mists of time to the most ancient prehisto-
ries of China. However, as David Palmer’s study of the history of qigong 
makes plain, although many physical practices that we may today class as 
qigong may well have existed here and there throughout history, it was 
actually in 1949 that Chinese officials settled on the name for the practices 
and set about ‘nationalising’ them (Palmer 2007). Palmer writes:
Many of the gymnastic, breathing and meditation techniques defined as 
qigong were widely practised in Chinese society before 1949, but were not 
known under that name, nor grouped under a single category. They were 
practised in a diversity of contexts, and embedded in a variety of systems 
of representations and social organisations: monastic institutions, sectarian 
groups, martial arts networks, literati circles and medical lineages. It was only 
in 1949 that qigong became a global category which aimed to include all Chi-
nese breathing, meditation and gymnastic techniques. (Palmer 2007: loc 136)
According to Palmer: ‘The choice of the term ‘qigong’ by Party cadres 
in 1949 reflected an ideological project’. This was ‘to extract Chinese body 
cultivation techniques from their “feudal” and religious setting, to stan-
dardise them, and to put them to the service of the construction of a secular, 
modern state. As such’, he states baldly, ‘qigong is an invented tradition’ 
(Palmer 2007: loc 98). 
Inevitably, part of the invention of tradition is the simultaneous obfusca-
tion of the act of invention and the attempt to cover one’s tracks. Thus, both 
taijiquan and qigong (along with styles of kung fu, such as Shaolin), have 
overwhelmingly been constructed and represented as ancient, unchang-
ing, and timeless, despite the fact that their histories and genealogies were 
often invented during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Historical 
studies, such as those of Wile (1996, 1999), Lorge (2012), Kennedy and 
Guo (2005), Shahar (2008), Palmer (2007), Henning (1995), Frank (2006), 
and the ongoing work of Judkins (2012–), have done much to counteract 
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allochronism in the academic discourse of Chinese martial arts. But rather 
than being content with ‘knowing’ such complexity, the question for mar-
tial arts studies becomes one of how to proceed to work on constructing 
different knowledge(s) of martial arts in light of such insights into the 
complexities and intertwining of history and ideology.
One interesting attempt to engage with the matter of how best to write 
an ethnographic study of a martial art can be found in the work of Adam 
Frank. Frank constructs a theoretical relation between poststructuralism 
and taijiquan, in his 2006 ethnographic study, Taijiquan and the Search 
for the Little Old Chinese Man (Frank 2006). In this book, Frank draws 
multiple relations between poststructuralism/deconstruction and taijiquan. 
But what is perhaps most unique is the way that he uses the taiji tu or yin/
yang symbol—which is used so often to explain the logic of taijiquan (as 
well as philosophical Daoism)—as an organizing structure both for the 
conceptual organization and movement of his book and for the argument 
he constructs within it.
The argument itself can be characterized in many ways. The book pur-
ports to focus on ‘identity’ (the book’s subtitle is Understanding Identity 
through Martial Arts), but Frank shows the necessity of regularly shifting 
focus from the personal to the cultural or social, and from the singular 
present to its multiple histories. In other words, through its shifting focus, 
the book performs the fact that one needs to shift focus if one wants to 
understand matters of private or personal identity, or indeed of the singular 
present moment: one must inevitably refer to moments outside of the self 
and outside of the present. In Daoist or taijiquan terms, this is understood 
as the grain of yin in the heart of yang and the grain of yang in the heart of 
yin. In the terms of deconstruction, any ‘one’ entity or identity is essentially 
the différance of the other.
Of course, this conceptual matrix is not new in itself. In fact, studies of 
identity almost necessarily have to refer to wider causes and correlations. 
Similarly, many people have drawn Daoism and deconstruction into vari-
ous kinds of relations, with varying degrees of success (see for example 
Hall 1991; Clarke 1997; Sedgwick 2003). However, few have done so with 
the success and subtlety of Frank. This is doubtless because of his equally 
theoretical and practical investment not only in taijiquan but also in cul-
tural theory and methodological issues in ethnography. This allows him to 
move from what he calls ‘sensual social’ matters—say, of interacting with 
oneself and one’s partner in push-hands practice or other elements of a taiji-
quan class or postclass conversation—to the most intimate matters of what 
psychoanalysis calls ‘phantasy’ (say, orientalist ideas about essential cul-
tural difference, for example), and outwards, into fields of media, politics, 
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history, language, culture, and economics—and back again. Indeed, Frank 
often ponders the question of exactly where the problem of cultural differ-
ence resides. When it seems to him that an idea of cultural difference is 
present in some way (in the form of presumptions about the other, whether 
orientalist or racist, etc.), he immediately wonders whether it is only pres-
ent in his head, or whether it popped into his head because it seemed to be 
affecting others around him. This question (‘Am I just imagining this or 
is it real?’) raises problems of verification: How does one establish where 
ideas of cultural difference are working? How does one establish what they 
are doing?
Frank’s solution is to maintain the problem as a problem. Hence, he 
always tries to read out of, off, and from the evidence of any situation. 
This requires contextual analysis of what people said and did at the time, 
and also auto-analysis of his own thoughts, hopes, fears, actions, and 
reactions. But he does not try to resolve or dissolve the problem, in the 
sense of dispensing with it and categorizing it as something that has been 
resolved. Instead, he treats it as something that long has and long will 
continue to emerge and have effects. Thus, he accepts, for instance, that he 
has certainly more than once harboured various phantasies about cultural 
difference, and he tries repeatedly to engage with them—with what they 
have made him think, feel, and do and what it would mean if and when 
they change. Then, he maintains a nonjudgemental position vis-à-vis the 
likelihood that his Chinese friends and colleagues may well harbour certain 
cultural assumptions about him, as a white Westerner/American. In other 
words, rather than trying to treat cultural difference as a necessarily bad 
problem to be solved, he treats it as an inevitable occurrence with a very 
wide-ranging and dynamic constellation of consequences, from fear or 
hatred at one extreme, to fetishization, love, or desire at other points. And 
he treats all of these possibilities as moveable. This is because social and 
cultural relations are formed from contingent histories and ongoing events. 
As he repeats, ‘identity moves’.
Frank’s use of the taiji symbol (taiji tu) as a matrix suggestive of a 
paradigm for exploring and writing the ways in which the most intimate 
and personal is always also political, historical, sociological, and so on, is 
an important example of the way in which an object of study can in itself 
propose a mode and manner apt for engaging with it. He writes:
I have tried to capture the play of multiple discourses within the unity of a 
particular embodied practice. To what end? All this talk of racisms, power, he-
gemony, deception, and capitalism run amok is not meant to give the impres-
sion that taijiquan is a painfully negative experience that one should avoid at 
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all costs. My goal has been the opposite: to highlight the obstacles to practice 
and understanding that teachers and fellow practitioners shared with me dur-
ing the course of my fieldwork. Ultimately, all these negatives are meant to 
yield a positive. By understanding the tendency to conceive taijiquan in terms 
of race, those who practice the art might more easily cut through the obstacle 
of preconception to experience it in a new light. Those who do not practice, 
but who see people practicing taijiquan in a park or read a book or rent a 
videotape, might approach the art, as well as their conception of China and 
Chinese people, in a more sophisticated way. Perhaps transnational practices 
like taijiquan allow us to engage in an act of reduction about identity, where 
comparison is no longer ‘cultural’, but internal. Practice can lead us to a mo-
ment when we are neither a particular self nor not that self—in other words, a 
moment when socially structured identities are negated through direct experi-
ence. (Frank 2006: 241)
This passage illustrates both the strengths and also perhaps some of the 
limitations of Frank’s approach. We can see the complexities of identity and 
its vicissitudes. Yet, ultimately perhaps, this work might still be said to be 
organized by focusing on a mirage or red herring: identity. A thoroughgoing 
deconstruction, on the other hand, might engage in processes of inverting and 
displacing such a focus. At times, Frank certainly inverts: he shows how indi-
vidual or group consciousness is produced by all sorts of ‘unreal’ or inhuman 
supplements—media representations, literary figures, political interventions, 
and so on. But he does not displace the discussion away from the human to the 
inhuman dimensions of the interhuman and, instead, effectively maintains a 
belief in—to borrow a phrase from Laclau and Mouffe (1985)—the individual 
as the origin and basis of human relations. There is more to identity construc-
tion than humans and other humans. And, as Laclau once argued in a discus-
sion of political identities, the ‘really important task is to understand the logics 
of their constitution and dissolution, as well as the formal determinations of 
the spaces in which they interrelate’ (Laclau 2000: 53). 
The logics and spaces of identity construction in and around martial arts 
doubtless cannot be ascertained via a one-size-fits-all approach. So while 
Wacquant’s use of the conceptual field of habitus may prove efficient and 
insightful in the context of an intensely competition-focused boxing gym in 
the United States, the same concept (habitus) may not prove entirely useful 
when considering, for example, taijiquan learning in Shanghai (as was the 
focus of Frank’s work). In fact, in relation to martial arts and identity—or 
indeed, the identity of martial arts—there are many ways to enquire into the 
‘logics of their constitution and dissolution’.
As distinct from the interpersonal foci of studies like that of Frank 
and Wacquant, we might enquire into other theoretical and interpretive 
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possibilities. One notable approach is offered by Sylvia Huey Chong in her 
study of the ‘place’ of Asia in twentieth-century American culture (Chong 
2012). This work offers an enormous array of insights into questions cen-
tral to martial arts studies, via considerations of media, culture, and history. 
It is, in a way, an example of what Stuart Hall would call a ‘conjunctural 
analysis’. In what follows, I will focus on the question of history (or, rather, 
discourse) in Chong’s contributions to our ways of understanding the iden-
tity of martial arts and martial artists.
rE: Writing history in MartiaL arts stuDiEs
It is common (indeed, ‘common sense’) to regard history as the ultimate 
referent: the name for the repository of every process and event and thing 
that happens. In this view, things happen, and they are either noticed or 
unnoticed, either recorded somewhere or somehow, or unrecorded, as 
the known or unknown contents of history; and history moves forward. 
However, arguably, history is quite different to this. It is something other, 
something more, and something less than this idealized process. Certainly, 
history is never a simple neutral referent. Nor is it always on a simple 
forward trajectory. Nor is it ever simply one thing. When we say ‘history’ 
we may seem to be evoking one thing. But we are not. We are referring to 
something that is written, recorded, experienced, fantasized about, engaged 
with, hidden from, denied, manipulated, invented, played and replayed, 
worked over, worked through, worked with. There is no sense in which 
‘history’ is ever a complete, comprehensive, self-present, self-identical 
entity, identity, or process. As with so many things, language tells us that 
it is a singular noun; but a moment’s reflection suggests it is a complex, 
incomplete, slipping, sliding, spiralling, vertiginous array of processes, 
moving at different speeds and in different directions. Moreover, historical 
processes are themselves part of other processes. They are always con-
nected with operations that might be called, for simplicity, ideology. I use 
the word ‘ideology’ here deliberately: in everyday usage ‘ideology’ tends 
to be used to mean ‘false belief’. It can also be used to evoke motivations, 
belief systems, visions, and ideals (as in, ‘the ideology of the Conserva-
tive Party’ and ‘the ideology of the Labour Party’). In some of the most 
‘radical’ cultural theory, the word can be used to refer to something from 
which there is no escape, no outside, and no getting away from—that is, 
something fundamental and constitutive of culture and society (Žižek 
1989). So the term can be used to evoke anything from the ‘most false’ 
to ‘most basic’ element of humanity. It is relevant here because bringing 
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the notion of ideology to bear on a consideration of history is pertinent to 
martial arts studies.
This can be illustrated through discussion of the figure of Sylvester Stal-
lone’s character John Rambo in First Blood (1982) and Rambo: First Blood 
Part II (1985). First Blood is one of a range of 1980s films which on first 
glance purport to display the power and combat supremacy of U.S. special 
forces. However, as Sylvia Chong points out, these films exist in a complex 
relationship with what has to be understood as the trauma of the Vietnam 
War (Chong 2012). Thus, First Blood is to be regarded as a reworking of 
historical issues from the 1960s and early 1970s in 1980s visual culture. 
Moreover, it becomes clearly ideological in a number of ways in the se-
quel, Rambo: First Blood Part II. This was the film about which President 
Ronald Reagan would comment, on one occasion, that it helped Americans 
to find a way to be proud of their involvement in Vietnam. On another oc-
casion, Reagan quoted Stallone’s character, John Rambo, in a motivational 
speech, saying, ‘In the spirit of Rambo: we’re gonna win this time’. In other 
words, the film functioned as a kind of fantasy replay of the war in which 
America gets to ‘win this time’. It is also the film that most showcases 
Stallone’s muscularity—something that film theorists and scholars of iden-
tity have remarked upon in terms of its relevance for signalling discursive 
changes in styles of masculinity. It certainly signals a kind of discursive 
change in the visual aesthetics of martial arts masculinity. In other words, 
in all of these registers and more, ideology is an apt term for thinking about 
what is happening with history in and through this film.
Chong’s overarching argument starts from the proposition that America 
was traumatized in the Vietnam War. But, she asks: ‘What might it mean 
to traumatize a nation? To borrow this diagnosis from psychology might 
seem to impose an unnatural unity upon the unruly collective known as the 
U.S. nation’ (Chong 2012: loc 223). However, she argues, ‘to analogize 
the nation as subject is not necessarily to adopt the organic unities of the 
body politic or the universalities of the Jungian collective unconscious or 
the “myth and symbol” school of American studies’ (226). Rather, ‘if the 
personification of the nation as a patient on the cultural critic’s couch is to 
be more than mere poetic analogy, it must take into account the way post-
structuralist psychoanalysis has fundamentally challenged the coherence of 
the subject’ (226). Accordingly, she continues:
The modern nation, like the modern subject, must be understood as funda-
mentally split, historically and socially contingent, and incapable of complete 
self-presence or self-awareness. The nation becomes a ‘subject’ in my analy-
sis only insofar as it is a fictive field within which the scenarios of the oriental 
obscene circulate and take on meaning. (231)
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For Chong, the ‘oriental’ was ‘obscene’ in the Vietnam era because of 
the power of the visual signs of carnage, violence, destruction, abjection, 
and otherness associated with it and articulated through it. The impact of 
such visual images of the Vietnam War on America was traumatic, Chong 
argues. As such, the emergence of Asian martial arts into the visual cultural 
realm during this time and against this backdrop of trauma should mean 
that we be resolutely ‘wary of celebrations of martial arts as an essentially 
Third World cultural form that is inherently resistant to dominant forma-
tions of state and economic power’ (2730).
One of the aesthetic productions of the overlapping emergence of Asian 
martial arts into U.S. consciousness at the time of the Vietnam was Stal-
lone’s Rambo—along with, of course, Ralph Macchio’s ‘karate kid’, and 
(earlier) Chuck Norris’s various special forces characters. Thus, in addition 
to the ‘mystical lore combining Buddhism and other Asian religions with 
the American counterculture’ (2743), what is also to be acknowledged as 
present is ‘the violence which such Asian bodies taught to Americans, a 
gestural vocabulary that retains an Asian cultural residue through periphery 
symbols: the use of Asian terminology, such as sensei or sifu for teacher, 
even when applied to non-Asians; costumes of white karate gi robes and 
kung fu outfits with Mandarin collars’ (2741). But, with Stallone, Norris, 
Macchio, Seagal, and Van Damme, ‘what seems to disappear once the 
martial arts leave the screen is the specificity of the Asian body’ (2741).
Of course, coming before all of these figures was Bruce Lee, as well as other 
notable figures, such as the Japanese actor Sonny Chiba. However, Chong 
argues that Asian figures like Chiba ‘do not serve as direct points of identifica-
tion’ but rather as ‘conduits for this style of violence that flows through them 
and into the audience as kinetic energy’ (2748). Significantly, though, she 
proposes that ‘the one exception to this exclusion is the figure of Bruce Lee, 
whose persona offers further insight into just how this orientalized violence 
makes its way into American bodies without those bodies becoming overtly 
racialized as Asian’ (2748). ‘The object of assimilation is not simply the static 
image of Lee, frozen in time on a movie poster, but rather a style of move-
ment: the combination of choreography and cinematography that produced 
the dynamic images of bodily movements identifiable as Bruce Lee’ (2768).
Film theorists may be interested in Chong’s argument that ‘Lee seems 
to provide an exemplary instance of the Deleuzian movement-image, since 
his star persona appears to be completely enmeshed with the mapping of 
his body moving through space onto the temporal medium of the cinema’ 
(2770). But for our present purposes, what is more important is the idea that 
‘the Vietnam War shadows the movement-images of Bruce Lee as well, 
appearing on the edges of films like Enter the Dragon through Vietnam 
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veteran characters such as Williams (Jim Kelly) and Roper (John Saxon), 
and emerging in the colonial settings and battles of his other films’ (2774).
Chong undertakes chapters-long analyses of the racial and ethnic sig-
nificance of the U.S. love of Bruce Lee, but does so in order to think more 
fully about the logic and dynamics of what arose after him, in the form of 
the characters played by Norris and Stallone in the 1980s. Crucial at the 
Lee-stage of the discursive movement is that Lee managed to ‘serve both 
as a metonym for the Chinese as a racialized group and also as an honorary 
white, a figure of masculine power who transcends his racialized status and 
is assimilated into existing structures of power’ (3136). Interestingly, she 
notes that, in many of the popular narratives about Lee’s status vis-à-vis 
‘race’ in the United States, the stories always seem to involve Chinese rac-
ism—namely, the presumed insularity of the Chinese kung fu community, 
the supposed scandal within the Chinese community of Lee teaching kung 
fu to non-Chinese, and so on. Chong points out that these stories ‘locate 
racism in Chinese rather than in American culture and depict Lee as over-
coming his own culture’s xenophobia and thus becoming “American” in 
the process’ (3178). Moreover, something significant happens with the 
tendency of post–Bruce Lee American films to displace matters of race and 
ethnicity into the realm of either individualism or class. Assessing Davis 
Miller’s (Miller 2000) account of Bruce Lee’s place and function in his 
own life, Chong argues that
Miller’s move from mourning the death of the ‘bad old white boy’ to being 
reborn through an identification with Bruce Lee is not simply about racial 
transcendence, but represents a reconfiguration of orientalness as a form of 
honorary whiteness, cleansed of its more troubling connotations. (3188)
Similarly, in the working-class drama of No Retreat, No Surrender, ‘the 
spirit of Lee is resurrected to restore the privileges of whiteness that Jason 
tem po rarily lost with the emasculation of his father’ (3200). Interestingly, 
however, 
the production history and subplots of No Retreat complicate the erasure of ra-
cial specificity that the film’s narrative tries to perform. The film was directed 
by Corey Yuen and produced by Ng See-Yuen, two Hong Kong martial arts 
film luminaries and members of the Seven Little Fortunes, a Hong Kong per-
formance troupe trained in Chinese opera acrobatics whose other illustrious 
members included Jackie Chan and Sammo Hung. As a result it is difficult to 
dismiss No Retreat as simply an appropriation and whitening of Bruce Lee’s 
legacy, when in fact the film serves as an early bridge for Chinese directors 
and actors to enter Hollywood. (3202)
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Thus, Chong proposes that we can extend Meaghan Morris’s argument 
that ‘instead of seeing No Retreat, No Surrender as a Hong Kong rip-off 
passing as American, we can just as well say that it remade The Karate Kid 
for people who like Hong Kong films’. So, ‘rather than viewing the film 
as simply Americanizing Bruce Lee as an honorary white pater familias, 
it might also orientalize Jason through his imagined relationship with Lee, 
whom he addresses as “Lee da ge” (big brother Lee)’ (3206). 
Chong discusses a range of films in which cross-ethnic identification is 
unstable. But, most pertinent for our consideration of history and ideology, 
she argues that a crucial change occurs around Chuck Norris in the 1980s:
By 1986, when Norris is promoting his tenth film after Good Guys, Invasion 
U.S.A. (1985), Bruce Lee is no longer the main point of reference for his ca-
reer. Instead, as another Los Angeles Times profile reveals, Norris is now the 
reincarnation of John Wayne, whose name is evoked four times on the first 
page alone, and Norris’s films in the mold of ‘modern-day Westerns’. (3293)
This is a significant transformation because, as Chong argues, it con-
stitutes a kind of strong disavowal and distancing of identities: before 
this moment it was, in a sense, ‘clear’ that the special forces characters 
played by the likes of Norris and Stallone were presented as not only hav-
ing been produced in Vietnam, but also by Vietnam, as well as owing a 
strong aesthetic debt to Bruce Lee films. As she notes, Stallone’s striated 
martial muscularity refers more to Bruce Lee’s body than Arnold Schwar-
zenegger’s Mr Olympia mass. Similarly, Norris’s martial moves always 
signalled the cross-fertilization or even contamination of bodily capacities 
by East-West encounters. But the semiotic switch from referring to Bruce 
Lee to referring to John Wayne signals a kind of backward-moving pre-
oriental reference: 
From Bruce Lee to John Wayne—this reverse genealogy of the Hollywood ac-
tion hero seems to undo the orientalization of the Vietnam veteran, replacing 
both the body incontinent of the traumatized soldier and the body mastered 
of the Asian martial artist with an earlier warrior figure more often associ-
ated with the violent oppression of racial difference on the edges of the U.S. 
nation-state. (3295)
Put differently, ‘the soldier-heroes played by Chuck Norris, and later by 
Sylvester Stallone, represent a differently orientalized body, one neither 
fully traumatized nor invincible, but rather the condensation of both fan-
tasies simultaneously’ (3298). Both have an ‘ostensibly white body whose 
origins are thoroughly oriental’ (3299). Indeed, Chong asserts: 
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Norris’s and Stallone’s Vietnam heroes are white Orientals, performing a yel-
lowface minstrelsy sans yellowface, in order to reinvigorate a whiteness that 
has lost both its hegemonic wholeness from the protests of the 1970s and its 
masculine vigor from the Vietnam War. But since the oriental source of this 
minstrelsy is phantasmatic to begin with, such a masquerade is ultimately less 
a theft of authentic Asian culture than a reflection of the original fantasy of 
the oriental obscene that produced such scenarios. (3309)
In such characters, Chong contends, their ‘whiteness is shot through with 
otherness’. This comes both ‘in the form of its bodily comportment’—that 
is, in terms of the ‘fighting techniques borrowed straight from the mysteri-
ous ars violentiae of Asian martial arts’—and also in ‘its specular form’, 
a form that had ‘descended from the bloody naked torso of Bruce Lee, re-
vealing its vulnerable embodiment as Wayne, Clint Eastwood, and Charles 
Bronson never did’ (3299).
This kind of analysis of the semiotic genealogy of what went on to 
be a supposedly thoroughly Americanized martial arts aesthetic reveals 
the ways in which history and ideology are ineradicably intertwined and 
produce aesthetics as much as conscious discourses. Although I have in 
no way done justice to the complexity and subtlety of Chong’s historical, 
ideological, and cultural analyses here, I hope that what I have focused 
on in her work suggests some of the ways in which historical analysis 
can be recruited to draw into focus the tectonic movements and interplays 
of forces that go into tracing the contours of different cultural-historical 
conjunctures. Incorporating this type of analysis into the purview of mar-
tial arts studies both continues the important tradition of what Stuart Hall 
called ‘conjunctural analysis’ and moves the paradigm on from any naïve 
understanding of carnal sociology’s habitus, without throwing the baby out 
with the bathwater. 
MartiaL arts, nationaLisM,  
anD transnationaLisM
As we have already seen, as well as history, ideology, and identity, the na-
tion has played a significant role in the previous discussions. Because of its 
centrality, it warrants further attention, but the question remains one of how 
best to approach it. The themes of the nation are familiar and common to 
many disciplines. To disrupt the smooth treatment of this theme, it makes 
sense to engage with it somewhat differently.
Petrus Liu discusses ‘the rise of martial arts studies’ in the field of Chi-
nese literature and culture (Liu 2011: 14). His novel study of martial arts 
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literature, Stateless Subjects: Chinese martial arts literature and postcolo-
nial history (Liu 2011), is an important study that is highly relevant to mar-
tial arts studies because it engages in several kinds of pertinent discourses. 
Among these are the following: First, Liu’s study recasts our understanding 
of the status of martial arts literature in modern China. Second, it clarifies 
certain obscured relations between literature and film. Third, it argues that 
martial arts literature long had a serious cultural-intellectual status in China 
but that twentieth-century events precipitated a project to erase its erstwhile 
status from the historical record. And fourth, it picks up on this literary 
form’s role as a site of critical engagement with wider social and histori-
cal forces. Consequently, martial arts literature is represented as having a 
largely neglected capacity to inform a critical engagement with a number 
of aspects directly and indirectly related to all things ‘China’—including, 
of course, many aspects of martial arts discourse. Liu writes at the opening 
of Stateless Subjects:
The past decades have seen a broad transformation of China studies into 
the new Sovietology. In the international sphere, this change has involved, 
in equal measure, frenzied media denunciations of China’s human rights 
violations, pollution, and military build-up—and at the same time, popular, 
sensationalist images of mummies, angels, and kung fu-fighting pandas. 
A culture of martial arts has come to play a surprisingly important role in 
shaping China’s global identity, delineating the contours of its cultural influ-
ence, helping to predict its political transformations, and suggesting ways 
to interpret its historical formation as a nation-state. Far from being a trivial 
matter of popular culture, Chinese martial arts are persistently linked—in the 
imagination of academic critics, political gurus, business entrepreneurs and 
social activists—to the master narratives of the twentieth century: capitalism, 
colonialism, and globalization. (Liu 2011: 1)
From here Liu immediately announces that his study will constitute a 
rejoinder to the dominant ways of approaching martial arts in film and 
literature. He observes, ‘Nationalism has emerged as the most common 
explanatory paradigm for the study of Chinese martial arts film and litera-
ture’. This is so much the case, he proposes, that ‘virtually every currently 
available scholarly work on martial arts fiction connects the genre’s histori-
cal rise, aesthetic conventions, and popular appeal to the emotional freight 
of representing the Chinese nation’ (Liu 2011: 1). Pointing to one exem-
plary and influential study, Chris Hamm’s Paper Swordsmen: Jin Yong and 
the Modern Chinese Martial Arts Novel (2005), Liu argues that this study 
uses the status of Hong Kong as a British colony to explain the author’s 
popular appeal to the masses, characterizing his martial arts novels as the 
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embodiment of ‘a heroic and erotic nationalism’. According to Hamm, Jin 
Yong’s writings signify the increasing dominance of ‘an essentialized and 
celebratory Chinese cultural identity’ over a ‘consciousness of loss and 
displacement’, which serves as ‘a point of reference and token of continuity 
amidst the uncertainties of existence’ for the citizens of Hong Kong. Hamm 
points out that all of Jin Yong’s novels were originally serialized in Hong 
Kong’s newspapers before appearing in book form, and he argues on this basis 
that Jin Yong’s martial arts fiction exemplifies Benedict Anderson’s theory 
of ‘print-capitalism’—the ability of serialized fiction to create sentiments of 
diasporic nationalism by allowing readers who have never met each other to 
imagine themselves as members of a coherent national community: cultural 
China. In the final analysis, Hamm’s explanation is a psychologizing one. 
His argument suggests that martial arts literature is a result of the colonial 
inferiority complex of the citizens of the British Crown Colony. The popular-
ity of the genre is explained by its ideological persuasiveness rather than its 
intellectual depth. (2)
Liu’s argument about Chinese martial arts literature will come to invert 
and displace these terms. However, he does not claim that twentieth-
century martial arts literature is intellectual by way of reading it in such a 
way as to find new ‘hidden depths’. Rather, he points to its long-standing 
status as recognizably central to Chinese literary culture. His argument is 
that the status of martial arts literature was eroded first during Chinese 
modernization movements and then decisively transformed by a range of 
twentieth-century acts of censorship. 
Of the contemporary consensus that martial arts literature always has 
something to do with nationalism, however, Liu notes that this apparent con-
sensus nevertheless involves a certain cacophony of discord and dissensus:
This common explanation of martial arts fiction as the ideological instrument 
of Chinese nationalism . . . has generated a bewildering array of contradic-
tory conclusions. Recent martial arts films such as Hero (2002), Kung Fu 
Hustle (2004), House of Flying Daggers (2004), and Crouching Tiger, Hidden 
Dragon (2000) have led critics to characterize the genre as a paean to Chinese 
authoritarianism, a representation of diasporic consciousness, an apologia for 
Chinese unification, cultural resistance to Sinocentrism from the margins, 
an instrument of China’s ‘kung fu diplomacy’, an index of the exploitation 
of third-world labor by a Hollywood-centered, capitalist regime of ‘flexible 
production’, or the reverse—cultural colonization of America by Asia—an 
‘Asian invasion of Hollywood’. (2)
Phrased in reverse, Liu explains: ‘While these interpretations contradict 
one another in their assessment of particular texts’ relation to Chinese na-
tionalism, they share one thing in common’—namely: 
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the assumption that martial arts fiction is a by-product of China’s colonial 
and postcolonial histories, and that therefore the economic and political or-
ganizations of China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan (semicolonial, postcolonial, 
capitalist, socialist, or postsocialist) should serve as the prevailing analytical 
framework for our interpretation of this literature. (2–3)
Of course, this would seem to make sense, given the importance placed 
on historicizing cultural phenomena and cultural values in contemporary 
scholarship. And Liu has no problems with this per se. However, as he 
puts it, ‘Traditional “state-centered” interpretations emphasize the problem 
of Chinese identity and the role of the nation-state in the production of the 
martial arts text’ (3), whereas ‘martial arts literature has demonstrated a 
remarkable ability to unify ideological opposites, an ability that is com-
pounded with the genre’s antisystemic, rhizomatous dispersion across 
many registers of social discourse’ (3). Indeed, after going through a list of 
different, mutually contradicting takes on martial arts literature, Liu points 
out that the ‘malleable nature of martial arts fiction allows it to be assimi-
lated to political claims about the “Sick Man of Asia’’ and “China rising” 
with equal ease’ (3).
However, such state-centred or macropolitics-focused understandings of 
martial arts literature miss simultaneously the ‘forgotten history’ and the 
aesthetics as well as the ‘vital contributions to the development of modern 
Chinese culture’ made by martial arts literature, Liu contends (3). Indeed, 
the presentation of ‘mutually contradictory views about China’s relation 
to the world is one of the most curious features of martial arts aesthetics’ 
(5). This is because, Liu argues, the institution of the ‘Chinese martial arts 
novel represents a radically different political philosophy of the state’ to 
those commonly dealt with by philosophers and political theorists. In mar-
tial arts literature, ‘the state is neither the arbiter of justice nor the sphere of 
moral constraints that prevents civil society from destroying itself through 
its own rapacity. On the contrary, the martial arts novel invents scenes of 
stateless subjects to explain the constitutive sociality of the self’ (5–6).
If some may regard this sort of argument as the eccentric interpreta-
tion of a lone critic, it must nevertheless still be acknowledged that the 
contrary impulse, the widespread and ‘persistent desire to read martial 
arts narratives as national allegories’ certainly seems to be something that 
has ‘prevented us from developing a historical account of precisely what 
is interesting and complex about these works’ (5). In fact, Liu notes, and 
perhaps as a consequence of this dominant tendency, ‘no sustained account 
of twentieth-century martial arts literature as literature—that is, as a his-
torically determinate discourse with a unique set of aesthetic conventions, 
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philosophical basis, institutional history, and thematic coherence—has 
been forthcoming’ (5). Liu proposes that the ‘lack of critical attention to the 
aesthetics of martial arts narratives stems, no doubt, from a widespread per-
ception of martial arts fiction as potboilers for mass culture consumption 
that have little to say about serious politics’ (5). As indicated above, such 
a perception ‘itself rests on the even more fundamental assumption that 
politics is always state politics, which is precisely what, I will argue, the 
martial arts novel as a modern literary movement sets out to challenge’ (5).
This is why Liu has two connected aims: on the one hand, ‘one aim 
of the present book is to produce a descriptive account of the distinctive 
aesthetic properties of the genre’; on the other hand, it also aims to ‘resitu-
ate this genre as an interventionist and progressive cultural movement 
in twentieth-century Chinese intellectual history that invented the most 
important model of nonstatist political responsibility’ (5). If this latter 
claim may still seem hard to swallow for some, Liu quickly points out 
that in the martial arts literature ‘discourse of jianghu (rivers and lakes) 
defines a public sphere unconnected to the sovereign power of the state, 
a sphere that is historically related to the idea of minjian (between the 
people) as opposed to the concept of tianxia (all under heaven) in Chinese 
philosophy’ (6). Thus, he suggests that martial arts novels present ‘the 
human subject as an ethical alterity, constituted by and dependent on its 
responsibilities to other human beings’:
It is through the recognition of this mutual interdependence, rather than the 
formal and positive laws of the state, that humanity manages to preserve it-
self despite rampant inequalities in privilege, rank, and status. As recounted 
by martial arts novels, the human subject is made and remade by forces that 
cannot be defined by positive laws of the state—rage, love, gender, morality, 
life and death. The formation of this stateless subject is incompatible with the 
liberal conception of an autonomous rights-bearing citizen. (6)
This is why Liu wishes to redress ‘the widely accepted thesis that 
China’s response to foreign imperialism has always been the establishment 
of a strong modern nation-state’ (6). Rather than this, he proposes that 
modern Chinese martial arts literature might actually be better approached 
‘as a thought experiment on this question: If we lived in a world where the 
meaning of politics were not reduced to the ballot-box, revolutions, fiscal 
crises, wars, and other trappings of governmentality, what would it mean 
to be a person of public responsibility?’ (6)
This is a long way from most treatments of martial arts fiction—for 
which we normally mean ‘film’. Indeed, this distance is something Liu 
actively seeks to draw attention to: 
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Despite the global hypervisibility of martial arts cinema, no systematic study 
of this visual culture’s literary basis in Chinese fiction is available in English. 
Wuxia xiaoshuo, the literary tradition that gave rise to these cultural images 
and political paradoxes of martial arts, is a novelistic genre unique to Chinese 
literature that has no satisfactory translation in English. (7)
Moreover, just because ‘the global hypervisibility of martial arts cin-
ema’ means that we all tend to know about martial arts drama and fictions 
in terms of a history of Hong Kong cinema, and just because academics 
tend to diagnose many aspects of Chinese culture as connected to a certain 
kind of cultural pathology, this does not necessarily mean that any of this 
is right. And it is around these areas that Liu packs the biggest punches:
Known in the West primarily through poorly subtitled films, Chinese martial 
arts fiction is one of the most iconic and yet the most understudied forms of 
modern sinophone creativity. Current scholarship on the subject is characterized 
by three central assumptions that I argue against in this book: first, that martial 
arts fiction is the representation of a bodily spectacle that historically originated 
in Hong Kong cinema; second, that the genre came into being as an escapist 
fantasy that provided psychological comfort to the Chinese people during the 
height of imperialism; and third, that martial arts fiction reflects a patriotic at-
titude that celebrates the greatness of Chinese culture, which in turn is variously 
described as the China-complex, colonial modernity, essentialized identity, 
diasporic consciousness, anxieties about globalization, or other psychological 
difficulties experienced by the Chinese people during modernization. (7)
Against all of this, Liu ‘reinterprets martial arts literature as a progressive 
intellectual critique of modernization theory’ (7). Moreover, he insists on 
the argument that ‘martial arts culture was first invented as a poetic relation 
between words rather than a visual relation between bodies’ (7–8). Thus, 
Liu asserts, ‘not only did the historical rise of martial arts literature predate 
the rise of martial arts cinema but the culture of martial arts, even in its 
cinematic incarnations and adaptations, is explicitly concerned with literari-
ness’ (8). In addition, ‘against commonly accepted interpretations of martial 
arts fiction as an apolitical form of escapist fantasy, this book presents it as 
a mode of intellectual intervention that has shaped the course of modern 
Chinese history’ (8). The real twist to Liu’s reading comes with his claim 
that the ‘historical reason for the genre’s exclusion from the Chinese canon’ 
boils down to ‘its distance from and incompatibility with Chinese national-
ism, which since the Qing dynasty has been a campaign to reform literature 
with criteria derived from European experiences of modernity’ (8, emphasis 
added). In other words, martial arts literature was, in a sense, a victim of 
nationalist modernizing discourses rather than a positive part of them: 
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The expansion of modernization discourse into the sphere of literary produc-
tion in the May Fourth period had rendered alternative (non-modernization-
based) philosophical and literary discourses illegitimate, and martial arts 
fiction, which has resisted Western models of instrumental reason and rational 
bureaucracy, was quickly branded as the feudal ideology of ‘Old China’, an 
obstacle that must be eradicated from the field of cultural production. (8)
This twist is also part of a double whammy. Not only was martial arts 
literature regarded as anathema to nationalist modernization, but it should 
also be understood as initially among the highest and most elite and edu-
cated of literary genres: 
While May Fourth intellectuals advocated Western thought as the basis for 
rapid modernization, martial arts novelists continued to draw upon China’s 
indigenous intellectual sources—Taoism, Buddhism, Confucianism, and pre-
modern literary models such as linked-chapter fiction. The martial arts novel 
in Chinese is renowned for the density of its classical poetic devices, historical 
allusions, philosophical precepts, and sophisticated plots. Indeed, the martial 
arts novel is the only genre in modern Chinese literature to be written in a 
semiclassical language after the early twentieth century, when the spoken 
vernacular Chinese (baihua) replaced Classical Chinese (wenyan) as the of-
ficial language of literary communication. Unlike the ‘universal language’ of 
cinema, the semiclassical language of the martial arts novel is in fact inac-
cessible to the masses—a fact that bedeviled early twentieth-century Chinese 
revolutionaries’ attempts to frame the genre as merely ‘popular fiction’. (8)
Consequently, because of the macropolitical and ideological twists and 
turns in the first half of the twentieth century, far from helping with any 
kind of nationalist project, ‘martial arts novelists were quickly demon-
ized as “traditionalists” who were holding China back from economic and 
military modernization’ (9). The irony is that, before the 1920s and 1930s, 
martial arts literature in China had held a long-standing position as being 
both central and canonical in the world of Chinese ‘high’ literary culture: 
As indicated by James Liu’s important and massive 1967 study, The Chinese 
Knight-Errant, the philosophy of martial arts has permeated and dominated 
virtually every form of premodern Chinese literature for over two thousand 
years: philosophical treatises, shi and ci poetry, dynastic histories, zawen 
(‘miscellaneous writings’), songs, Tang chuanqi (legends), Ming drama, and 
prose fiction. Indeed, two of the so-called Four Great Classical Novels of 
Chinese Literature (sida qishu) are explicit representations of the culture of 
martial arts: Water Margin and Romance of the Three Kingdoms, and despite 
being proto-martial arts novels, the two fourteenth-century classics have never 
been relegated to the status of popular fiction. (9)
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However, from the 1920s onwards, Chinese martial arts literature was 
attacked and disparaged by various parties, and, according to Liu, this was 
because it occupied a problematic position vis-à-vis nation building and 
modernization. It was denounced as lowbrow popular fiction, despite be-
ing written in a classical Chinese language unintelligible to all but the most 
highly educated. Thus, Liu argues that the label ‘popular fiction was . . . 
strictly a May Fourth construction’ and that before the ‘rise of moderniza-
tion discourse and developmental thinking in China, martial arts narratives 
were not seen as popular or even middle-brow fiction, but part of China’s 
high literary canon’. Indeed, he continues: ‘The culture of martial arts has 
always been a normative and privileged theme in Chinese literature’ (9). 
Nonetheless, during ‘the May Fourth crusade against martial arts fiction’, 
the genre was conflated ‘with “mandarin ducks and butterflies” (yuanyang 
hudie pai) fiction, stories about love published in Saturday and other less 
respected venues’ (9). 
The reasons for the May Fourth reformers’ crusade against martial arts 
literature was not its existence per se, but its continued existence in a time 
when the agenda was being driven by the desire to reform, modernize, and 
nationalize:
We can see that what May Fourth reformers objected to was not martial arts 
narratives as such, but the existence of such narratives in the twentieth cen-
tury. Both Mao Zedong and Lu Xun wrote approvingly of premodern narra-
tives of outlaws and martial valor, which they considered to be an expression 
of the people’s heroic struggles against feudal values, while accusing the 
modern descendants of the same works of corrupting the minds of the Chinese 
masses and blocking their revolutionary consciousness. (10) 
Thus, martial arts literature and culture was represented and reconsti-
tuted as something lowbrow, anti-modern, anachronistic and politically 
regressive. In 1932 martial arts films were banned in China, and martial 
arts fiction tout court ‘was banned by both the Communist Party in China 
and the Nationalist government in Taiwan after 1949’ (10). Subsequently: 
In post-1949 mainland China, members of the League of Leftist Writers as-
sumed leading positions in the PRC’s cultural bureaucracy and published 
literary histories that canonized (socialist) realism as ‘modern Chinese lit-
erature’. Nonrealist trends in early twentieth-century China, such as martial 
arts fiction, were removed from literary history. The story of modern Chinese 
literature and Chinese modernity was subsequently told as a unilinear move-
ment toward realism and Europeanized syntax, a feat accomplished through 
the translations, introductions, and appropriations of Western thought. (10)
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With these clampdowns in both Mainland China and Taiwan, Hong 
Kong ‘became the new center for martial arts film and literature after 1949, 
although Taiwan also produced a significant number of talented and prolific 
authors despite censorship’. Indeed, Liu notes, ‘literary historian Lin Bao-
chun actually considers the early period under martial law (1961–1970) to 
be Taiwan’s “golden age of martial arts literature”’ (10).
This is an interesting history. It is not as widely known in the West (and 
maybe also in the East) as it could be. However, this could be changing. Liu 
devotes a lot of space to the consideration of the ‘Jin Yong phenomenon’—
namely, the recent explosion of interest in, and accolades showered upon, the 
contemporary martial arts novelist, whose work has led to something of a re-
naissance or discursive revaluation of the status of martial arts literature. But, 
for Liu, the implications of the revaluation of Chinese literary history pro-
voked by interest in Jin Yong are more far-reaching than mere canon revision:
The ‘Jin Yong phenomenon’, as critics are now calling it, signifies more than 
an emerging literary canon or merely changing conditions of literary evalua-
tion. Comprehended historically, the rise of martial arts studies has profound 
implications for postcolonial studies and our understanding of what consti-
tutes a colonial situation. While a previous generation of scholars tended to 
understand colonialism in a more literal sense as territorial occupation, we are 
now much more aware of colonialism’s discursive workings in the production 
of identities and subject positions. Newer postcolonial theory has taught us to 
recognize the ways in which colonialism reproduces itself as the anticolonial 
nationalist elite’s attitude toward their own past. As the subaltern studies 
scholar Partha Chatterjee argues, the dominant West not only colonizes 
non-Western peoples and territories, but their imagination as well. Martial 
arts literature provides an opportunity for us to re-evaluate the assumption, 
promulgated since the May Fourth period, that Chinese modernity could only 
be attained through the negation and destruction of its own traditions. Mar-
tial arts literature challenges our conventional sense that literary modernity 
belonged to those ‘iconoclasts’ who promoted the Europeanization of the 
Chinese language. The submerged political history of martial arts literature 
reveals one of the modes in which a desire for the West and its rationalism 
colonized Chinese intellectuals’ consciousness in their self-appointed roles 
as saviors of the nation. For Liu Zaifu, Jin Yong’s achievements and the rea-
sons for his newfound canonicity reside precisely in his ability to develop an 
‘anti-Europeanized Chinese writing’ against the May Fourth enlightenment 
ideology and Europeanized sentence structures, and Jin Yong’s writing has 
succeeded in preserving China’s ‘accumulated cultural treasures’. (14–15)
This is an expansive and effusive passage. However, it strikes me that 
this representation of the matter actually circles back around behind Liu’s 
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argument and allows the thing he is arguing against to reenter through the 
back door. For Liu is hostile to the reading of Chinese literature in terms 
of nationalism, but yet here it is, coming to the forefront of attention, in 
the form of a rethinking of the postcolonial as what thinkers like Fredric 
Jameson, Haile Gerima, Vijay Prashad, and others have constructed as a 
decolonizing of colonized consciousness (Prashad 2001). At this point, 
one wonders about the status of Liu’s earlier polemical distancing and 
differencing from critics who read martial arts culture under the sign of 
nationalism. 
Of course, to adhere to Liu’s own contentions about the complexity and 
subtlety of martial arts literature, it would therefore seem to be very wrong 
to approach this in an all or nothing manner. Liu himself is concerned with 
the internal textual, narrative, and generic features of martial arts literature 
and is dead against the ignoring of these elements in the name of grouping 
it all together as pro- or anti-nationalist or pro- or anti-capitalist, and so 
on. Rather, Liu insists upon two important things. The first is the literari-
ness of martial arts literature. The second is the range of possible relations, 
groupings, identifications, and practices that it can precipitate. Of the first, 
he writes:
Martial arts texts’ concern with literariness is foregrounded by the recurring 
motif of the ‘Secret Scripture’ (miji). A standard formula in wuxia films and 
novels, the Secret Scripture is a lost or carefully guarded ancient text that en-
dows its owner with superhuman combat abilities; the competition or quest for 
this book forms the main plot of many wuxia stories. Significantly, the Secret 
Scripture is not a training manual with pictorial illustrations of martial moves, 
but a verbal text written in Classical Chinese (or sometimes in Sanskrit). The 
Secret Scripture contains instructions that guide the protagonist through a 
series of inner or spiritual transformations, which is, however, possible only 
if the protagonist is literate—that is, if the character has access to what in the 
real world would be termed the educational capital of the dominant class. (11)
Liu emphasizes ‘the genre’s advocacy of book learning as the source of 
martial power’ (12) in order to impress upon us the fact that the genre was 
not merely read by the educated classes but also that it has long been self-
reflexive about its literariness. It is a literary genre that values literature. 
Its stock figures with the highest skills have an ineradicable relationship 
to literature. In his words: ‘Wuxia is a self-consciously literary discourse 
that draws attention to the aesthetic properties of language’. Moreover, one 
of its effects was ‘to translate classical Chinese literary and cosmologi-
cal concepts into a large corpus of easily quotable, memorable phrases’. 
So influential has been this movement from the literary into the popular 
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cultural realm of everyday discourse that many ‘wuxia phrases have by 
now become endemic in speech situations unrelated to martial arts’ (12). 
Over two pages, Liu lists some of the most common everyday expressions 
that are used frequently in contexts of conversation, advertising, politics, 
and journalism in China, expressions that derive directly from martial arts 
literature (12–13). 
If the seeping into Chinese language, in all sorts of context, of terms and 
expressions from martial arts literature provides evidence of the strange 
unacknowledged or disavowed centrality of martial arts literature to con-
temporary Chinese culture, Liu hammers this point home by noting that 
even contemporary martial arts film comedies are structured by ideas that 
are only funny to the extent that the literariness of martial arts literature is 
known. Thus, he writes:
The narrative tradition of the Secret Scripture is the subject of Stephen 
Chow’s critically acclaimed 2004 parody of the genre, Kung Fu Hustle, in 
which Yuen Wooping (Yuan Heping), the legendary action cinema choreog-
rapher behind Matrix and Kill Bill, plays the character of a beggar who sells 
‘fake’ manuals that turn out to be real Secret Scriptures for the protagonist, 
played by Stephen Chow himself. The inside joke for those who recognize 
Yuen is that the action choreographer is the creator of fantastic martial arts, 
while the wirework, trampolines, and computer-generated images are the real 
Secret Scriptures. The joke draws its comedic power from a local knowledge 
of the genre’s tendency to reference textual artifacts. (11)
The secret scripture is a theme that will be most well known to non-
specialists in the Western(ized) world as it appears in the film Crouching 
Tiger, Hidden Dragon. And it was of course around, through, and because 
of this film and subsequent ‘similar’ arty martial arts films that the genre 
started to attain or regain a kind of artistic/intellectual ‘capital’ in these con-
texts. Wong Kar-wai’s recent film The Grandmaster is perhaps at the pin-
nacle of this ‘reclaiming’ of the martial arts for ‘high culture’. During this 
same time period, martial arts literature has been reappraised in China, too: 
Since the 1990s, the martial arts novel has undergone a significant reversal of 
fortune in the opinion of Chinese critics and cultural authorities. Doctoral dis-
sertations on the topic mushroomed across Chinese universities; research cen-
ters, archives, and international conferences have come into being. The study 
of the best-selling martial arts novelist, Jin Yong, is now a newly baptized 
sub-branch of academic studies—‘Jin-ology’ (jinxue)—in a manner analo-
gous to hongxue, the dedicated specialization in the study of Hong lou meng 
(Dream of the Red Chamber), or to Shakespeare Studies in the West. (13)
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All of this recasts the question of writing in (the writing of) martial arts 
studies. However, there are also some problematic steps in Liu’s writing. 
I have already indicated that one is the problematic status of the relations 
between martial arts literature and the nation. There is at least one more. 
Paying close attention to the way that Liu sets up his argument in State-
less Subjects (Liu 2011) reaps rewards. As we have seen, the work stridently 
opposes and seeks to redress the tendency to read Chinese and Hong Kong 
martial arts literature (and film) as being ultimately somehow basically just 
about nationalism. The force and clarity through which he argues this is ad-
mirable and highly thought provoking. However, I am not entirely convinced 
that he successfully manages to reconfigure our understanding of this area. 
This is because, when reading his work, the now-clichéd line from Hamlet 
kept popping into my head—‘the lady doth protest too much, methinks’.
By this I mean that although Liu is a sophisticated writer, and although his 
major claims and contentions involve an attention to the complexity and his-
torical imbrication of Chinese martial arts literature and the twists and turns 
of history, I still feel that he overplays his enabling observation about the 
injustice of reducing martial arts literature to what Jameson called ‘national 
allegory’ readings. Liu seeks to extricate the texts from their consignment to 
more or less nationalist productions and to demonstrate that, in actual fact, 
the textual features of the genre relate to the condition of protagonists being 
‘stateless subjects’. It is in the study of these textual features that Liu’s work 
is most successful and in resituating the texts in terms of a kind of aesthetic 
continuity that persevered at the same time and despite the modernizing and 
nationalizing tendencies of the May Fourth movement that would have pre-
ferred to see the back of such a genre. The differentiating of his perspective 
from any of the ‘national allegory’ positions strikes me as necessary, but 
overplayed. This is so even though, rather than ‘opposing’, Liu seems more 
interested in exposing subterranean forces and movements, tangential to or 
under, through, and between, the dominant currents.
One of the benefits of Liu’s approach is that the modernizing and na-
tionalizing forces of the twentieth century in China come to be recast in 
such a way that they are shown to be more reactionary and Westernized in 
and through the desire to modernize and ‘nationalize’ than the writers of 
traditional genres of martial arts literature. To reiterate what Liu writes in 
relation to the ‘Jin Yong phenomenon’:
Martial arts literature provides an opportunity for us to reevaluate the assump-
tion, promulgated since the May Fourth period, that Chinese modernity could 
only be attained through the negation and destruction of its own traditions. 
Martial arts literature challenges our conventional sense that literary moder-
nity belonged to those ‘iconoclasts’ who promoted the Europeanization of the 
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Chinese language. The submerged political history of martial arts literature 
reveals one of the modes in which a desire for the West and its rationalism 
colonized Chinese intellectuals’ consciousness in their self-appointed roles 
as saviors of the nation. For Liu Zaifu, Jin Yong’s achievements and the rea-
sons for his newfound canonicity reside precisely in his ability to develop an 
‘anti-Europeanized Chinese writing’ against the May Fourth enlightenment 
ideology and Europeanized sentence structures, and Jin Yong’s writing has 
succeeded in preserving China’s ‘accumulated cultural treasures’. (14–15)
At the end of this paragraph it is as if (as they say of energies in taijiquan) 
‘old yin’ turns into ‘young yang’. For it strikes me that this paragraph means 
that the modernizers and nationalizers of the twentieth century were only 
operating according to one possible nationalizing logic—one whose motto 
would be ‘in with the new’. However, the contemporary rediscovery of 
tradition, such as Liu describes, smacks of a rather nostalgic (even postmod-
ern) nationalism. Thus, to continue with another allusion to Shakespeare, 
although Liu claims to come to bury nationalism here, this also seems to 
amount to a certain kind of praising. To my mind, there is only something—
and not everything—in Liu’s reference to the argument that ‘martial arts 
novels serve the repository of what Paul Ricoeur, Richard Dyer, and Fredric 
Jameson have called “the Utopian impulse” of society: the collective desire 
for a classless society that the development of capitalism fails to suppress’ 
(15). The absence of—or the bypassing of—the state in martial arts litera-
ture is crucial to Liu’s sense that martial arts literature stands as a rumina-
tion on other (non-statist) forms of sociality. And I accept this argument. 
However, because it involves absence and bypassing, the use of traditional 
academic terms like ‘resistance’ is what leads the sense of the argument in 
the wrong direction. Consider, for example, this passage: 
martial arts literature offers an important form of subaltern resistance to the 
logic of internalized colonialism. If what made the martial arts novel aes-
thetically disreputable half a century ago is also what makes it a privileged 
object of cultural studies today, we have in this genre a unique opportunity 
to understand the lost organicity of Chinese culture before the bureaucratic 
rationalization of modernity. (15)
Crucial to making this paragraph ‘work’ are certain points that Liu 
neglects to mention, such as the important Lacanian poststructuralist 
point that an idea like ‘lost organicity’ does not have a referent. There 
never was a unity, organic wholeness, or plenitude. This is a retroactively 
constituted nostalgic myth of something that never existed, precisely be-
cause it is impossible (because the things closest to what it could possibly 
refer to are either the Garden of Eden or the womb). But there are other 
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problems here, too. For if martial arts literature is indeed a continuation 
through modernity of a high cultural form, then it seems problematic to 
represent it as a kind of ‘subaltern resistance’. Moreover, as Rey Chow 
might point out, this construction of literature as resistance smacks of 
the ‘repressive hypothesis’ that Foucault himself first seemed to hold 
(vis-à-vis the status of ‘literature’ in the face of the ‘bureaucratic ratio-
nalization’ of language) before going on to challenge precisely such a 
view later on in The History of Sexuality (Chow 2002; Bowman 2013b). 
In other words, Liu seems to be forwarding the idea that a certain type 
of literature is non-nationalist and actively ‘resistant’ in and of itself. 
Chow has deconstructed this poststructuralist fetishistic overvaluation of 
literature on several occasions, but especially in The Protestant Ethnic. 
And Liu seems to be replaying the problem here. What is perhaps most 
problematic in the passage quoted above is the implied sense that there re-
ally was an organicity before the emergence of modernity. If this claim is 
being made, then Liu is being carried along by what Chow calls ‘primitive 
passions’ (Chow 1995, 2002; Bowman 2013b). Of course, there is good 
reason to give Liu the benefit of the doubt and note that he is probably 
not falling into the trap of ‘really’ making such a claim. But the problem 
remains, that the terms being used to structure his framing of his project 
are a minefield. Consider this passage: 
The mythic time of the wuxia imaginary belongs to the time of pre-capital; it 
constitutes an idealized space in which the subject and the object of social life 
are still unified before their fragmentation by the advent of capitalist moder-
nity. What was once considered the result of an infectious, commodified mass 
culture is today China’s Homeric epic. (15)
Even though the first clause makes it clear that wuxia is set in ‘mythic 
time’, the unwary reader may still easily come away with the sense that 
there really was a time ‘in which the subject and the object of social life 
[were] still unified before their fragmentation by the advent of capitalist 
modernity’. But, as contemporary theorists from the Lacanians of the 1980s 
and 1990s to Rey Chow today have all made clear in various ways, the 
sense of a mythic completeness and unified wholeness in the past is itself a 
symptomatic fantasy always (re)invented in the present. Liu surely knows 
this, for it constitutes pretty much the horizon and backdrop of the realms 
of the literary and cultural theory within which this work exists. But the 
wording of much of the framing of the problematic tends to drive the text 
in directions I believe it would rather not go. A language of ‘resistance’, 
‘subalternity’, and so on, does not seem entirely appropriate to a text which 
seems really to be more organized by a ‘yes, and . . .’ spirit, rather than a 
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‘no, but . . .’ spirit. As Derrida once argued, the deconstructive approach 
should be one which embraces the logic of ‘yes, and’ rather than ‘either/or’ 
(Royle 2000). So, here then, the martial arts literature can be shown to be 
also all of the things Liu says it is, as well as having functioned in the ways 
he demonstrates it ‘shouldn’t’ (only) have. 
In order to set out some of the alternative approaches to, and uses and 
values of, martial arts literature, Liu turns elsewhere. He introduces ‘only 
a few examples of critical uses of the lessons of martial arts today’, but 
insists that the ‘boundless political possibilities of critical martial arts are 
something we are only beginning to imagine’ (16). However, in reading 
Liu’s account of these possibilities, it seems that to find any of them, one 
has to look outside of China itself and indeed, arguably, outside of and 
away from literature per se. As his formulation of the question reveals, Liu 
looks away from China and to ‘the global citizen’ when formulating the 
question itself:
What difference, then, does it make when we cease to view this form of litera-
ture as the stuff of cheaply produced B-list midnight movies and the window 
on the colonial psyche of the Chinese people, and instead begin to view it as 
a serious mode of social thought, as an intellectual resource of importance for 
contemporary theory and cultural practice from which all global citizens have 
something to learn? (15–16)
The question (re)introduces ‘movies’ and also ‘global citizens’ in what 
was ostensibly meant to be a question about literature. Consequently, the 
answer comes as an answer to a question about movies and international 
(non-Chinese or diasporic Chinese) people: 
Inspired by Guattari and Deleuze’s notion of ‘minor literature’, Meaghan 
Morris characterizes martial arts film as ‘minor cinema’ that serves as a 
critical pedagogical tool in the classroom for the study of class conscious-
ness. While ‘major cinema’ is ‘global’ (difference-denying), ‘minor cinema’ 
is ‘transnational’ (community-building). For Morris, martial arts cinema is 
a historical example of how a minor cinema from a distant culture (Hong 
Kong) can reshape world culture through the preservation of spaces that are 
rapidly disappearing—urban slums, motels, buses, factories, and other ‘any-
space-whatever’ filled with distressed futures and chronic dereliction and 
loss-against the apocalyptic, spectacular, U.S. patriotic (‘saving the world’) or 
global folkloric design of Hollywood’s big-budget major cinema. (16)
In other words, this is an answer about martial arts film, not literature. 
Moreover, it is arguably also an answer about something that is only ‘mi-
nor’ when viewed from a certain place and a certain perspective—one that 
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might provocatively be characterized as having been constitutively blinded 
to the possibility that martial arts literature and film today in China and in 
Hong Kong are neither ‘minor’ nor ‘not nationalizing’. Martial arts may 
well still be ‘minor’ in the United States and Europe. Morris’s argument 
was actually about the minor genre of U.S. produced martial arts films for 
the U.S. market—normally ‘direct to video’ films with very small circula-
tion (Morris 2004). Is this an argument that can be translated or transposed 
to Hong Kong or China? 
Then Liu turns to another academic treatment of the cultural and ‘politi-
cal’ effects of martial arts film (not literature) during the 1970s:
Similarly, Vijay Prashad observes in an important book on Afro-Asian con-
nections that, historically, martial arts culture has produced political solidar-
ity and interracial cross-identification between oppressed peoples across the 
globe—a strange ‘alliance between the Red Guard and the Black Panthers’ 
from the Cultural Revolution in China to the Civil Rights movement in the 
States—that is otherwise unthinkable. What Prashad cleverly terms ‘Kung 
Fusion’ indicates a form of ‘polycultural’ communication that is distinct from 
the multiculturalist celebration of diversity (similar to Morris’s distinction 
between the transnational and the global). Amy Abugo Ongiri argues that by 
recognizing the historical role played by kung fu visual icons in the formation 
of a Black aesthetic that she calls ‘spectacular Blackness’, and by recognizing 
the interconnections and dialogues between Asians and African Americans, 
we can refuse America’s racial ideological landscape that constructs these 
communities as polar opposites in debates surrounding affirmative action and 
the model minority myth. (16)
Now, I do not disagree with any of this in and of itself. But the few 
evocations of certain readings of the significance of martial arts films 
on groups, communities, cultures, and literacies around the world in the 
1970s that Liu gives here are both a world away from literature and from 
China. Perhaps this is because, in the effort to set out his sophisticated and 
fascinating study of Chinese martial arts literature, Liu goes too far in the 
direction of constructing it as somehow free from the reactionary forces and 
historical processes that he sees as having militated against it throughout 
the twentieth century. Or perhaps it is because such dramatic examples 
of ‘polycultural’ building cannot be found in the realms and registers of 
literature, compared to the proliferation of such examples around film. Or 
perhaps it is because the gravitational pull of issues of nationalism in and 
around both martial arts literature and film in and around China is some-
thing that has not only been produced by Western theorists but also by 
Chinese literature, film, and nationalism. 
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nation anD siMuLation
Things become more complicated when we shift our attention from either 
martial arts literature or film to martial arts practice and the question of 
nationalism. For instance, Frank states the relation to be as follows: ‘taiji-
quan is a master symbol of Chinese nationalism’ (Frank 2006: 186). Many 
are critical of the arguments of scholars like Frank—and Douglas Wile, 
too—who claim strong connections between taijiquan and nationalism. 
This criticism seems to arise because a lot of the development of taijiquan 
predates the modern Chinese nation-state. Accordingly, to attribute a na-
tionalistic fervour or even flavour to the first archivists and intellectuals of 
taijiquan seems anachronistic. Put differently, to connect something like 
taijiquan and nationalism could be characterized as a problem of projec-
tion, of projecting our present values backwards in time, from the position 
of the present—as if there had always been nation-states. This is related to 
one of Althusser’s definitions of ideology: the belief in the eternality and 
natural inevitability in all times and all places of the truth and reality of 
the values of the present. In other words, the challenge seems to be: How 
could something possibly be nationalistic before nationalism or before the 
nation? The way Adam Frank explains it is like this:
Like the Alamo’s position in the construction and experience of Texas moder-
nity, taijiquan in China ‘is a shrine committed to memorializing a past event 
by authenticating a singular version of it’ (Flores 2002: 33), but in this case, 
the ‘event’ is an ancient China whose history has been reconfigured by suc-
cessive winners in the constant shift of dynastic power that has occurred over 
the centuries. (2006: 185)
Although it is common to approach such matters by way of reference to 
Benedict Anderson’s work on the origins and spread of nationalism, Jacques 
Derrida’s thinking of temporality in works such as Politics of Friendship 
(Derrida 1997) is also helpful. For there are indeed all sorts of conceptual 
and terminological difficulties involved in thinking back and discoursing 
on states of affairs before the establishment of nations. This is because 
nationalistic thinking—that is, thinking according to, or in the terms of, 
nation-states—is so ingrained in us as to be almost inescapable. And yet, as 
Anderson notes in the early pages of Imagined Communities, the paradox is 
that while nations so often seem to present themselves as ancient, they are 
really modern inventions. Before nations, there were monarchies, aristocra-
cies, blood and feudal ties, and above all, in Europe, religious denomina-
tions. The idea of a nation was born comparatively recently, with (argues 
Anderson) the birth of the printing press as a technology that had all sorts of 
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linking, connecting, and standardizing consequences and the demise (partly 
because of the birth of the printing press) of the monopoly of Church Latin 
over the written word. This occurred because the printing press enabled 
the rapid dissemination of texts in indigenous languages. Martin Luther’s 
protestant ‘heresy’ arguably only succeeded in challenging Rome because 
of the speed with which Luther’s text was disseminated, in German. 
Certainly, Frank does fascinating things with his creative reading of 
Benedict Anderson. For instance, he connects taijiquan and Chinese na-
tionalism like this:
While Anderson is primarily concerned with print-capitalism in the creation 
of ‘vernacular languages of state’, I am extending his argument here to include 
taijiquan as a kind of kinesthetic vernacular language of state. Regardless of 
whether the language we are talking about is print or architecture or move-
ment, the state controls the standardization of that language and privileges its 
standardized forms over other languages. Thus, certain taijiquan forms be-
come vernaculars of the Chinese state, while others are ignored or subsumed 
within the nationalist discourse, if not banned outright. What goes on in park 
practice or sequestered, secret practice in family homes is often in tension 
with standardization. For the individual practitioner who might dabble in a 
family-based, ‘traditional’ form and something like the forty-eight-movement 
form developed for national and international competition, the contradiction 
between state and teacher, between interpretations of Daoism and socialism, 
between a family’s history and a nation’s history, may occur within a single 
body. (161)
But, is it really the case that—and, if so, how did it come about that—in 
Frank’s words, ‘at the level of the nation, taijiquan has become not only 
the single most popular exercise in China but also one of the most visible 
symbols of Chineseness that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) projects 
to the world’? (158–59) Frank’s own answer starts from referring to the 
promulgation of taijiquan as ‘part of the construction of a whole national 
discourse about “strengthening the national body” that arose in China in 
the 1920s’ (159). From this, he contends, taijiquan ‘emerged from that 
discourse as a kind of “master symbol”’. 
The temporality of this argument is unclear. But the word ‘emerged’ 
suggests that it was not always the case that taijiquan was the necessary or 
inevitable master symbol of Chineseness. In other words, we are dealing 
here with a process of becoming, rather than fixed or essential being.
In Politics of Friendship, Derrida introduces the term teleiopoeisis. This 
is a term he uses to describe the logic of the establishment of meaning and 
value for entities. What it means in practical terms is this. If we believe 
that a martial art—say, mulanquan—is ancient, and stretches back to the 
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historical era of Mulan, then we are a lot more likely to accord it a position 
of respect, or even reverence, than we are if we believe it was dreamed 
up by state apparatchiks, in 1999 or even 1971. As we saw earlier in the 
discussion of Chong, temporality, history—time—can be manipulated, for 
all manner of reasons. If newness is valued, then some old thing can be 
repackaged as brand new. If age is valued, then we can construct a lineage 
that shows we are direct descendants of Zhang Sanfeng or Bodhidharma. 
This is politically important in terms of our lives and values because where 
we believe we come from determines very much where we think we are 
and where we feel we should be going. This is known and exploited by 
ideologues and marketers alike. Frank contends that romantic, nostalgic, 
phantasmatic, allochronic, self-orientalizing nationalism permeates every 
level of discourse in and around taijiquan in China. ‘Martial arts tourna-
ments, martial arts tourist sites, and research produced in Chinese sports 
science and history journals contribute to a picture of how a nationalist 
discourse has developed in regard to martial arts in general and taijiquan in 
particular’ (159). Moreover, he argues:
Most taijiquan practitioners in the PRC, despite their attraction to one style or 
another, are not really practicing a particular taijiquan. Rather, by playing the 
slow form or learning a sword dance or two, they are enacting an imagined 
moment in the past in order to experience who they are, or who they are sup-
posed to be, in the present. Taijiquan, to paraphrase Clifford Geertz, produces 
both a ‘feeling of’ and a ‘feeling for’ Chineseness. (158–59)
But where did it all come from? Nationalism does not arise in a vacuum. 
According to Anderson, different nations were essentially forced into 
existence by virtue of the pressure on kingdoms and geographical spaces 
to self-identify as nations and play the (inter)national ‘game’, or to be 
pounced upon and become colonized. The older imperial orders were in-
creasingly challenged by national forces of all orders. In the case of China, 
revolutionaries led by Sun Yat-sen acquired the right combination of military 
strength, political influence, and luck to stage a successful revolt and dis-
mantle the imperial structure. Many of these radical revolutionaries, including 
Sun himself, were educated in Japan, the United States, or Europe. Their over-
seas experiences and educations heavily influenced their notions of China’s 
priorities, the foremost of which was the cultivation of national identity—a 
sense of ‘Chineseness’—that superseded the allegiance to local place and 
local language that had historically provided fertile ground for warlordism in 
China. They also hoped to use an energetic nationalism to overcome the sense 
of inferiority that many Chinese had felt in the seventy-five years since the 
Opium War. (161–62)
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Key to the constitution of nationalistic sensibilities was the generation of 
a certain type of pride. And, according to Frank, ‘the recently constituted 
modern Olympic movement, which almost immediately became a prov-
ing ground for national pride, held a special attraction for new officials 
concerned with “strengthening the national body”’ (162). The rationale, 
according to Frank, was that ‘if Chinese athletes could excel in even a few 
Olympic sports, the resulting national pride would facilitate a sense of na-
tion among the masses. It would also inevitably raise the new government’s 
standing in the international community’ (163): 
Policy makers in the new government took this world of possibility to heart. 
Among other strategies, they reasoned that the easiest and quickest way to 
collect Olympic gold medals would be to advocate for the inclusion in the 
Olympics of ‘folk sports’ (minzu chuantong tiyu) at which Chinese athletes 
could immediately excel (Jing Cai 1959; Zhang Shan et al. 1996; Xu, Zhang, 
and Zhang 2000; Morris 1998). The most popular and obvious choice among 
these sports were martial arts, since high-level teachers already existed, and, 
to some degree, international interest had already been generated in Asian 
fighting arts through the slow popularization of Japanese judo, which began 
with the synthesizing of the art in the 1880s by Dr. Jigorō Kanō, ‘a Japanese 
reformer steeped in the lore of Western physical education’. (163)
Frank has much more to say about the strengthening of the hold of nation-
alistic discourses on taijiquan. These occur in the modern era, but they build 
on materials ‘fit for purpose’, so to speak. So, rather than accusing academics 
such as Wile and Frank of projecting modern discursive formations (whether 
nationalism or Chineseness) back in time, it seems better to acknowledge the 
complex and subtle ways in which notions of the ‘back in time’, such as ‘an-
cient’ or ‘essential Chineseness’, are often decidedly modern discursive con-
structs. As Rey Chow argues in Primitive Passions, a passion for the idea of 
the primitive (the ancient, the timeless, the state of nature, and so on) emerges 
in times of crisis in modernity or postmodernity (Chow 1995). Modern dis-
cursive formations and socio-political configurations are actively involved in 
the construction of the very notions of the ‘back in time’ against and through 
which they are defined, as both history and, romantically, destiny. 
hEgEMony anD iDEntity
At this juncture, it will be useful to work through some of Adam Frank’s 
points in relation to the ideological establishment of the identity of taijiquan 
in China through the twentieth century. He observes:
 Writing Martial Arts Studies 91
For the reformers who began the slow process of modernizing China’s bureau-
cracy in 1912 . . . the challenge was to channel this resentment [at the losses 
of the Opium War] into a positive energy that would place China in a strong-
enough economic position on the world stage to eventually allow it to wrest 
foreign concessions and ‘leased’ territories such as Hong Kong and Macau 
from foreign control. The creation of a national physical fitness movement 
was one among many such projects. (Frank 2006: 162)
Strong bodies, strong personal characteristics, strong sense of worth and 
identity, strong nation: such is the logic. This is part of domestic policy. As 
mentioned earlier, many of Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionaries had been educated 
in the United States, Japan, or Europe, and their ‘overseas experiences and 
educations heavily influenced their notions of China’s priorities, the fore-
most of which was the cultivation of national identity’ (162). Part of that 
nationalistic fervour was to be produced through sport. This project culmi-
nated in the famous appearance of taijiquan at the 1936 Berlin Olympics: 
The year 1936, when the famous Berlin Olympics in which Adolph Hitler 
walked out on the ceremony that saw Jesse Owens and other African Ameri-
can athletes anointed with medals, was also seminal for early Chinese at-
tempts to make taijiquan an Olympic event. Participating nations were given 
an opportunity to show off their national athletic arts. The Chinese fielded 
both men’s and women’s martial arts teams that performed short, modified 
taijiquan sets created by several teachers just for the occasion. (166)
Unfortunately, perhaps, ‘this planned, intellectualized approach to tai-
jiquan virtually disappeared with the Japanese occupation that began in 
earnest in 1937’, not least because of the fact that ‘within a few years, most 
of the top martial artists had been killed or fled’ (167). After the war: 
The Party’s glorification of martial arts and the ongoing push to popularize 
taijiquan were both a continuation of Guomindang support for martial arts 
before the war and a continuation of the cultural policy that Mao outlined 
during the 1942 Yenan Forum (. . .). Taijiquan and other ‘regional’ martial 
arts were folded into the category of minzu chuantong tiyu (‘traditional folk 
sports’). (168)
Frank notes that ‘the Cultural Revolution disrupted and almost destroyed 
[many] martial arts organizations . . . which were branded by Red Guards 
as examples of feudalism’ (168). However, by the 1980s the Chinese Com-
munist Party were starting to become much more supportive of the idea 
of legitimizing martial arts institutions, and also of actively promoting the 
sporting dimensions of martial arts again: 
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By that time, the Party became even more energetic about promoting the tour-
nament system, and local, provincial, and national-level professional martial 
arts teachers found opportunities to link with their foreign counterparts as the 
door to cultural exchange opened wider. The International Shaolin Festival at 
Zhengzhou became one of the most visible manifestations of this combina-
tion of local interests and state-level cultural policies. It also served as a kind 
of sensual festival of identity construction, where audiences and performers 
could exchange notions of nationalism and internationalism through the struc-
tured world of the tournament. (168)
Throughout all of these historical transformations, the interplay of per-
sonal senses of identity, group senses of identity, and national senses of 
identity should be emphasized. Frank contends that in the atmosphere in 
and around these major tournaments in China ‘those of us who practiced 
Chinese martial arts shared a camaraderie that seemed to transfer readily 
across national, cultural, even stylistic boundaries’. Then, ominously, the 
first line of the next paragraph reads: ‘At least on the surface’ (Frank 2006: 
157). The sense of foreboding conjured up here refers not to enmity, but 
rather to the force exerted by nationalistic identifications that subtend and 
often trump any other form of bonding at these events. This is so, even 
though, as Frank observes: 
Throughout the city, but especially in the vicinity of the stadium, banners pro-
claimed unity in Chinese and English: ‘To make progress together’ declared 
one banner in English, while a Chinese rendition said ‘Using martial arts to 
become friends and make progress together’ (yi wu hui you gongtong jinbu). 
As one of the largest comprehensive martial arts tournaments in China, the 
Zhengzhou tournament attracted participants from dozens of countries. (157)
This all indicates the emergence a new form of business ‘marketing 
logic’, organized by branding and ‘networking’, the aim being to make 
contacts. The branding plays on the strange nexus of ‘popular conceptions 
of Daoism as individual cultivation’ (185) combined with stalls selling 
‘souvenirs that seemed to have little or nothing to do with martial arts but 
had much to do with martial arts tourists fulfilling a dream by traveling to 
China for the first time’ (157). 
Significantly, Frank emphasizes that the events are thoroughly interna-
tionalized.1 Their organization not only enables but actively promotes a 
preferred type of martial arts tourism.2 Via these and other examples (in-
cluding discussion of Chen village and the Shaolin Temple tourism) of the 
logic of commodification conceived as part of a new ‘vernacular language 
of state’, Frank hammers home the point that
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the Chinese government had been very astute in understanding that martial 
arts in China are simultaneously separate and of a piece. In the nationalist 
project, Shaolin and taijiquan were not only easily lumped together but actu-
ally lumped together in the public imagination through movies and television. 
Therefore, it was no surprise that the tournament in Zhengzhou, ostensibly de-
voted to Shaolin, included taijiquan events, or that Shaolin people competed in 
full-contact fighting and push hands at taijiquan events. Images of the nation 
thus became inextricably tied to images of martial arts. (182–83)
Martial arts, then, become a vehicle for the articulation of a dimension 
of national identity (qua nationalism). But this articulation is also couched 
as inclusionary and border crossing: it involves appeal to an international 
community of practitioners, fans, believers, and consumers. However, 
this culture crossing is subtended by an economic logic: making connec-
tions, networking, making ‘progress’ happen. None of this is to say that 
individual entities or the events themselves are false or fake. Rather, it 
is to indicate the extent to which identities are double—sometimes even 
duplicitous. The devout spiritual believer who purchases accordingly, the 
friends who are friends purely because of their business aspirations, the 
international connections made for nationalist reasons: none of these things 
are new or scandalous or unique to martial arts. They are discursive forces 
and relations that constitute relations and identities. 
We will return to these entanglements again. But at this juncture, hav-
ing followed the writing of several key thinkers throughout this chapter, I 
would like to offer two further disruptive readings of martial arts in terms 
of identity. The first offers an alternative way to think through matters of 
martial arts, identity, and transnationalism. The second explores some of 
the issues raised in the earlier sections of this chapter via the reading of an 
appropriately international, or transnational, film.
ECLipsing thE huMan
The first reading is inspired by an image. When I was a child, I saw an item 
on a children’s television news programme about an imminent total eclipse 
of the sun. The item centred on jet aircraft being sent out to ‘chase’ the 
eclipse. The idea, as I recall, was that the jets would try to maintain a posi-
tion such that the total eclipse could be experienced for as long as possible. 
Scientific equipment of all sorts could thereby film, record, photograph, 
and variously monitor the eclipse for as long as possible. And this was said 
to be important, I recall, because having the sun blocked out in this way 
would enable many more things to come into view than could normally be 
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perceived. In other words, blocking out the sun enabled scientists to see and 
study and learn a lot more about the sun. Blocking out the sun in the study 
of the sun drew into visibility things to do with the sun that the sun itself 
normally blocked out.
This is the analogy or metaphor that I propose to use to rethink certain 
issues in martial arts studies here. I want to block out or bracket off the very 
thing that seems absolutely central and fundamental. The image of the sun 
as at once both centre and source of light, while also at the same time (and 
by the same token) the absolute blind spot, is one that philosophers have 
used in various ways for quite some time. For instance, the sun has been 
a metaphor for the paradigm, for the way of seeing—or, as the old zenrin 
poems put it: for ‘the eye that sees but cannot see itself’ or ‘the sword that 
cuts but cannot cut itself’. And the figure that I want to block out, here—
perhaps surprisingly—is the figure of the martial arts expert or master him 
or herself. The practitioner might seem like a peculiar figure to want to 
exclude from a discussion of martial arts. But I want to do so in order to 
see whether we can see more clearly some things that a too-focused focus 
on the figure of the martial artist might remain blind to.
In any eventuality, such an exercise might potentially be helpful for 
martial arts studies, just as eclipse gazing might be helpful for studies of 
the sun. It might be the case that we can see more things related to the 
supposedly ‘primary’ object when that primary object itself is deliberately 
blocked from view. Indeed, in the terms of deconstruction, it is not only 
important but also necessary (albeit insufficient) to invert the presumed 
hierarchy of things in order to detect the presence and force of conflations, 
blocks, traps, and displacements—or even to effect certain displacements 
that are already ‘trying’ to happen, or happening, at the same time as being 
blocked from happening because of the hold and sway of the presumed 
hierarchy of things. To rephrase this, we can put it back into the terms of 
our eclipse-gazing metaphor: surely one of the things that the sun blinds 
us to is the whole range of other things that we are actually concerned 
with. Are we really concerned with the sun, or are we concerned with the 
effects of the sun on other things? Thus, similarly, with the figure of the 
martial artist: What is the nature of our investment in this object? What 
is it that we are really interested in? This is not a personal question about 
personal motivations. It is a rhetorical question about discursive opera-
tions. The idea is that if we block out the figure of the martial artist, we 
might be able to see what this or that discourse about this or that object or 
topic is, in a sense, ‘really about’—or also about.3 This formulation may 
seem convoluted. But another—Derridean—way of putting this might be 
to say that discourses on a certain subject cannot but drift, diverge, double, 
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and disseminate away from that subject (Derrida 1981). This is because, 
although, say, martial arts themselves may be the nominal or notional 
focus, they will invariably also be or become in some sense subordinated 
or marginalized to other concerns and questions—political, economic, 
cultural, managerial, academic, and so on. As Derrida would have said, the 
discourse is always going to be double, divided, maybe even duplicitous 
(see Bowman 2007a). The approach is as much a part of the focus as the 
thing approached.
Many studies of martial arts are organized by a focus on the figure of the 
referent of the martial artist. But what happens when we don’t organize our 
studies around individuals or groups; when we think martial arts outside of 
martial artists? This may seem impossible. Martial arts need martial artists. 
Nevertheless, to see what happens when we eclipse the figure of the martial 
artist, we might consider the case of their spread and development—some-
thing that on first glance may seem to be necessarily and apparently entirely 
and inescapably embodied.
Studies of the spread and development of martial arts are very often 
organized by matters of the actions, movements, and migrations of certain 
key people—key teachers, in particular—or, conversely, the migration of 
students to and from these key teachers (Assunção 2005; Frank 2006). 
This is hardly surprising. Martial arts practices are essentially physical, 
embodied, interhuman, tactile, sensuous activities. They are ultimately 
wedded and welded to human bodies. Embodied, physical, face-to-face, 
body-to-body contact is roundly regarded as the prerequisite for any kind of 
teaching, learning, or transmission (Downey 2005; Frank 2006). However, 
at the same time as this, all studies of martial arts dissemination are obliged 
to acknowledge, to a greater or lesser extent, that what went on around the 
key people made the most difference. Indeed, what went on around the key 
people is what made those people turn out to be key.
For instance, as is well known, ‘oriental’ martial arts ‘arrived’ in West-
ern popular consciousness thanks to the film and media explosion in the 
representation of these arts in the 1960s and early 1970s (Krug 2001). It 
was not until this time that Westerners even started to make enquiries about 
Asian martial arts. Non-Asian practitioners of Asian martial arts were, be-
fore the 1960s, rare and exceptional idiosyncrasies. It was the appearance 
of Asian martial arts in film and television that caused the boom in prac-
tice. The boom in practice was not simply caused by a boom in Chinese, 
Japanese, or Korean immigration into the United States, Europe, or the 
UK. In fact, these embodied human practices can be said to have migrated 
separately—often paradoxically disconnected from any migration of the 
humans who were their embodiment. For instance, in the UK throughout 
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the 1980s and 1990s, the nominally Korean art of taekwondo became by 
far the most widely practiced Asian martial art. But its spread had no con-
nection to Korean migration. The martial art spread through franchises, 
syndicates, memberships, and institutional hierarchies.
Similarly, in the United States, legend has it that before Bruce Lee 
started doing so, no Chinese would teach the ‘secrets’ of kung fu to white 
or black Westerners. Of course, things are not so simple. There were in-
deed reputed to be a number of non-Chinese students of Chinese martial 
arts in the West before Bruce Lee started to teach non-Chinese—including, 
indeed, non-Chinese students being taught by Wong Jack Man, the person 
Bruce Lee legendarily fought in San Francisco (in the fight that led Lee to 
reconsider and revise his fighting style and training methods). According 
to the most popular version of the legend, Lee was challenged to a duel 
by the Chinese martial arts community because he was teaching Chinese 
secrets to non-Chinese. However, according to Wong Jack Man, the fight 
only occurred because Lee had issued an open challenge at a demonstra-
tion, claiming that he could beat any martial artist in the area. Indeed, he did 
beat Wong, but the important point is that the fight arose not because Lee 
was teaching non-Chinese students but because he issued a challenge. The 
Lee estate and Hollywood hagiographies have preferred to represent Lee as 
someone who was besieged by racism from all directions—from the white 
American community and from the Chinese community.
Rather than that, the crucial point to be emphasized about who Bruce 
Lee taught is this: the significance of Bruce Lee was not that he taught 
non-Chinese people but rather that he taught Hollywood actors, directors, 
and producers. This had exponential knock on cultural effects. Before 
this, the fact is that the primary reason why whites and blacks were not 
being taught kung fu was not that the American Chinese community was 
racist (see Chong 2012); rather it was because before Chinese martial arts 
began appearing on screen, no one was asking to be taught kung fu. Some 
whites and blacks in the United States were learning Japanese and Korean 
martial arts, of course. But the fact is that these were only really known 
in the United States because ex–U.S. military personnel, returning from 
Japan and Korea, began to teach them. The massive proliferation of martial 
arts occurred because film and media images constituted the desire. Sub-
sequently, this also arguably constituted the sense in Asian countries that 
there was a demand for Asian martial arts in the West. It was this sense of 
a possible U.S. demand that pulled Chinese martial artists towards emigra-
tion to the United States and other countries. Adam Frank’s ethnographic 
works frequently relate conversations about the fact that Chinese martial 
artists emigrate because of perceived demand for their skills in Europe or 
 Writing Martial Arts Studies 97
the United States (Frank 2006, 2014). This demand comes from a desire 
that is constitutively mediated, put in place by film and television.
In a sense, then, questions of martial arts migration and questions of hu-
man—say, Chinese, Japanese, or Korean—migration are really two very 
different questions. They have different temporalities and different logics, 
even if they might overlap. Yet, posed like this, it seems illogical: it seems 
counterintuitive to try to separate the ‘martial artist’ from the ‘martial art’. 
Indeed, phrased like this, we are in the conceptual terrain of thinkers like 
Friedrich Nietzsche and Judith Butler and their various explorations of con-
ceptual pairs like ‘the dancer and the dance’, ‘the actor and the action’, ‘the 
doer and the deed’, and so on (Butler 1990). Ultimately, the radicality and 
productivity of the lines of thought of such thinkers relate to their argument 
that it is in a sense an ontological mistake to hold an idea of a pre-existing 
actor outside of the action. The agent or actor only comes into existence as 
such in and through involvement in the social practice, which itself exists 
only insofar as it is defined as what it is by the force of social convention.
Given this, what does it mean to try to separate the martial artist from 
the martial art? The martial artist only exists in and as the practice of the 
martial art. The martial art only exists in its embodied practice. Their con-
ceptual separation now has the status of a problem badly posed. Neverthe-
less, my contention would be that, in line with certain of the implications of 
Butler’s poststructuralist understanding of ‘discourse’ and ‘performativity’, 
although the martial artist must necessarily be a completely embodied en-
tity, there can and will be all manner of jumps, breaks, discontinuities, and 
ruptures involved in the spread and development of martial arts. Indeed, 
arguably, there always will be: arguably, every kind of ‘communication’ or 
passing on and passing over in martial arts must inevitably involve an ele-
ment of discontinuity and rupture (Bowman 2010a). The inheritor is never 
a pure repeater, but always to some degree an impure reiterator (Derrida 
1988). This is amplified in a media age. We can see this very clearly in the 
way that the cinematic ‘movement image’ of Bruce Lee both sparked a set 
of desires and taught one or more lessons in and through the same move-
ments/images (Chong 2012). Lee produced a much-remarked mimetic tidal 
wave. He taught the world that it wanted something it had largely never 
even dreamed of. And he showed the world how to do it, outside of all 
physical contact and all formal pedagogical relations.
Lee’s films produced many mimics. His movement-image supplemented 
and subverted many formal pedagogical relations. After Bruce Lee, judo 
throws and Shotokan kicks were simply not enough. So-called classical 
karate came to seem stultified and stultifying (Lee 1971). Indeed, it is to 
Bruce Lee’s movement-image, on the one hand, combined with the power 
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of the franchise system on the other, that we can attribute the subsequent 
popularity and proliferation of the flamboyant and high-kicking Korean 
martial art of taekwondo. This came to pass because of the desire to kick 
high, which itself was fostered by the cinematic spectacle and subsequently 
fed by the institutional proliferation of taekwondo associations.
The cinematic martial arts spectacle (especially Bruce Lee) had multiple 
and contrary effects. It sent some people running to formal martial arts 
schools—of any kind—whatever was available. It sent other people running 
away from formal martial arts schools—and running into inventing their 
own hands-on, DIY approaches to martial arts—in accordance with the ethos 
of Bruce Lee’s anti-establishment jeet kune do (Bowman 2010b, 2013a). 
Styles, techniques, and movements were copied from films. Weapons were 
crafted in school metalwork and woodwork rooms. People wearing black 
belts emerged from out of nowhere. Training videos and then DVDs came 
onto the market. Then there was YouTube. . . . Now, whether yours is an 
orientalist phantasy involving swaying bamboo, Chinese string music, and 
silk pyjamas, or proletarian Chinese street clothes in back alleys between 
tower blocks, or Thai boxing shorts on the beach, or military combat pants 
and army boots in pub car parks, there is a DVD or YouTube feed for you.
Manifesting as movement-images, martial arts migrate from body to 
body like a virus. Some are even reanimated from the frozen mists of time, 
like the long dead ancient Greek art of Pankration, which was reconstructed 
post–World War II. Virus combines with virus, mutates, and sometimes 
threatens a new pandemic. The first great pandemic was carried by cel-
luloid in the 1970s, when it seemed ‘everybody was kung fu fighting’. 
Infection rates are difficult to gauge, but what is clear is that the young are 
most at risk. Another pandemic seemed imminent in the wake of Batman 
Begins (2005), when the unusual new martial art used in the fight chore-
ography was given almost as much attention as the other aspects of the 
production. Capitalizing on this publicity, the devisers of the fighting style 
itself (‘KFM’ or ‘Keysi Fighting Method’) embraced both DVD and online 
means to disseminate their ‘new’ art as quickly and as widely as possible. 
They made and sold a full range of training videos, from white belt level 
through to black belt level. Ironically, this most mediated of martial arts 
innovations painted itself as most physical, most ‘real’. It had to be trained 
with a partner, or ideally two; and it was touted as being born on the street 
and designed for the street.
This happened in the ‘noughties’; but TV’s Ultimate Fighting Champi-
onship (the UFC) had achieved something similar—and on a much bigger 
scale—in the early 1990s. Presenting itself as having ‘no rules’ and as be-
ing ‘ultimate’ and completely ‘real’, the UFC initiated the deconstruction 
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of styles in the name of ‘reality’. But ultimately it developed according to 
the dictates of televized media spectacle: it had to have fixed round lengths 
(for ad breaks), spectacular techniques (to avoid viewer boredom), and fixed 
match lengths (to facilitate programme scheduling) (Downey 2014). Soon, 
the UFC’s deconstruction of styles produced its own style, ‘mixed martial 
arts’ (MMA). MMA itself was a hybrid form, hegemonized first by what was 
either called Gracie jiujitsu or, more commonly, Brazilian jiujitsu (BJJ). In 
fact, the UFC had been the brainchild of the Gracie family, who had devised 
it as a way to legitimize, popularize, and monetize their style. BJJ is now one 
of the most widely known and popular martial arts styles in the world.
What is clear about the many recent mutations of ‘real’ or ‘reality’ or 
‘street’ or ‘no frills’ martial arts is that they are constitutively mediated—
postmodern cultural productions for a media age. And, as case studies, 
they cast light on many important issues related not only to martial arts 
but also to culture, its causalities, relations, and effects. My argument in 
this ‘rewriting exercise’ has been that the role of mediatization, while 
easily regarded as secondary, is arguably primary and constitutive for the 
dissemination of martial arts—whether those arts be postmodern, hybrid, 
‘classical’, ‘traditional’, or whatever. In this relation, the much-fetishized 
figure of the martial art expert is arguably secondary to the media-image, 
both in the sense of ‘coming after’ and in the sense of coming ‘because of’ 
or, indeed, ‘in response to’.
Having thus eclipsed the figure of the martial arts migrant in the name 
of attempting to think this character’s relations and effects, what happens 
if we now let the martial arts migrant figure return? As Roland Barthes put 
it, of the figure of the author, this character can now return, but must now 
be regarded as a ‘figure in the carpet’, and not as the origin and basis of the 
relations in which we might still want to think of him or her as the ‘centre’. 
This is because, in Derrida’s sense, the centre is a presence-effect. In Fou-
cault’s sense, the central figure is an effect of a network of power/knowl-
edge. In the sense I have been using here, the central figure is a simulation 
who looks most uncannily like David Carradine’s wandering, orientalist, 
‘yellowface’ Kwai Chang Caine character from the 1970s TV show Kung 
Fu: in other words, a completely fictional yet absolutely true entity who 
shows that martial arts migrate not just through blood, sweat, and physical 
contact but by a process of transmigration from screens to minds to bodies.
Building on this, in my second concluding discussion, I will examine the 
way many of the themes of this chapter are played out within a peculiar 
‘cross-cultural’ or ‘transnational’ film, Keanu Reeves’s directorial debut, 
Man of Tai Chi (2013), and relate these to wider questions of nation and 
martial arts in the twenty-first century.
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priMitivE passions anD Crisis MoDErnity
In a 1995 book on the themes of visuality, sexuality, ethnography, and con-
tem porary Chinese cinema (Chow 1995), Rey Chow offers an argument 
about what she calls primitive passions. This is a concept so central to her 
analysis of ‘contemporary Chinese films’ that she elevates it to the book’s 
very title. Early on, she sets out a list of seven key points about ‘primitive 
passions’. These are:
1.  The interest in the primitive emerges at a moment of cultural crisis—at 
a time when . . . the predominant sign of traditional culture . . . is be-
ing dislocated amid vast changes in technologies of signification. . . .
2.  [In such a context] fantasies of an origin arise. These fantasies are 
played out through a generic realm of associations, typically having 
to do with the animal, the savage, the countryside, the indigenous, the 
people, and so forth, which stand in for that ‘original’ something that 
has been lost. . . .
3.  This origin is . . . (re)constructed as a common place and a com-
monplace, a point of common knowledge and reference that was 
there prior to our present existence. The primitive, as the figure for 
this irretrievable common/place, is thus always an invention after the 
fact—a fabrication of a pre that occurs in the time of the post. . . .
4.  The primitive defined in these terms provides a way for thinking 
about the unthinkable—as that which is at once basic, universal, and 
transparent to us all, and that which is outside time and language. . . .
5.  Because it is only in this imaginary space that the primitive is located, 
the primitive is phantasmagoric and, literally, ex-otic. . . .
6.  In a culture caught between the forces of ‘first world’ imperialism 
and ‘third world’ nationalism, such as that of twentieth century China, 
the primitive is the precise paradox, the amalgamation of the two 
modes of signification known as ‘culture’ and ‘nature.’ If Chinese 
culture is ‘primitive’ in the pejorative sense of being ‘backward’ (be-
ing stuck in an earlier stage of ‘culture’ and thus closer to ‘nature’) 
when compared to the West, it is also ‘primitive’ in the meliorative 
sense of being an ancient culture (it was there first, before many 
Western nations). A strong sense of primordial, rural rootedness thus 
goes hand in hand with an equally compelling conviction of China’s 
primariness, of China’s potential primacy as a modern nation with a 
glorious civilization. This paradox of a primitivism that sees China 
as simultaneously victim and empire is what leads modern Chinese 
intellectuals to their so-called obsession with China. . . .
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7.  Although there may be nothing new about reinterpreting the past as a 
way to conceive of the present and the future—and this is definitely 
one possible way of understanding primitivism—my proposal is that 
this ‘structure of feeling’ finds its most appropriate material expres-
sion in film. (Chow 1995: 22–23)
Obviously, a lot has happened since the publication of Primitive Pas-
sions in 1995. The films Chow herself analysed in the early 1990s can 
hardly still be considered ‘contemporary’, for instance. Furthermore, even 
the term ‘Chinese film’ can hardly be taken to have the same referent or to 
refer to the same spaces, entities, institutions, and processes as were operat-
ing in the early 1990s. Indeed, one might say, perhaps the very notion of 
‘film’, on the one hand, and ‘China’ or ‘Chinese’ on the other, might be 
said to have changed significantly, in any number of ways. 
But what about Chow’s central paradigm or analytical optic—namely, 
her conceptualization of ‘primitive passions’? For, if all of the other terms 
might be said to have changed—‘contemporary’, ‘Chinese’, and ‘films’—
then one might enquire as to the status of primitive passions within today’s 
‘contemporary’ ‘Chinese’ film. In other words, are primitive passions 
always the same? Are they always the same in film theory and in film prac-
tice? Are they the same, East and West? Are primitive passions universal or 
do they differ between geographical cultures? Do they change over time? 
Are they culturally or ethno-nationalistically determined?
Chow herself argues that ‘primitivism’ is ‘the imaginary foundation 
of industrialized modernity’ and that it ‘is crucial to cultural production 
regardless of the geographical setting’ (24). If we connect this to her first 
claim (in point 1, quoted above) that ‘interest in the primitive emerges at 
a moment of cultural crisis’, then it seems that ‘industrialized modernity’ 
equals or produces ‘cultural crisis’ in which primitivism arises as a symp-
tom, side effect, or consequence of modernity. Accordingly, we might 
expect to find symptomatic ‘primitive passions’ wherever there is ‘crisis 
modernity’. And if there is ‘crisis modernity’ East and West, what might be 
the specifics of its elaboration in contemporary martial arts film?
It strikes me that a lot of Chinese martial arts films—including (perhaps 
especially) Hong Kong films—do indeed replay, reiterate, or act out certain 
symptomatic responses to ‘modernity’ and other forms of ‘crisis’—whether 
colonial, imperial, or gangster capitalist. One of the most enduringly in-
fluential examples is Bruce Lee’s 1972 film, Jing Wu Men (Fist of Fury) 
(Lo 1972), in which the Jing Wu martial arts association is persecuted by 
belligerent Japanese martial artists in early twentieth-century Shanghai. In 
this film, the crisis faced by the Jing Wu association seems transparently 
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to stand for that of China—embattled, besieged, fragmented, divided, ex-
ploited, and oppressed, by internal and external forces. And this theme—of 
a time and condition of crisis—persists in Chinese martial arts film (how-
ever defined: ethnically and linguistically Chinese film; not merely PRC 
film) all the way through to today. It even structures Wong Kar-wai’s 
recent film, The Grandmaster (Wong 2013). And despite The Grand-
master initially being touted as another rendition of the story of Ip Man, 
the teacher of Bruce Lee, and hence an internationally popular figure, it 
is actually much less about its lead male character and much more about 
the easily allegorizable theme of the desire to unify northern and southern 
Chinese martial arts into one institution—an institution that, in the film, 
tears itself apart and then implodes.
So, to reiterate, a great many Hong Kong, Taiwanese, and Chinese 
martial arts films are structured by, or are elaborated as, a symptomatic re-
sponse to ‘crisis’—whether that crisis be precipitated by Japanese, Russian, 
or Western imperialism, colonialism, capitalism, or the ‘progress’ of indus-
trialized modernity. However, the fantasies that arise in martial arts film do 
not ‘typically hav[e] to do with the animal, the savage, the countryside, the 
indigenous, [or] the people’, as Rey Chow contends. They are certainly, to 
use Chow’s phrase, organized by the championing of ‘an earlier stage of 
“culture”’. But I would hesitate before moving on, as Chow does, to the as-
sertion that this ‘earlier stage of “culture” [is] thus closer to “nature”’. For 
what is valued in martial arts films is precisely institution, discipline, re-
spect, tradition, and, in other words, a constructed and achieved culture. So 
I would supplement Chow’s formulation by appending the word ‘Chinese’ 
to ‘nature’: therefore, the ‘earlier stage of culture’ that is championed in 
martial arts films is not closer to ‘nature’ but rather to a fantasy of Chinese 
nature. And, here, Chinese nature is culture.
As Chow says, here we are dealing with a paradox. And I am not dis-
agreeing with her. All I want to do is explore this paradoxical situation in 
a different way. Specifically this: in Chinese martial arts film, crisis typi-
cally comes at the fraught moments and processes of the passing on and 
passing over of the legacy, the tradition, and the institutional inheritance. In 
an almost explicitly Derridean way (Derrida 1981), the problem explored 
by these martial arts films is this: how to ensure the smooth Socratic/Pla-
tonic transmission of fixed, stable, and complete knowledge from master 
to disciple/successor in the face of the interrupting, disrupting, subverting, 
and perverting agency of an external force. In Derrida’s terms, what the 
institution wants is insemination: pure, uncorrupted, undiluted, unmodified 
transmission. What the world constantly throws up is the threat of dissemi-
nation: impure, corrupted, diluted, incomplete, modified scattering.
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In martial arts films, then, the primitive passion is not a simple fantasy 
about nature versus culture. It is rather a fantasy about an impossibly ideal-
ized relation of inside to outside. The outside is not necessarily bad, as long 
as (to echo Derrida) it leaves the inside to remain inside, while it, the out-
side, remains outside. The problem that Chinese martial arts films explore 
is therefore the problem of maintaining the institutions. It is rarely, if ever, 
nature versus culture. It is almost always institution versus institution. If 
this characterizes a tendency within the institutions of Chinese martial arts 
films, we might ask: What about other cultures or institutions of martial 
arts film?
priMitivE passions East anD WEst
Interestingly, it is much easier to find straightforwardly primitivist fanta-
sies and primitive passions in Western martial arts discourses and Western 
(primarily Hollywood) approaches to martial arts style and martial arts–
inspired film. At the pinnacle of this discourse, in the field of martial arts 
practice, would be the Ultimate Fighting Championship. From its incep-
tion, the UFC declared itself to be the ultimate in the sense of most ‘real’ 
because it initially claimed to have ‘no rules’. This was a rejection of rules 
and limits—or indeed culture—in order to cut through the conventions and 
limitations produced by—precisely—‘culture’. But, from the outset, the 
UFC played the paradox of, on the one hand, letting different styles meet 
each other in an unfettered space, to see which style was best, while, on the 
other hand, letting primitive barbaric animality reign.
The first child of the UFC was what is now known as ‘mixed martial 
arts’ (MMA), a combat sport that both plays and erases its status as a style, 
discipline, or cultural practice. On the one hand, it is a sport, a discipline, a 
culture. But at the same time its rhetoric and discourse fantasize about pure 
primitive animality.
The exemplary cinematic version of this impulse away from tradition, 
rules, and conventions and towards a different sort of fantasy of ‘primitive 
nature’ is Fight Club (Fincher 1999). In both actual MMA and the film 
fantasy of Fight Club, the primitivist fantasy is the same: it is one of redis-
covering a repressed primitive ‘truth’—that is, the primitive nature that has 
been repressed by ‘culture’ and resides within each one of us. As commen-
tators have noted, Fight Club is a kind of study of one possible response 
to the crisis of masculinity in an alienating consumerist society (Giroux 
2002). In other words, Fight Club may be about the UFC and MMA as 
primitivist responses to the crisis of masculinity in consumer culture.
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To summarize my argument so far, then: my proposal is that in as many 
Chinese and Hong Kong martial arts films as I have seen, the ‘primitive 
passion’ takes the form not of a desire for a state of nature but for an un-
mediated (or, indeed, metaphysical) transmission from master to disciple4 
in the face of one or another kind of crisis of external intervention.5 The 
passion here is for an idealized institutional condition, or state, but not sim-
ply for a ‘state of nature’. Rather, the ‘state of nature’ primitive passion is 
much easier to find in Western martial arts discourses—as exemplified by 
what I have come to think of as the Fight-Club-ization of Western martial 
arts discourse.
Of course, my schematic separation of East from West, or China from 
the United States, here, may be cause for concern or consternation. Indeed, 
it should be. The traffic between East and West in film and martial arts has 
long been taking place. Yuen Woo Ping and myriad lesser known luminar-
ies are surely just as likely now to keep apartments in Hollywood as in 
Hong Kong, Taipei, or Beijing, and at the same time. Furthermore, as Jane 
Park has demonstrated in her book Yellow Future, we can see more and 
more of what she calls ‘oriental style in Hollywood cinema’ (Park 2010). 
So, can the reverse also be demonstrated? Can we see Hollywood style in 
‘oriental’ cinema? Doubtless, we could find many ways to answer in the af-
firmative.6 But I propose to explore this matter in terms of an example that 
might problematize an easy understanding of the term ‘Chinese cinema’ 
and that might illuminate some more the connections between film, culture, 
primitive passions, and crisis.
Man of tai Chi
Keanu Reeves’s recent directorial debut is called Man of Tai Chi (Reeves 
2013). It is a multilingual film. If flits between Beijing and Hong Kong 
and between English and Chinese. It flits also from bustling Beijing city 
to its less modern hinterlands and from multibillionaire lifestyles to the 
bureaucratic banality of planning and development legislation, as well as a 
dilapidated temple whose sole occupant is the mandatory white-haired taiji 
master. The dilapidated temple is, of course, a relic of Chinese heritage. 
The white-haired sifu is, then, one of the last living residues of a former 
pinnacle of Chinese culture, or ‘Chineseness’.
The person who navigates these waters is Tiger Chen, the sole student 
of an obscure style of taiji. He is almost ready to receive the final transmis-
sion, but, his sifu says, he is not yet in control of his chi—rather, his chi 
is controlling him. Moreover, Tiger is evidently keen to dabble in the dark 
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side and to explore the use of power and violent force in combat, rather 
than sticking to the taiji principles of softness, sensitivity, yielding, and 
neutralizing. Tiger, then, is at a crossroads. The first time we see him, he is 
practicing standing-tree qigong at 5 a.m. Then he gets in his car. The first 
words we hear are in English, coming from the radio, and he repeats them, 
practicing his English: today we have to ‘do the right thing’. ‘Do the right 
thing’, he says. And this is what his story will be.
His sifu does not want him to use force or indeed to use taiji to fight. But 
Tiger enters a televized contest and uses taiji to beat opponent after oppo-
nent. Keanu Reeves, who plays the billionaire ‘Donaka Mark’, and who we 
have already seen murder a fighter who refused to kill his opponent, sees 
Tiger on the TV and declares, with delight, ‘innocent!’. Tiger is an innocent 
and the evil Donaka Mark wants him to participate in his own illegal no-
holds-barred matches.
When approached, Tiger declines the offer, despite the enormous wage 
he is offered, because it would be dishonorable to fight for money. But when 
his sifu is given an eviction order because his temple is deemed unsafe and 
has been scheduled for demolition and commercial redevelopment, Tiger 
decides to take up Donaka’s offer, in order to fund the repair work within 
thirty days. As his secret fights become more brutal, Tiger continues to 
compete in the televized contests but becomes noticeably more brutal here, 
too, until he is disqualified from the final for using such excessive force 
that the judges and audience deem his approach to be ‘completely against 
the spirit of this competition’. The spirit of the competition is style against 
style. But what Tiger has done is move from style into brutal animality.
Tiger’s animality emerges through his progressive brutalization in 
Donaka’s contests. But, more fundamentally, it comes from the fact that, 
as Donaka and his henchmen begin to remark, ‘he likes it!’, ‘he enjoys it!’ 
In other words, it comes from a spark of primitive blood lust within him 
that they are drawing out and bringing to the surface. This is the spark that 
his sifu called his ‘not being in control of his own qi.’ We can translate this 
into: his lack of maturity. He is not ready. He stands at the crossroads. He 
has to decide, to do the right thing, or the wrong thing.
Before the final contest, Tiger witnesses a film that is being played to 
the audience. It is about him. He has been constantly secretly filmed since 
Donaka first spotted him. The film’s voiceover tells both Tiger and the 
audience that the idea was to transform an ‘innocent, pure hearted man of 
tai chi’ into a killer. Donaka reiterates: This was never about illegal fights 
to the death. This was about transforming an innocent into a killer.
In light of a consideration of primitive passions in Chinese and U.S. 
martial arts films, what can we say about Man of Tai Chi? Thematically, it 
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is perhaps less a ‘Chinese’ martial arts film than it is a reworking of the Ed-
die Murphy film Trading Places (Landis 1983) combined with The Truman 
Show (Weir 1998) and Return of the Jedi (Marquand 1983). Visually, the 
film seems to try to avoid looking too much like The Matrix (Wachowski 
and Wachowski 1999), despite seeking to cash in once more on what hap-
pens when Yuen Woo Ping choreographs Keanu Reeves. Indeed, before it 
was released, the pre-publicity for Man of Tai Chi was almost exclusively 
one snippet of information: namely, that the idea for the film was born 
when Keanu Reeves was being trained by Tiger Chen for his fight scenes in 
The Matrix. Reeves and Chen became friends and then collaborators on the 
project—which was ultimately funded by both Chinese and U.S. investors.
Accordingly, we might want to ask: Is this a Chinese film? Perhaps such 
an ethnonationalist question betrays a kind of primitive passion still current 
in a regionalist approach to film studies that proceed in the manner of area 
studies, despite the fact that the kind of multinational assemblage of inter-
ests and agencies that produced it is not geographically unified any more 
(Chow 1998; Hunt 2003). But Man of Tai Chi certainly seems to import 
themes that I have been associating with a Hollywood tradition—although 
it may be the case that where I see Trading Places and The Truman Show, 
other people might see Asian precedents and antecedents that I simply 
don’t know about. In any case, it is clearly a modulation, modification, 
and translation of different devices, formulas, and codes. But what made 
me sit up and pay attention to this particular film—even more than I did in 
the face of a film like The Grandmaster—is the fact that this one seems to 
import what strikes me as a uniquely Western primitive passion into an oth-
erwise overwhelmingly Eastern situation. Its primitivism is vaguely Freud-
ian: its idea is that beneath the limitations of cultured life, the constructs of 
culture or enculturation, is a raging id of murderous animalism. Unleashing 
primal brutality is painted in Fight Club (and Western MMA) as emancipa-
tion from culture—as transcultural truth. Keanu Reeves’s Donaka Mark’s 
last words, after Tiger delivers the most lethal blow of taiji, are ‘I knew 
you had it in you’.
However, this is not Fight Club. What kills Donaka Mark is not Tiger’s 
primal hate, or indeed joy. It is, rather, the most mythical technique of 
the most mythical taiji—a so-called spirit punch, in which what hits is 
the qi rather than the body. Thus what kills is a fantasy of the fantasy of 
the highest state of culture, and what is killed is the primitive passion of 
individualism.
Then the scene changes. The sharp-suited business developers stand side 
by side with the urban planning bureaucrats in front of the old white-haired 
taiji sifu, who makes a speech about development and culture. Then the 
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sifu signs a document with a traditional ink stamp and we learn that the 
temple will be developed as a kind of theme park. This idea alludes loudly 
to that most famous of Chinese theme parks, of course, the Shaolin Temple. 
In both, ancient authentic Chinese culture will be ‘preserved’ precisely in 
Baudrillardian simulation (Baudrillard 1994), as a simulacrum, and in a 
manner much more perfect than the hysterical virtual simulacrum of mil-
lennial fears that we saw in The Matrix. Rather, here, in the words of Rey 
Chow: ‘This origin is . . . (re)constructed as a common place and a com-
monplace, a point of common knowledge and reference that was there prior 
to our present existence. The primitive, as the figure for this irretrievable 
common/place, is thus always an invention after the fact—a fabrication of 
a pre that occurs in the time of the post’. Accordingly, Man of Tai Chi—as 
both Chinese and not Chinese, and not Chinese and Chinese—is a film 
which illustrates the ongoing simultaneous deconstruction and intensifica-
tion of ‘China’, in a manner that is suggestive for the approach of martial 
arts studies to perhaps any ‘national’ practice in the contemporary world. 
Moreover, within this chapter’s exploration of writing, nation, and narra-
tion, we have also encountered problematics related to reality and style, 
culture and animality, and so on, which deserve to be probed further. It is 
to them that we now turn.
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❖ ❖
The Reality of Martial Arts
The discussion of notion of the Fight-Club-ization of martial arts that emerged in the previous chapter deserves some attention. The emer-
gence of a ‘reality drive’ in martial arts—especially in contemporary 
Western contexts—is an interesting and important phenomenon, which 
has disrupted the boundaries between many martial arts. This chapter will 
explore the matters that arise in and around a consideration of the desire for 
reality in martial arts training. It will do so first via an examination of one 
case study of the spectacular history of one contemporary Western reality 
martial art, before opening out into a consideration of the matters that have 
arisen in relation to ‘traditional’ martial arts.
thE rEaLity DrivE
In late 2012, news emerged of the break up of a martial arts institution 
that had seemed to be taking the martial arts world by storm (Holland 
2012). Keysi Fighting Method (or KFM) had been founded by a Span-
iard, Justo Dieguez, and an Englishman, Andy Norman. Before inventing 
KFM, both Dieguez and Norman had been qualified jeet kune do (JKD) 
instructors under Bruce Lee’s senior student, Dan Inosanto. Through this 
institutional connection, they had met and trained together on an associated 
international jeet kune do circuit (Norman n.d.). Within this context, and 
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by working together regularly, Dieguez and Norman came to devise an ap-
proach to self-defence training that became regarded as a new and discrete 
fighting system; one that went on to be touted, by themselves and others, 
as revolutionary.
However, in elaborating their new approach, the shared jeet kune do past 
of Dieguez and Norman was consistently downplayed. Their names were 
removed from the list of JKD instructors on Dan Inosanto’s website, and 
they almost never mentioned JKD or any of their other martial arts train-
ing in any of their public statements about KFM, whether in interviews, 
articles, or on their website. In fact, both Norman and Dieguez seemed ac-
tively intent on distancing themselves from any institution of any kind and, 
instead, on presenting KFM as a practice of and for ‘the street’. Certainly, 
in all public discourse, KFM was consistently said to have been developed 
‘on the street’ and ‘for the street’. (When Norman did briefly mention 
his former martial arts training, it was only as something he discovered 
the hard way that ‘did not work’ and, hence, as something he rejected in 
devising KFM ‘on the street’.) In other words, its own actual institutional 
history and formation was obscured from view, pushed out of the way, and 
replaced by a powerful mythology, which said: this is not an institutional 
style; this is real.
This ‘reality drive’ (that is so often coupled with the disavowal of insti-
tutionality) is the focus of this chapter. It is certainly not something that 
is exclusive to KFM. It is arguably central to many—if not all—martial 
arts. It is certainly central to a whole movement of modern ‘reality martial 
arts’—a movement characterized heavily by the explicit rejection of ideas 
like ‘tradition’ and ‘style’.
However, the way KFM spokespeople like Norman and Dieguez formu-
lated their own rejection of style is significant and helps to historicize and 
characterize its discursive context. At the very least, there is a certain irony 
in their downplaying or disavowal of KFM’s jeet kune do origins. This is 
because, in KFM’s distancing itself from ‘institutional style’ and aligning 
itself instead with what we might call ‘street reality’,1 KFM actually (wit-
tingly or unwittingly) repeated the very rhetorical gesture used by Bruce 
Lee in his articulation of jeet kune do in the late 1960s: this is not an institu-
tional style, said Bruce Lee; this is real (Lee 1971; Bowman 2010b, 2013a).
The conscious or unconscious reiteration by KFM of Bruce Lee’s fa-
mous disavowal of style in the avowal of a commitment to ‘reality’ is 
what leads me to single it out as a representative of contemporary ‘reality 
martial arts’.2 There are other equally significant potential examples that 
could have been studied. Indeed, part of my argument is that much of what 
we can learn from the case of KFM can be applied to other examples and 
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can enrich our understanding of martial arts in/and/as culture more broadly. 
However, KFM also appeals particularly because surely few (if any) other 
examples of ‘non-styles’ both reiterate and replay Bruce Lee’s renunciation 
of formal martial arts styles so completely, while at the same time being 
so directly and absolutely indebted to Bruce Lee’s own anti-institutional 
approach. The founders of KFM had previously been certified jeet kune 
do instructors, after all. However, in any case, the ultimate concern of this 
chapter is a consideration of the eternally returning martial arts desire to 
achieve reality in combat training. Going hand in hand with this will be 
questions of institution and institutionalization—which, it seems, always 
hound this primary concern.
Indeed, a first thing to be said about this desire is that it constantly seems 
to be frustrated. It is as if any established mode or manner of training for 
combat will always—sooner or later, here or there—come to be deemed 
at best asymptotic to reality (approaching it but never getting there) or at 
worst as leading away from reality. It appears that martial arts seem con-
stantly to be devised and revised, invented, rejected, and reconfigured, in 
attempt after attempt to measure up to the perceived demand of capturing 
and mastering reality. At all times, as sure as night follows day, what occur 
are splits, factions, revolutions, and heresies.3 Aside from ‘political’ institu-
tional disputes, the reasons given for breaks and rejections often boil down 
to contentions that the old institution wasn’t managing to measure up to 
the demands of reality. Bruce Lee said this, if not first then certainly most 
famously, vis-à-vis his ‘rejection’ of all traditional martial arts (Tom 2005). 
Unfortunately, however, the new institutions themselves seem destined to 
follow the same trajectory, never quite becoming or remaining ‘real’. Even 
JKD instructors peel off and invent their own styles. Practitioners become 
dissatisfied with established approaches. Revolutions occur and recur. And 
each revolution attempts or claims to bridge the reality gap.
The recurrence of paradigm shifts and revolutions in martial arts—or, 
indeed, the persistence of what Roland Barthes called the ‘jolts of fashion’ 
(Barthes 1977: 154) in martial arts—and the apparent impossibility of 
realising Bruce Lee’s dream of a world in which there would be no mar-
tial arts styles suggest that the reality gap (the distance between training 
becoming a style and the perceived demands of real combat) is never de-
cisively bridged, even if the gap can be papered over or decorated in ways 
that satisfy different people for different reasons at different times.4 But 
what always bubbles away beneath, around, and within—and what always 
threatens to erupt within and subvert—any given martial art at any time 
are challenging discourses, structured by the evocation of an art’s unsatis-
factory position in relation to ‘reality’. The potential worry, suspicion, or 
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challenge is always that this or that style is, in Bruce Lee’s words, nothing 
more than a ‘fancy mess’ of ‘organised despair’ (Lee 1971). When this 
idea gains the upper hand, it can cause practitioners to quit training, switch 
teachers or clubs, change styles, or break away to invent their own new (or 
‘authentic’) approach.
All of this might be recast philosophically as a set of problems caused by 
the unknowability and unpredictability of the event of real combat. Because 
such an event could take place anywhere, and involve any of an infinite 
range of variables, the problem faced by martial artists is always one of 
how to train so as to stack the deck in one’s favour. Even after pondering 
probabilities and improbabilities and making decisions (or ‘guesstimat-
ing’) about likely ‘real scenarios’, training will always be limited. This 
is so even though some styles—such as KFM or (more famously) krav 
maga—specialize in training for ever more different combat environments 
and scenarios. Such approaches to training ultimately seek to ‘emancipate’ 
the practitioner, in the sense of aiming to turn them into someone who can 
function dynamically, efficiently, and even creatively within ever more 
different contexts.
Arguably, the styles of training developed in approaches such as KFM 
and krav maga exemplify a general paradigm shift or revolution that has 
been taking place in martial arts practices in the West at least since Bruce 
Lee popularized the idea of interdisciplinarity, or indeed antidisciplinarity 
(Bowman 2010b). That is to say, rather than being based on training the 
body via endless repetition (as in ‘classical’ karate classes, which ‘tradi-
tionally’5 involve large groups of students marching in formation and per-
forming set techniques, or kata), they often start not from training the body 
to be able to perform certain movements (blocks, strikes, kicks, throws, 
etc.), but rather from training the mind to be able to perceive threats and to 
handle the shocks and stresses of violent situations.
Thus, rather than the implicit logics of traditional martial arts training, 
newer self-defence approaches often base themselves on an explicit psy-
chological theory, in which the training of mind, attitude, perception, and 
emotion are emphasized from the outset. This new psychological approach 
is something that can be distinguished from what are called ‘classical’ or 
‘traditional’ approaches to martial arts training. The latter do not neces-
sarily have an explicit or univocal position on the subject, even if many 
are clearly informed either by an ethos that internalizes ‘toughening up’ 
through punishing training, or one is focused on developing an ‘indomi-
table spirit’ or, indeed, ‘remaining calm under pressure’, and so forth.
Nevertheless, even in the most dynamic types of scenario-based train-
ing, a certain paradox will not go away. This is because, in any training, 
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repetition is essential. And, as many practitioners of such approaches to 
self-defence and martial arts have suggested, the risk is always that repeti-
tion can lead to what Jacques Rancière would call ‘stultification’—namely, 
the reduction of a practitioner’s capacities to the robot-like repetition 
of a set of institutional strictures (Rancière 1991).6 In other words, the 
pedagogical situation can be regarded as the scene of an essential problem. 
Repetition is necessary, and enabling, but it is also limiting. The expert 
will be trained to master many possible situations and scenarios, but the 
consequence of the training (or disciplining) of the practitioner’s body is 
that it will come to move and behave only in the ways that are trained into 
it (Foucault 1977).
This is related to a second paradox—one that has been much debated in 
different ways by both philosophers and martial artists. This paradox re-
lates to the fact that training for reality must always involve and rely on, at 
some level, unreality or ‘simulation’ (Baudrillard 1994). The self-defence 
author Rory Miller refers to this as the inevitable ‘built in flaw’ of all train-
ing (Miller 2008). You cannot ‘go 100 percent’ in training, because of the 
inevitability of injury or death were you to do so. (Reviewers and readers 
of earlier versions of my argument here have raised questions about this 
claim. However, Miller’s point is simply that if a martial art is designed to 
be lethal, or even to inflict serious damage, then you obviously and neces-
sarily cannot go 100 percent in training, unless you are prepared to end 
lives or permanently incapacitate yourself or your training partners. Hence 
Miller’s contention that all martial arts training involves a necessary and 
ineradicable ‘built in flaw’. But there are other reasons for not ‘going 100 
percent’: these include placing certain parameters around various scenarios 
or exercises for pedagogical purposes, to enable the practice or emphasis 
of certain aspects of combat and not others, and so on. And this extends 
beyond martial arts training proper: Wacquant’s discussion of this in the 
context of boxing sparring, for instance, is relevant here (Wacquant 2004).)
Equally, you cannot ‘know 100 percent’ about reality because the con-
text in which an event of violence could occur cannot be predicted with 100 
percent accuracy. The most one can hope is that the training simulations 
one has been taught to master approximate to the key features of the event 
of combat. In Aristotelian terms, certainty (apodicticity) is impossible; one 
has to work to master probabilities (phronesis).
Put differently, if one really is concerned with questions of violence and 
reality, then the decision to commit to one style of martial arts as opposed 
to any other involves a leap of faith (For an important reflection on the 
place of faith and uncertainty in decisions, see Derrida 2001, 1996). The 
hope is that the training will prove adequate in reality, if and when required. 
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The fear is that one is deluding oneself, or being satisfied with simulations. 
The problem is that, in any eventuality, all roads are leading to institution-
alization. This is because ways of training become styles (institutions)—
disciplines that produce the bodily propensities, reflexes, and dispositions 
that sociologists like Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant have approached 
in terms of ‘habitus’ (Bourdieu 1979; Wacquant 2004) and which others 
more recently have attempted to conceptualize as ‘martial habitus’ (Brown 
and Jennings 2013).
According to my rationale, if we understand bodily training like this, the 
other side of ‘emancipation’ is always going to be ‘stultification’ (Rancière 
1991). This means that, despite the hopes of evangelical thinkers of eman-
cipation such as Bruce Lee, advocates of movements such as MMA, and 
even perhaps Jacques Rancière (the key theorist of ‘pedagogical emanci-
pation’ that I am drawing on here), liberation or emancipation from style, 
on the one hand, and stultification by style, on the other, seem to emerge 
reciprocally and to be opposite sides of the same coin. Put differently: even 
if it may be the case that at some level the desire to ‘master reality’ is what 
prompts such activities as martial arts training in the first place,7 the end 
result is always a kind of disciplining and hence institutionalization.
In a psychoanalytical register, Slavoj Žižek illustrates the problem like 
this: ‘let us imagine an individual trying to perform some simple manual 
task—say, grabbing an object that repeatedly eludes him: the moment he 
changes his attitude, starts to find pleasure in just repeating the failed task 
(squeezing the object, which again and again eludes him), he shifts from 
desire to drive’ (Žižek 2005: 10). So, if I am hungry and trying to catch a 
fish by thrusting my hand into a river or pool, I am acting on my desire. I 
desire to catch the fish. However, the moment I start to take pleasure in the 
act of thrusting my hand, or take pleasure in the refinements of my tech-
nique, I am moving from desire and into drive—and drive, in this context, 
is all about the pleasure to be generated from a potentially endless and 
possibly pointless repetition. Catching the fish, or grabbing the real thing, 
threatens to become, in a perverse way, less important than going through 
the motions of ‘trying’—and ‘trying well’ or ‘trying properly’.
This has an obvious parallel in the criticisms made of ‘classical’ arts 
that emphasize forms, drills, and katas, rather than the unstructured, free 
sparring or constantly experimental approaches of modern sport and reality 
martial arts. However, as Žižek’s formulation suggests, there may be no 
escaping the drift and switch from desire to drive. Even if we enter a mar-
tial arts class because we fear attack, sooner or later we will want to know 
how to do things properly, and we will more and more police ourselves and 
take pleasure in doing things ‘properly’. And taking pleasure in propriety 
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is arguably a key aspect of institutionalization (Douglas 1986; Bowman 
2007a). Given this, we should enquire further into the place of reality, un-
reality, and institutionalization in KFM and other reality martial arts.
visiBiLity, physiCaLity, anD MEDiatED rEaLity
KFM became globally visible when it was thrown into the spotlight by the 
box office success of the 2005 film, Batman Begins (directed by Chris-
topher Nolan). Norman and Dieguez’s fighting system had been selected 
to feature prominently within the fight choreography of Batman Begins 
because, according to online interviews with co-founder Andy Norman 
(Norman n.d.)8 and also interviews on the DVD-extras with the director, the 
star (Christian Bale), and the film’s fight choreographer,9 the look and feel 
of the techniques and movements of KFM were very different to anything 
that had been used in Hollywood movies before.
Accordingly, KFM was employed as a way to help make the film look 
excitingly ‘different’. The key features of this visual difference hinged on 
the fact that KFM looked rough, raw, and brutal in ways that Hollywood 
had not really explored or exhausted before. There were no big kicks in 
KFM; there were not even many extended techniques, neither the swinging 
arm techniques seen in some styles of kung fu, like hung gar, Shaolin, or 
choy lee fut nor even the long straight punches of karate, taekwondo, or 
boxing. Rather, everything was close-in, compact, and brutal. KFM was all 
elbows, head-butts, shoulders, and knees. The image used by its founders 
was that of a bull—indeed, the basic defensive-aggressive posture (and 
core) of KFM is a position one might adopt if one were to do an impression 
of a bull. This they called ‘the pensador’, or ‘thinking man’. In it, the palms 
are held on the head, the body is hunched, and the elbows are used as both 
shields and battering rams against (and for) all forms of attack.
This posture was selected as the core defensive-aggressive position of 
KFM for a double-pronged reason: on the one hand, it is very close to 
the position people seem automatically or naturally to adopt when being 
beaten, especially by more than one attacker; and on the other hand, this 
position is also strangely ideal for launching a range of very close-quarter 
and very destructive counterattacks, especially with elbows, knees, and 
head. Of course, this propensity is only a propensity to the extent that you 
have been trained to perceive or to ‘realize’ this movement-possibility, and 
if you have practiced diligently so that your body can successfully move in 
accordance with this realization in highly stressful and painful situations. 
(In her book on pedagogy, the late Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick discusses Zen 
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and other forms of Buddhist pedagogy, which emphasize the importance of 
‘realizing’ as a crucial form of perception and propensity. In one scenario 
discussed, a walking Zen practitioner bumps into a tree. When asked why 
she didn’t see the tree, she replied that she had seen the tree, she just hadn’t 
realized it. A similar situation exists in martial arts: one may know where 
hands and feet, my body and your body, targets, threats, openings and 
points of resistance, and so on, are, but ‘realizing’ them as possibilities—
being able ‘spontaneously’ and ‘naturally’ to act on them—is quite another 
matter (Sedgwick 2003).) Learning how to move such that the pensador can 
become an effective block and attack position is not actually as easy or as 
‘natural’ as KFM discourse seems often to suggest.
KFM certainly helped add to the novelty and appeal of Batman Begins.10 
Subsequently, it went on to appear in many other Hollywood blockbusters. 
However, other than its actual appearance within the film’s fight choreogra-
phy, what was crucial to its global visibility was that a range of interviews, 
‘making of’ clips, and other extras appeared on the DVDs, and subsequently 
on the Internet, all focusing on what went into the choreography of the film. 
It was this visibility—itself a possibility arising hand in hand with the in-
stitution of DVD-extras11 and the circulation of snippets of pre-, para-, and 
extra-texts on the Internet—that gave Dieguez, Norman, and KFM enough 
exposure to make KFM internationally known (Bowman 2013a).
KFM took off in the wake of this exposure. However, allegedly because 
of the high number of companies in the world also called KFM (including 
many radio stations), the acronym eventually came to be dropped. Conse-
quently, the name was changed simply to Keysi. This is pertinent because 
it was around the time of this name change that the partnership between 
Dieguez and Norman broke up. In fact, it seems likely that the moment of 
the name change from KFM to Keysi was also the moment of the breakup 
of the Norman and Dieguez partnership. Henceforth, other than being in-
delibly tattooed on the bodies of some of its original students and teachers, 
from late 2012 KFM, as once was, was no more.
Dieguez continued with a style now called ‘Keysi’. Norman became in-
volved in a number of projects, including a UK-based one called ‘Defence 
Lab’. The activities of the other people who appear in the early KFM train-
ing videos are not as well known, but some of the ‘ambassadors’ (instruc-
tors) who appear in the early KFM training videos continue to pop up here 
and there on the Internet, sometimes in videos associated with Dieguez, 
sometimes with Norman, and sometimes fronting their own schools and/or 
new styles or systems.
Clearly, the partnership may have ended for any number of reasons—
personal, financial, ideological, philosophical, logistical, pedagogical, 
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theoretical, or practical. There is no need to speculate on personal or 
financial matters here. But it may be of more than anecdotal interest for 
a cultural study of KFM to note that Norman and Dieguez were said to 
have separated because each wanted to pursue a different business model: 
Norman wanted to develop a franchise system, while Dieguez reputedly 
wanted to remain small-scale and hands-on. This, in itself, might signal the 
presence of different ideological and theoretical-pedagogical biases, rather 
than just different ideas about how best to make a living from KFM.
But whether the split was led by financial concerns or personal matters 
or—more interestingly—by a differing theory or ideology of pedagogy and 
knowledge dissemination, what should not be overlooked is the signifi-
cance of the initial (post–Batman Begins) way that Norman and Dieguez 
had disseminated the training methods of KFM. If they had operated exclu-
sively small-scale and hands-on before Batman Begins, after this film their 
‘teaching’ moved quickly into the realm of online ‘courses’ that took the 
form of DVDs and downloadable MPEG videos, each containing a differ-
ent ‘belt’ level. As one progressed through the levels, the cost of the next 
DVD or MPEG increased. The black belt course was the most expensive.
Accordingly, given KFM’s early use of computer-mediated communica-
tion in the dissemination of its syllabus, it seems somewhat unfair to go on 
to frame a disagreement between the two founders in terms of one founder 
wanting to ‘remain’ more hands-on and intimate with students (presumably 
in order to ‘maintain standards’), while the other founder is framed as hav-
ing somehow transgressed some ‘initial-authentic’ intimacy by wanting to 
materialize and embody the initial DVD and MPEG mode of dissemination 
by setting up a franchise system based on the production and establishment 
of actual human ‘hands-on’ instructors in physically present schools. What 
is most important here is that foregrounding this situation might help us to 
identify and isolate the paradox not only of KFM discourse but also that of 
all ‘real’, ‘practical’, or ‘no frills’ martial arts in a media-saturated world. 
The paradox is this: on the one hand, such martial arts are resolutely and 
absolutely ‘about’ the physical, the ‘hands on’, the ‘real’; but, on the other 
hand, and to a much greater extent, they are known, disseminated, and circu-
lated by various media—film, DVD, VCD, MPEG, YouTube, and Torrent 
sites. The vicissitudes of this paradoxical situation deserve some attention.
MinD, BoDy, anD MEDiasCapE
Just as it is eminently reasonable to argue that Brazilian jiujitsu (BJJ) and 
mixed martial arts (MMA) exploded into widespread visibility as a result 
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of the televizing of the Ultimate Fighting Championship/Competition, the 
UFC (Downey 2014), so one might say that KFM came to have the visibil-
ity and stature it did solely thanks to its incorporation into the choreography 
of the film Batman Begins, and the space devoted to discussing KFM in the 
DVD-extras and promotional behind-the-scenes clips that became available 
around the feature film itself. In other words, BJJ, MMA, KFM, and argu-
ably now many other martial arts all share certain key characteristics and a 
paradox: all of them champion ‘bare/brute reality’, but all are constituted 
by and cannot but operate and exist within and according to the terms of 
the mediascape.12
Increasing academic attention is being given to televized ‘combat 
sports’, such as MMA (Spencer 2011; Downey 2007). But, here, I am 
more interested in institutions like KFM, which represent a different but 
equally important aspect of the reality movement in martial arts. Ap-
proaches to combat such as krav maga and KFM may seem to be ‘the 
other’ of sporting martial arts (even MMA) because they have very dif-
ferent discourses and attitudes towards ‘reality’ and ‘combat’ than combat 
sports. Indeed, reality martial arts such as KFM and krav maga regard 
themselves as more radical or more real than even extreme combat sports, 
such as BJJ and MMA.
Yet, despite its claim to ‘street’ credentials, KFM remains as wedded 
to the mediascape as MMA. It is certainly indebted to it for its popularity. 
Krav maga, however, is rather different. Being born in a Jewish ghetto in 
World War II and subsequently being institutionalized as the name of the 
hand-to-hand combat training of the Israeli military and security forces, 
krav maga has a very different history and discursive existence to KFM. 
The latter was born on the jeet kune do circuit and was designed with Euro-
pean nightclubs, pub car-parks, and city streets in mind, rather than highly 
securitized military situations (for krav maga, see Cohen 2009).
Most importantly, though, as well as having different histories, differ-
ent pre-suppositions about ‘real situations’, and different ethoi, krav maga 
and KFM also have different relations to media and mediatization. KFM’s 
relation to media is closer to MMA’s than krav maga’s, even though it 
orientates itself differently in important respects. Ultimately, however, 
even though reality martial arts like KFM may wish to align themselves 
more with krav maga than MMA, there are crucial differences between 
krav maga and KFM and important similarities between KFM and MMA. 
These boil down to the role played by the mediascape for their existence. 
Put bluntly, krav maga does not ‘need’ the media, whereas the populariza-
tion and dissemination of KFM was entirely determined by what we might 
call ‘DVD-extra visibility’.
 The Reality of Martial Arts 119
In any case, the point to emphasize is that the mediascape is the dis-
avowed but constitutive supplement to many reality martial arts. In Der-
rida’s sense, the mediascape is a ‘dangerous supplement’ for reality martial 
arts because the putative fakery of mediatization is at once part of their con-
ditions of possibility for existence and yet their declared antithesis (Derrida 
1976). Film is fake, remember, while MMA and KFM insist they are ‘real’.
thriLLs, friLLs, anD institutionaL stiLLs
The problem that reality martial arts discourses have with the cinema is not 
unrelated to the problem they have with classical or traditional martial arts. 
This relates to ‘frills’. Cinema has frills. Showy, spectacular, and ‘tradi-
tional’ martial arts all have frills. But, the crucial question for ‘realists’ in 
martial arts is this: Does reality have frills? The consensus among nontradi-
tional martial artists always resounds in the negative. The reality of combat 
is overwhelmingly defined in some way as having ‘no frills’. But, again, 
such a position quickly becomes grey and uncertain. How does one define 
a frill? Is a head-kick frilly? Or a side thrust kick? Is an arm-bar frilly? Or 
the whirling sinawali (the crisscrossing figure eight pattern) that is the core 
of stick and knife fighting arts like escrima? Proponents of fighting at kick-
ing distance and proponents of ground-fighting, as well as proponents of 
knife fighting, and so on, are all equally likely to be accused by each other 
of living in a reality-denying dream world—because any of these practices 
can be deemed ‘too risky’ or ‘too unreal’ for various reasons.
Interestingly, in the case of KFM, during the last few years of the 
Norman-Dieguez relationship, there were more and more blog posts, com-
ments, discussions, stories, and opinions circulating on the Internet among 
practitioners and former practitioners of KFM who reputedly came to feel 
disgruntled with the development of the KFM syllabus. At first, so these 
stories went, KFM had been radically practical and entirely pragmatic. But 
as time went on, showy frills and frilliness, in the form of more spectacular 
or less plausible techniques, sequences, tactics, and strategies, were added 
to the system.
Whether this is true or not, it raises a question connected to any focus 
on ‘reality’; namely that of syllabus development. For, if any martial art 
presents itself as already being able to do what it says it can do, then how 
can change be legitimated? Given the implications of any discursive posi-
tioning which involves a claim of already knowing, then any ‘development’ 
within the syllabus is likely to throw up some problems. This is because, on 
the one hand, the martial art claims to have already identified and to have 
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already conceptually, physically, and strategically mastered the problems 
and possibilities of certain sorts of physical encounters. Each art or sys-
tem claims to be a unique approach to such situations. It claims to know, 
already. How, then, can change justifiably (non-hypocritically) happen?13
In the case of KFM, its training videos regularly reiterate the maxim 
that no student or practitioner should ever say or think anything like, ‘Yes, 
I’ve got that, I understand that; now, what’s next?’ This is because, as the 
course narrator (Andy Norman) informs us, believing you have mastered 
something—believing you have ‘done it’ or ‘finished learning it’—is an 
arrogant mistake that could cost you dearly in a real situation. The basics 
must be ingrained and regularly repeated, regularly trained.
However, in the next breath, KFM discourse states that the system is 
ongoing, unfinished, evolving; that practitioners can and should explore 
and improvize; and that no one but you/the individual can really come up 
with the right answer to any problem or ‘question’. Even if the same attack 
were directed at everyone, each individual should really have explored and 
experimented in training in order to feel confident that their response will 
work for them. This is because, if an attack is regarded as the posing of 
the question, ‘How are you going to deal with this?’, then the answer, we 
are told, could vary infinitely or infinitesimally from person to person. In 
this, KFM discourse closely reiterates Bruce Lee’s jeet kune do discourse 
(Inosanto 1994; Bolelli 2003).
On a first reading, these two sorts of statements seem to contradict each 
other. For, taken together, the statements seem to say: you must drum these 
movements into yourself, and never move away from trying to perfect 
them, while, at the same time, you should constantly experiment, or at least 
understand that your system is liable to change in response to the results of 
the experiments and explorations of your teachers or the founders.
However, on an institutional level, the two statements are not contra-
dictory. Indeed, they sit quite comfortably together in the tacitly assumed 
context of an institutional hierarchy. The implicit logic is as follows. One 
needs to have internalized and naturalized the movement skills of the sys-
tem (the movement skills that are the system) before one can experiment 
with it properly. I emphasize again the word ‘properly’ because, although 
it is theoretically possible that anyone could knock anyone else out and al-
though any wildly flailing novice may indeed manage to land some strong 
blows on a trained martial artist, the point is that one is not doing KFM if 
one is flailing wildly. One is not doing any ‘system’ or ‘art’ if one moves 
outside of the rules of its movement principles or logics. One is not doing 
capoeira if one is break dancing or ‘tricking’.14 Equally, one is not doing 
capoeira if one is doing taekwondo or judo. In other words, one must learn 
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a system ‘mechanically’ in order to learn how to play with it ‘artistically’ 
or to come to attain the competency to know that you are actually in pos-
session of what you are experimenting with.15
Thus, although the system may not be absolutely or classically ‘hier-
archical’, in the negative sense of students not being allowed to question 
teachers, it is hierarchical in the sense of operating according to the as-
sumption that time and properly guided effort in learning the mechanics, 
strategies, and tactics—the discipline and the language—of the system 
will result in increasing competence over time. Thus, the assumption is 
that ‘beginner questions’ can be answered easily within the terms of the 
system itself, whereas more ‘advanced questions’ or problems that probe 
at the limits of the system in its present form could challenge the present 
form of the system. These would apparently necessarily have to be formu-
lated by more advanced participants or advanced challengers from outside 
of the system.
So KFM is (or was) an institution. But given its DVD-extra and rather 
freely flowing mode of online distribution (it is still possible to download 
many of the KFM training videos for free, albeit illegally), one might 
wish to ask, what kind of institution is it, was it, does it continue—
‘hauntologically’, ‘spectrally’16—to be?
post-DvD pEDagogy as BoDy tEChnoLogy
All institutions change. Sometimes institutions change at a glacial pace. 
Sometimes they have very visible revolutions and reconfigurations. And 
sometimes historical and ideological processes obscure the points of inven-
tion, mutation, or transformation.17 Keysi Fighting Method came and went 
very quickly. But the dynamics that we can see at play here, I think, can 
be seen to be at work in many martial arts institutions at different times. 
Indeed, perhaps the very rapidity of the formation, proliferation, and frag-
mentation of KFM can be treated as a kind of ‘hyperreal’ instance exem-
plifying wider principles and movements. It is likely that it all happened so 
fast for KFM because it was catapulted into the limelight via its association 
with Hollywood films. This is certainly why and how the world came to 
know it. And the significance of this deserves some consideration.
Of course, ‘knowledge’ of almost all martial arts in the West has long 
been closely connected with their cinematic representation (Krug 2001). 
But ‘knowledge’ of KFM was not circulated in the same way that ‘knowl-
edge’ about other martial arts had been circulated, prior to DVD and the In-
ternet. Rather, with KFM, fans were not merely trying to mimic the martial 
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moves they had seen in the movie. Rather, the DVD-extras offered little 
insights, pedagogical documentaries, and signposts to further pedagogical 
resources to come—resources that Dieguez and Norman quickly went on 
to provide with their range of training MPEGs.18
This is important because it illustrates the fact that this type of DVD-
pedagogy differs from earlier forms of cinematic dissemination and hence 
suggests a different form of what Morris calls ‘popular cultural formation’ 
(Morris 2004; Morris, Li, and Chan 2005). The types of popular cultural 
formation explored so well by Morris involved fandom that often featured 
a certain kind of mimicry of the cinematic spectacle, whether via cinema 
or VHS reception (see also Morris 2001; Brown 1997).
What KFM’s difference suggests is that, even though it is ‘yet an-
other’ case of a fashion that is almost entirely ‘cinematically’ constituted, 
mediated, and disseminated, it is one that is unique enough to call for 
a further—and perhaps ultimately quite different—consideration of the 
relationship between bodily practices and institutions. This is because the 
‘post-DVD textuality’ (Hunt 2014) at play in this case involves a specific 
pedagogical interpellative mode, which is a species or relative of—while 
remaining different from—either fiction film or documentary. And the 
effects of this DVD and post-DVD pedagogical interpellation are poten-
tially profound.
KFM and other such training videos are of course ‘merely commodi-
ties’. However, they are also active in the production of identification and 
even a kind of ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1991; Spencer 2014). 
When acted upon, they become body technologies, transformative of lived 
bodily ethos, topos, and habitus. When consumed and explored by existing 
martial artists, their lessons become supplementary to and potentially sub-
versive or deconstructive of existing forms of martial arts practice. This 
is because, unlike certain other forms of dissemination, demonstration, 
discussion, idea sharing, and community building that take place within 
a style, KFM primarily arrived from the outside and amounted to an ap-
proach and set of principles and techniques that supplemented and even 
subverted extant practices.19
The ‘challenge’ posed by KFM to other martial arts styles devolved 
on offering a different set of propositions about the reality of combat. Its 
distinguishing and definitive proposition was that, contrary to most martial 
arts practice, which is based on the idea that combat involves facing one 
opponent (and hence involves training for one-to-one combat), KFM pro-
poses that it is most likely that it will be more than one assailant that will 
attack you. Hence, runs the reasoning, the core of training should always 
start from the assumption of multiple attackers.
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Changing the assumptions about the context and organization of violent 
events changes understandings of, or beliefs about, combat and thereupon 
training methods and practices, too, because of the reconfigured sense of 
the character of reality and hence what is ‘natural’ or ‘essential’.
Thus, we are thereby obliged to engage with the question of the ‘nature’ 
of combat, as assumptions or theories about it feed into the form and con-
tent of martial arts practices and discourses. Indeed, there is no escaping 
from the question of ‘nature’ or ‘the natural’ in martial arts discourse. They 
are terms whose meaning is defined in close connection with understand-
ings of reality. In fact, the status of ideas about ‘nature’ in martial arts 
discourses of all kinds run deep.
thE rEaLity of CoMBat
A number of traditions of sociological and anthropological work strongly 
suggest that bodily propensities, dispositions, and capacities are more often 
than not strongly cultivated (Mauss 1992; Bourdieu 1979). Accordingly, 
the idea of ‘the natural’ (or indeed the universal) becomes correspondingly 
problematic. Specifically, what becomes problematic is the connection of 
ideas like ‘the natural’ or ‘the universal’ to ideas like the essential, the time-
less, or fixed and unchanging reality.
The inexorable proliferation of ever more paradigms and approaches to 
hand-to-hand combat, and the ongoing development of individual styles 
themselves, all demonstrates that there is no single theory of the reality 
of violence or combat. Different styles are implicitly or explicitly orga-
nized by different theories of how combat works and how to master it. 
They are each, in effect, performative interpretations of their implicit or 
explicit theories.20
The question, ‘Which theory is right?’ is the eternally returning question 
of the anxious martial artist. As is well known, Bruce Lee believed there 
was only one reality of combat: simplicity and directness (Lee 1971). For 
Lee, any approach that complicated things any further than this was veer-
ing away into confusion, floweriness, frilliness, and ultimately, despair. Of 
course, Bruce Lee’s thinking was arguably organized (indeed, ‘hegemon-
ized’) by his teenage training in wing chun kung fu, and this clearly influ-
enced his thinking and approach even after he had gone on to declare that 
he no longer had any connection to any style.21
Rather than holding Lee’s position, then, it seems better to say that, rather 
than being ‘fixed’, the reality of combat or violence is always produced in 
the encounter between two or more combatants in a specific physical and 
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cultural context. The ‘reality of combat’ between two untrained fighters 
will be very different to that between two people trained in boxing, or one 
trained in boxing and one trained in wrestling, or a judoka and a karateka, 
or if the ground is wet or dry, flat or uneven, and so on. Furthermore, the 
‘reality’ is fundamentally experiential and always therefore radically per-
spectival. It has no simple univocal objectivity. Rather than looking for 
one, a more pertinent thing to note in the context of this discussion is that 
martial arts institutions (re)train bodies to behave in particular ways. Hu-
man bodies and their capacities and propensities are moulded, produced, 
and policed by institutions. In Foucault’s vocabulary, institutions discipline 
bodies. Institutions produce disciplined bodies.22
One of the implications of Foucauldian arguments about the relation-
ship between bodies and institutions in a disciplinary society is that we 
have to de-naturalize our understanding of human physical propensities. 
We have to denature the body. This idea may seem slightly peculiar, but it 
is an active element of the teaching and learning practices of a great deal 
of martial arts, wherever learning requires the repetition of an ‘unnatural’ 
technique, movement, or movement-system, until it becomes natural to the 
practitioner. This is both banal and yet important to emphasize because the 
becoming-natural of movements or movement principles might also help-
fully be thought of as the becoming-institutionalized of the body.23 The 
point at which the unnatural or initially non-spontaneous movements of the 
martial arts become internalized, such that the practitioner does them natu-
rally, is the point at which they have developed, in a Foucauldian sense, a 
disciplined or ‘docile body’ (Foucault 1977).
‘Docility’, in Foucault’s usage, refers to a lack of bodily resistance to 
a power system or institution, rather than sedentariness. A body is docile 
in relation to an institution, as seen when it acts without resistance or 
smoothly in accordance with the principles of the institution. Thus, the 
soldier who has been trained to react in a certain way when hearing gun-
shot (for example, immediately drawing their own weapon and charging 
forward in response to this or other sights, sounds, and signals, rather than 
behaving differently, say, screaming in fear, running away, or cowering in 
a doorway) or the pugilist who senses it as soon as the opponent is in range 
and strikes automatically or the ‘internal’ martial artist who senses, yields, 
and redirects the incoming force without thinking can each be said to be 
‘docile’. Docile means disciplined, and disciplined means entirely part of 
a movement system. The martial arts master of an established traditional 
system would thus be a prime example of a Foucauldian docile body.
Of course, saying this much is merely to reiterate the relatively com-
monplace point that ‘the natural’ in bodily movement is almost entirely 
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an effect of training. ‘Natural movement’ is institutionally constructed. On 
one level, this is uncontroversial when applied to many aspects of our lives, 
including martial arts practice. After all, one learns a movement system 
and it becomes ‘second nature’. But there is more to the notion of ‘nature’ 
as it functions within and structures many aspects of various martial arts 
discourses, and as it works to institute various senses of ‘reality’.
thE tWo naturEs
At one end of the spectrum of martial arts discourse, ‘nature’ is distin-
guished from ‘institution’ or ‘style’ (Lee 1971, 1975; Lee and Little 1997; 
Miller 2000). Nature is valued as good, real, true, superior, and so forth. 
Style is regarded as limitation, stultification, stricture, convention, and 
so on (Bolelli 2003). The exemplification of this would be the ‘modern’ 
(post–Bruce Lee) dictum of ‘discover your own natural movement’. This 
position sounds all very well and good. However, in Foucauldian terms, 
closer inspection of this position suggests that it is organized by a ‘repres-
sive hypothesis’ (Foucault 1978). The implication of this is that styles or 
institutions are ‘repressive’, that they ‘repress’ something that therefore 
needs to be freed or emancipated (nature). In Bruce Lee this argument has 
a clear countercultural resonance (Bowman 2008b, 2010b). But even when 
it is disconnected from any kind of countercultural discourse, we can per-
ceive the presence and effects of a ‘repressive hypothesis’ in the attitudes 
of many modern nontraditional and anti-traditional approaches to martial 
arts. For them, ‘styles stifle nature’, and nature is what arises naturally and 
spontaneously. Your nature and my nature may well differ. Hence, in this 
discourse, nature is individualistic.
At the other end of the spectrum of uses of nature would be the ‘ancient’, 
‘timeless’, ‘essential truth’ perspective, in which ‘nature’ is the truth and 
reality that was discovered by Taoist ancients. This perspective is often al-
lochronic (Fabian 1983), orientalist (Said 1995), ‘self-orientalizing’ (Frank 
2006), or ‘Western Buddhist’ (Žižek 2001). In this perspective, nature is 
universal, timeless, and essential—to be discovered by individuals, indeed, 
but it will always be the same nature. Here, institutions are necessary for 
showing the way. They are not repressive; they direct (Ronell 2004).
These two ends of the spectrum of the uses of ‘nature’ in martial arts 
discourse are often presented as if they are opposites and antithetical to 
each other (Bolelli 2003). But are they? Certainly, both positions share the 
term ‘nature’ yet disagree about what this term means or what a martial 
art’s relation to nature is.24 But what role does nature play in each position?
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On the one hand, we might group contemporary ‘scientific’ or ‘verifica-
tionist’ martial arts into one group. Bruce Lee spearheaded this approach to 
martial arts in the west (Bowman 2010b). The key principle of this approach 
is to establish what works best and most efficiently, based on systematic 
research and individual experience. However, even if verificationist martial 
arts aspire to be ‘scientific’ in approach, that scientific approach is often 
closely tied to a belief in ‘discovering the natural’ in terms of establishing 
and cultivating individual propensities. This position is based on a belief 
that every body has its own ‘natural degree zero’ and that the best thing 
to do is to ‘find’ that nature for oneself, rather than joining an institution 
and having an artificial system imposed upon the body (Miller 2000). This 
‘natural’ is regarded as individual, contingent, and bodily. My natural move-
ment may be different from your natural movement, but we will both have 
‘natural movement’. It may be unnatural for me to try to mimic your style 
of movement because we may be different sizes and shapes and have differ-
ent histories or ‘primary habitus’ (Hilgers 2009). This is the ‘find your own 
truth’ version of nature. It is often anti-institutional and overwhelmingly 
verificationist (Bolelli 2003).
The putative polar opposite position of the supposedly modern verifi-
cationist martial arts approach would be that occupied by the ‘ancient and 
timeless’ camp. This might be exemplified by the contemporary ‘Taoist’ 
taijiquan and qigong nexus, the discourse or ideology of which insists that 
‘nature’ is constant, timeless, and universal (Wile 1996; Frank 2006). Ad-
mittedly, ‘constant’ here refers to a constant state of change in the interplay 
of yin and yang, but the point is that in contradistinction to modern ‘evolv-
ing’ martial arts and combat systems, the discourse of ‘Taoist’ martial arts 
is one which values tradition and institution.
All martial arts have their traditions, of course, and all martial artists 
have their places within and their relations to traditions. But the point to 
be emphasized here is that vis-à-vis ‘nature’ or ‘reality’, there are at least 
two different pedagogical paradigms in play: verificationist approaches to 
martial arts seek to advocate experimentation and development: you find 
out what works for you; you can take advice or not take advice, the choice 
is yours. But traditionalist approaches hold that the wisdom is encoded 
within the traditional forms, kata, and training exercises (such as step spar-
ring, technique sparring, push-hands, sticking hands, or even in standing 
qigong, meditation, and so on). 
More precisely, in traditionalist martial arts, one may experiment, but 
only in terms of applying principles. Transgression of the principles is 
transgression of the wisdom encoded in the martial art. Thus, in taijiquan 
push-hands, it would simply not do to smash into your partner with punches 
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and kicks that force their way through your partner’s posture or moves—
unless one were doing so deliberately in order to help the partner to practice 
taiji principles against a non-taiji opponent. But essentially this would be 
force against force, which is anathema to taijiquan principles. So, doing this 
would mean that you weren’t doing taijiquan.
In other words, and to recap: there are two senses of nature in play here, 
both with different sorts of institution around them. The nature to be dis-
covered in modern verificationist martial arts will always be singular or 
particular to the individual. The nature to be discovered in traditionalist 
martial arts will be regarded as universal or timeless. Both senses of nature 
involve a different sense of ‘institution’. ‘Nature’ in taijiquan discourse 
takes the form of timeless universal principles, which translate into timeless 
natural biomechanical principles. Because of this, institutions are regarded 
as necessary and necessarily to be respected. This is because the student 
must be conformist in order to learn how to embody and actualize universal 
principles in prescribed movements and logics of interaction. The peda-
gogical institution is one of simultaneous cultivation and stripping back 
or removal of encultured ‘mistakes’ (resisting or meeting force with force 
being a prime example). This discourse affirms that what is being taught is 
natural but that our everyday lives have made us forget how to move, act, 
and react ‘naturally’. Paradoxically, ‘natural movement’ is (re)learned by 
perfecting the most unnatural looking of movement sequences, such as a 
taiji form.
Verificationist martial arts are predisposed to regard such an approach to 
learning as conformist and stultifying—indeed, as a movement away from 
the natural or from the proper nature of combat, without any proper return 
to it (Lee 1971). Tales abound, in the world of modern innovations into 
martial arts training, about martial artists discovering painfully that they 
had been deluded about the nature of combat by their ‘classical’ martial arts 
training; about how in their first ‘real fight’ fear and adrenaline made them 
freeze or made all of their techniques fail; about how they lost their balance 
or grip or coordination and couldn’t compensate; about how they had never 
trained for being attacked by multiple opponents, and so on (Miller 2008; 
Miller 2000). Thus, a ‘martial art’ like taijiquan can and is often easily 
taken to represent the most fake and artificial of institutions.
instituting naturE
However, according to the terms of my argument, neither traditional-
ist martial arts like taijiquan nor anti-traditional martial arts like KFM 
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are necessarily any closer to the ‘truth’ or ‘reality’ of combat. They are 
both merely performative embodiments of different theories, organized 
implicitly or explicitly by different premises or presuppositions about the 
nature of the event. The natural in taijiquan and other ‘internal’ martial arts 
involves adopting a strong, relaxed posture with a straight spine, rounded 
shoulders (and ‘qua’), bent and relaxed elbows and knees, and so on, in 
order to enable the greatest sensitivity and smoothness of response and 
movement. (There are also ‘philosophical’, cosmological, or esoteric and 
vitalist reasons given for the posture considerations of taijiquan—which 
refer to the circulation of qi—but insofar as it is approached as a martial art, 
the posture considerations of taijiquan relate chiefly to enabling sensitivity 
(listening, sticking, yielding) and the ability to respond spontaneously.)
On the other hand, in a verificationist approach like Keysi Fighting 
Method, training such a posture would represent indulging in the height of 
artifice and inefficiency. In Keysi, ‘the natural’ refers to what ‘a person’ 
would be likely to do spontaneously, almost as an involuntary reflex, when 
attacked by multiple opponents; specifically, as discussed, putting your 
hands on your head and hunching down into a ball to protect your head, 
face, neck, chest, belly, and groin.
Arguably, then, another key difference between taijiquan and KFM 
involves a different theory of the relation between untrained and trained 
reactions. That is to say, while many ‘classical’ martial arts clearly seek to 
train any kind of ‘foetal position’ reaction out of students, Keysi seeks to 
build upon it and transform it into a robust response. As mentioned, this is 
based on the assumption that you will tend to curl up like this automatically 
and that, despite its potential shortcomings, it can be modified slightly to 
become a good strong starting position for a counterattack. The putative 
proximity of the pensador position to ‘untrained reactions’ is precisely why 
the pensador becomes the basic and central stance. It is clearly very differ-
ent to the ‘natural’ position of taijiquan. But in Keysi, the pensador is ac-
corded superiority because it is so close to what its theory states will come 
naturally to any untrained person anyway. What Keysi strives to do is to 
build strong strategies, tactics, and movement principles from what comes 
‘naturally’ to untrained people (and trained people, when overwhelmed in 
a fight).
Nevertheless, both Keysi and taijiquan movement principles require 
 cultivation to work at all. Both require quite precise forms of biome-
chanical coordination. Both also require a metaphorical coordination or 
alignment of the mind and the body. Without this, no ‘technique’ or other 
aspect of the martial art will ‘work’. In fact, both require quite precise 
forms of cultivation.
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Cultivation is a complex term. It refers to relations between the bio-
logical and the social or institutional. It clearly involves nature, but nature 
trained. ‘Cultivation’ is connected with ‘culture’, in all senses, and can be 
used with reference to anything from the earliest traces of the historical 
emergence of human society to the cellular contents of a test tube in the 
most contemporary of laboratories, as well as the most formative stages 
of infant development, any aspect of education, as well as the most avant-
garde artistic installations, aesthetic or intellectual productions and experi-
ences, and so on. As seems clear from many debates about the relations 
between technology and biology, trying to ascertain what is part of the 
natural and what is part of the artificial or the technological in the modern 
world is very often a very grey area indeed. This is as much the case in 
martial arts as it is in agriculture, food science, sport, medicine, marketing, 
or any other area involving ‘cultivation’.
Moreover, in martial arts, we are dealing with the institutional man-
agement of different kinds of material, of different ontological and epis-
temological statuses: from hopes, fears, and fantasies (or phantasies) to 
bodily propensities and pedagogical paradigms in particular technological 
environments and discursive contexts. In all of this, the idea of ‘reality’ in 
martial arts is always discursively constructed, in and by institutions that 
are born within and feed back into these discourses.25 This reality is always 
therefore in some sense irreducibly theoretical and informed by narratives, 
myths, and legends of all orders, from anecdotes about ‘fights we have 
known’ to YouTube clips we have seen. The theories are actualized in their 
performative elaboration; the dojo, kwoon, and training hall act as laborato-
ries where reality tests are run and rerun. Habitus and illusio arise together, 
prompted by a ‘reality’ that exists as a future threat, a monstrous spectre, 
that demands to be warded off or paid off up front with blood and sweat 
and devotion, while pain shades into pleasure as we are seduced into be-
lieving that what we are doing must be real (Green 2011). And from desire 
emerges drive and pleasure, pride, propriety, and identity, each becoming 
entangled with the others and becoming indecipherable, inextricable—as 
institution wrestles with the enigma of reality and each moves into focus 
and the foreground as the other moves out and recedes, as if the one is al-
ways yin to the other’s yang, or each is the différance of the other.
ConCLusions: LEarning Without LEarning
Bruce Lee spawned a movement in martial arts, whose imperatives 
boil down to an anti-institutionalism, on the one hand, and an intimate 
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experimental and verificationist ethos, on the other. Indeed, in its most 
radical receptions, the Bruce Lee message can actually be interpreted as: 
Don’t join a school or club; work it out for yourself (Miller 2000). This is 
what Bruce Lee did: he walked away from—actively renounced—martial 
arts styles. By the late 1960s he was saying that he no longer saw himself 
as practicing Chinese kung fu at all (Tom 2005).
But in his renunciation of styles and institutions lies the very problem of 
Bruce Lee. He never completed the syllabus of the martial art he studied 
in Hong Kong through his teens (wing chun). He went to America when 
he was eighteen and soon started teaching. As a young hotshot he made 
a name for himself; and in a context saturated by militaristically trained 
and sports-focused Japanese and Korean martial arts, Lee’s Chinese kung 
fu performances stood out as something else. It was in the U.S. context, 
saturated by katas and points-based competition, that Lee developed his 
belief that martial arts seemed to be in a sorry state: Currently, the martial 
arts are ineffective, he said. They are formal, rule bound, artificial. They 
are full of strictures, a ‘fancy mess’, a ‘classical mess’, ‘organized despair’. 
Stultifying (Lee 1971). And so he began to innovate. He maintained the 
wing chun centreline; he added Korean taekwondo kicks; he adopted the 
Western fencing stance; he emulated the techniques used by the best boxers 
with the most powerful jabs; he began learning the grappling, in-fighting, 
and ground-fighting of Japanese jujitsu; he explored the weapons styles of 
the Philippines. And so on (Inosanto 1994).
But, to restate the problem differently: Was this done in ignorance or 
knowledgably? Can you really dip into a martial art—one whose practi-
tioners insist it takes years to master—and pull out bits and pieces? Are 
you really able to evaluate them? Are you even able to perceive them? 
Certainly, this kind of thing is nowadays easily sent up, as a joke. In the 
online comedy mockumentary series Enter the Dojo, Master Ken has de-
vised his own martial art, called Ameri-do-te, whose motto is ‘the best of 
all, the worst of none’.
The question that is endlessly asked about Bruce Lee is: Was his new hy-
brid form a real, authentic improvement? Or was it that he could only have 
had the arrogance to think that any martial art needed improving because 
he had not actually finished the syllabus in any martial art (Smith 1999)? 
There are stories of Bruce Lee returning to see his teachers and classmates 
in Hong Kong after he had been training away from them in the United 
States, believing he was progressing on his own. In these stories, we hear 
that Lee demonstrated how much he had improved. His former teachers 
and peers, however, believed that he had not improved at all! Indeed, to 
their mind, how could he improve? He hadn’t finished learning the syllabus 
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and so didn’t know what he was missing. The conundrum is: Do you have 
to go through the ranks of the institution before you can know enough to 
legitimately disagree with the institution or to be in a position to contest it 
legitimately? Is this logical, reasonable, and necessary or is it an inegalitar-
ian, hierarchical, and possibly even stultifying position?
In the end, our own decisions about this matter little because this kind 
of thing happens all the time in the world and, perhaps, nowhere more than 
in and around martial arts institutions. Schools, associations, and styles 
are instituted, flourish, fragment and collapse, or reform. Agreeing or 
disagreeing with it is like agreeing or disagreeing with the weather. There 
are heresies and there are factions. There are paradigm shifts and revolu-
tions. There are mutations and transformations; there are translators and 
traitors. There is also the growing perception that all styles and systems are 
hybrids and bastards, each typically claiming a pure lineage, a complete-
ness, a plenitude and unitarity that is actually only pure in that it is purely 
ideological. Consequently, we are rarely, if ever, in a position to know with 
certainty whether our martial art is authentic, original, or best. Your kung 
fu is not real kung fu; your taiji is hippy taiji, my taiji is real martial taiji; 
yours is a bastardized form, mine is the original and best. And so on. These 
are common accusations.
Of course, it is easy now to say that we know that the idea of the 
original, like the idea of the authentic, is a red herring. So perhaps we can 
adjudicate in terms of better and worse. And this is the time-honoured 
question of martial arts: Which martial art is best? Which martial art 
works best? Which style would win? Whether or not Bruce Lee really 
knew the ins and outs of all the other martial arts, was his own construc-
tion objectively better or worse than others? Surely this can be decided. 
You’d think. Unfortunately, deciding this is like deciding which is the 
best move in rock-paper-scissors/scissors-paper-stone. Style against style 
is only ever person against person in context after context. In other words, 
interminably undecidable.
Which is perhaps why Bruce Lee never really engaged in polemics 
against specific martial arts styles. His problem was with the very idea of 
style, and specifically with the way styles were taught. Styles stultify, he 
argued. True learning is not about accumulation but about reduction. You 
have to get to the essence. Hence, he proposed, his approach (jeet kune do), 
could be taught and could be learned, but could not really be institutional-
ized. It could not be formalized. It demanded an ethos and an intimacy. It 
was less about formal content and much more about attitude. Teaching and 
learning should be experimental, alive, moving, hands on, verificationist, 
one-on-one. In learning jeet kune do, Lee argued, one is in a sense only 
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relearning—retooling, reorienting, reprogramming, rewiring, rewriting—
one’s own body. Learning how to ‘honestly express yourself’ is the phrase 
Lee would often use.
This started in the 1960s. Bruce Lee became world famous in the 1970s. 
He either initiated or was at least at the forefront of a massive revolution 
in martial arts pedagogy that accelerated from that point on in the West: 
anti-institutional, inventive, verificationist, intimate, one-on-one or one-on-
two or one-on-three, and so on. A lot of this inventiveness has proceeded 
in more or less complete ignorance of classical or formal martial arts dis-
ciplines. This anti-disciplinarity has of course produced new disciplines: 
MMA, or mixed martial arts, was—as its name attests—never meant to be 
one thing. But over time it has become so (kicking, punching, grappling, 
ground), with recognizable features and forms.
Whence the paradox: the rejection of discipline is not freedom from dis-
cipline. All martial arts revolutions, all martial arts paradigms, all martial 
arts learning, involve retraining one’s body, or bodily propensities. This 
can only happen through a discipline and to the extent that what emerges is 
a discipline. Without the institution of discipline—inherited or invented—
you get nothing. No change, no improvement, no event. The discipline can 
be adopted (like when you take lessons); or it can be invented (like when 
you devise your own style, techniques, or training regimen). It will always 
be implicitly or explicitly social or invented from socially circulating ma-
terials, discourses, ideas, and principles.
Most revolutions in martial arts paradigms and institutions that I know 
have involved the rejection of one discipline and the reciprocal construc-
tion of another. To stick with Bruce Lee: the legend has it that he had a 
major rethink after ending one challenge match (with Wong Jack Man) 
completely exhausted and dejected because he had not won the fight much 
more quickly and efficiently. Thus, the legend continues, he rejected a 
lot of the training and techniques specific to the style of kung fu he had 
hitherto practiced and added weight training, running and other stamina 
training, boxing style training, and a whole range of pad work and bag 
work, as well as attention to diet. Some say he also took performance 
enhancing drugs.
However, much of the logic and structure of the wing chun ‘nucleus’ 
remained active within his new creation. As Derrida put it, an institution 
is not just the four walls which surround us; it is the very structure of 
our thought. And Bruce Lee’s thinking about combat can be said to have 
remained hegemonized by the structure of wing chun’s implicit theory of 
efficiency in combat.
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unLEarning DisCipLinE
Which raises an interesting question. Can discipline be unlearned? In an 
obvious sense, yes, of course it can. Lack of practice or improper prac-
tice means getting out of practice, getting sloppy, drifting away from 
the proper, forgetting, getting it wrong. This is as true for spending time 
away from training as it is for spending time away from academia or as 
it is for not practicing your foreign language or not practicing anything. 
Indeed, if we follow certain of the implications in Derrida’s argument 
about the inevitability of dissemination, then the question might perhaps 
be reposed as one of whether it is ever possible to halt the drift and warps 
and discursive wending away from discipline. As Adam Frank argues in 
his ethnographic and genealogical study of taijiquan in Shanghai, one need 
only have a quick read of the so-called taiji classics to realize that the art 
these nineteenth-century texts are discussing is very different—very dif-
ferent indeed—from anything seen in the parks of Shanghai today. This is 
because the styles have drifted, bifurcated, intermingled, been subject to 
fashions, fads, government policies, standardizations, the modernization 
movement in the early twentieth-century, Maoism, and so on and so forth, 
such that any practitioner of any form of taijiquan today is literally em-
bodying decades upon decades of writings and rewritings that they cannot 
but be largely ignorant of. The embodied practice is a material residue of 
historical layers and all kinds of intervention that are, in effect, the uncon-
scious of the activity.
On a related tangent, Frank also mentions the problem of the vacuum left 
in Shanghai’s parks after the state crackdown on Falun Gong practice in the 
1990s. He notes that in order to fill the spaces where Falun Gong practitio-
ners had previously been, the government actually bussed in hundreds upon 
hundreds—even thousands—of practitioners of a new ‘ancient’ art, called 
mulanquan. Now, mulanquan is passed off as ancient, but its first appear-
ance in public was in the wake of both the crackdown on Falun Gong and 
the global success of the Disney animation, Mulan. Needless to say, surely 
most of the now myriad practitioners of this sanitized and state-approved 
form are ignorant of its peculiar emergence or institution.
But, by the same token, it is only thanks to Adam Frank’s publication of 
knowledge gained on his intimate ethnographic research that I have learned 
this myself. So can I even be sure that I know it?—This may be a version 
of a Lyotardian ‘postmodern legitimation crisis in knowledge’, but it also 
sums up a problem for anyone who practices what they may want to believe 
to be an ancient and timeless Chinese or Japanese art: Is this the real thing? 
Do I really know taiji? Is what I know really taiji?
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Interestingly, most practitioners of Asian martial arts—Eastern and 
Western practitioners—have not the faintest idea about or interest in the 
actual history of the art they practice. They may believe all kinds of things 
about a lineage stretching back to Bodhidharma or Zhang Sanfeng or the 
Shaolin Temple. But most martial arts are not allowed to have a history, 
in the sense of change or development. And this is not necessarily either a 
problem of orientalism or self-orientalization. Rather, it is a matter of what 
Derrida called teleiopoeisis: the crucially important political process of 
evoking the ancient and unchanging as a proof of the present.
Nevertheless, history moves. Discourses drift. Stabilizations dissemi-
nate. Fashions jolt. There is no pure repetition in embodied, kinetic, or any 
other kind of mimesis. There is reiteration, which equals the introduction 
of alterity. This goes on without our noticing. If we noticed it, we would 
try to halt it. Because our aim is learning, not unlearning. But, if it were: 
Could discipline be consciously unlearned, deliberately rejected, and with 
or without a teacher? Can we unlearn the habits of our own lifetime? Can 
you teach an old dog new tricks? I would propose that learning something 
new—something truly different—is often likely to involve a reciprocal un-
learning. To stay with the example of taiji: I spent over a decade learning 
taiji, after having studied several other martial arts at different times for 
different lengths of time. The discipline of taiji demands more or less ex-
actly the opposite of everything I’d ever learned to do before. Learning taiji 
involved unlearning so many accumulated habits: resistance, force against 
force, using strength, separation, speed. And I would have to say that this 
kind of thing could not have been learned by me without a teacher. How-
ever, the basic teaching was mimetic. (Hands here, feet here. Watch. Copy.) 
The more advanced teaching was necessarily tactile and hands on. Error 
was shown, in terms of what happened to my body (pain, being pinned in 
an armlock, or headlock, or throw). Correctness revealed itself (in terms of 
not getting trapped or thrown or in terms of trapping, locking, or throwing 
the other). The teacher’s words were limited to commands, corrections: 
relax your shoulder, regain your posture, turn from the waist, yield, push.
Unfortunately, this kind of bodily knowledge is all too easily unlearned. 
It requires such a high degree of proprioceptive sensitivity and control that 
if you don’t use it, you lose it. You can remember it intellectually, you can 
discuss it in words, but your body loses the ability to know it and do it.
So anthropologists and sociologists speak of bodily knowledge, embod-
ied knowledge, the intelligence of the body. But I don’t think they speak of 
bodily stupidity or the stupidity of the body. Ignorance, perhaps: bodies can 
be ignorant. Bodies can not-know, can be unaware, or indeed can ignore. 
But you are unlikely to hear anyone say (other than in jest) ‘my body is 
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too stupid to do push-hands’, or ‘my body is too stupid to do a jumping 
spinning back kick’. And you are unlikely to think you are more intelligent 
than your training partners if you beat them in any kind of sparring. You are 
merely likely to have trained harder, longer, or better. Everyone is equal. 
Anyone can knock anyone else out. One meaning of ‘kung fu’ is simply the 
disciplined, sustained, skilled investment of time and effort. Every martial 
arts teacher knows that the distance between teacher and student can close 
fast, sometimes in an instant. Indeed, arguably one of the basic reasons to 
teach students is to bring them up to a level where they can push you, to 
make you keep up your own discipline.
Disciplines are invented traditions. The knowledge that disciplines pro-
duce is not only disciplinary knowledge but also, and perhaps fundamen-
tally, knowledge of the discipline. This is as true for academic disciplines 
as it is for martial disciplines. All have their ‘reality tests’ and modes 
and manners of verification and self-verification or validation and self- 
validation. And very often it is possible for even contiguous work in contig-
uous disciplines to develop in complete ignorance of the work in the other 
field. This is not because researchers are lazy or stupid. It is rather that the 
metaphor for disciplinary work itself—specifically, the word ‘field’ (as in 
‘disciplinary field’ or ‘academic field’)—is something of a misnomer. This 
is because, today, at least, so-called academic fields are really rather more 
akin to halls of mirrors in which you can see yourself and other objects 
reflected back at yourself, in various shapes and sizes, but without really 
knowing where the objects are, and without being able to see anyone or 
anything around the corner or reflected away.
It is to questions of visibility that we will turn, in the next chapter.
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❖ ❖
Martial Arts and Cultural  
Politics Mediated
Disrupting Political Theory
There are other dimensions to be explored in the discussion begun in the previous chapter, about reality, martial arts, and institutions. To pick up 
and start off from Bruce Lee’s statements on the matter of the best: When-
ever he was asked questions like ‘which martial art is best?’ Lee would 
answer with words to this effect: as a species, humans only have two hands 
and two feet; so really, how many ways to fight can there be? The impli-
cation here is that there should be only one universal martial art. But Lee 
preferred to say that he was against styles. Styles ‘separate and divide us’, 
he would say. In the terms of cultural theory, one might say that Bruce Lee 
was against particularisms—whether local, regional, national, institutional, 
traditional, or disciplinary. He was for universalism. He was for rational 
‘scientific’ experimentation, for testing and verification, for working out 
what worked best. He was against ‘tradition without reason’ and rejected 
the idea of necessary or inevitable differences between cultures, styles, 
or traditions in martial arts. To him, these signalled only limitation (Lee 
1971). His unfinished film, Game of Death, was clearly intended to be one 
long lesson about the need for emancipation from disciplinary stultification.
In effect, Lee believed that martial arts plural should be universalized as 
martial art singular. Regional, ethnic, or disciplinary styles should be over-
come, and one set of—human—parameters and potencies should be uncov-
ered. The proper route to this would be through research and experiment. 
This would necessarily be iconoclastic, colour-blind, transcultural, and 
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universalist (Miller 2000). Like science. However, Lee didn’t use the term 
martial science. He retained the term martial art—because, for him, every 
individual practitioner should find their own way to ‘honestly express’ 
themselves. His belief in the inevitability of individual difference (but not 
cultural difference) is why, for Lee, hand-to-hand combat remained art and 
not science. There is no ‘one size fits all’ formula; there is only feel and 
flow and degrees of effectiveness, and no simple objectivity: what works is 
what you can make work. As he once reputedly put it, ‘the fastest punch is 
the one that lands first’. So, Lee’s universalist humanism allowed for singu-
larity (i.e., individual uniqueness) but not particularity (i.e., local, regional, 
or institutional cultural uniqueness).
However, in his apparent belief in the one, the ultimate, the universal, 
both history and theory reveal Lee’s theory to be idealistic: its inevitable 
failure illustrates what Ernesto Laclau would term the mutually constituting 
and reciprocally subverting relations between universalism and particular-
ism (Laclau 1992, 1996; Zerilli 1998). I will say more about this. But first, I 
want to insist: I am not merely going to use (or abuse) Bruce Lee to ‘prove’ 
this or that point of political theory. Indeed, I want rather to explore the is-
sues that Bruce Lee raises for martial arts studies in order both to advance 
this field and also, at the same time and by the same token, to reveal some 
limitations of political theory. In fact, I want to suggest that the political 
theory to which we turn to draw such terms and concepts as universalism 
and particularism may have only very limited applicability to martial arts 
studies1—at least until such terms have been in some sense translated2 and 
reconstituted, within very different paradigms.3 But, the stakes and signifi-
cances of this exercise do not pertain solely to martial arts studies: I’d go 
as far as to suggest that perhaps political theory itself has only very limited 
applicability, even when used to analyse politics.
All of this might seem ‘theoretical’. But it matters in two directions: 
first, insofar as any kind of politicized martial arts studies—like media 
or cultural studies, and so on—needs concepts of politics and the politi-
cal and, second, insofar as any kind of political studies surely also needs 
concepts or understandings of media and culture. Given the necessity of 
political concepts, it may seem reasonable for martial arts studies to import 
them directly from the field of political theory (Bowman 2007a). But, can 
we actually trust concepts of politics and the political that have been built 
in political theory? Do they actually work in (or for) martial arts studies? 
Are they the best? Should they be universalized? Or are they particular or 
singular to political theory?
For instance: What if (as I would argue) political theory (even post-
structuralist political theory) were shown to be fundamentally logocentric, 
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phonocentric, anthropocentric, realist, and metaphysical? If it were, then 
what status would its concepts have when our concerns lie with media and 
culture? Such ‘fields’ are not necessarily dominated or driven by written 
or spoken words or by intentionality, demands, assertions, or collective 
wills, and they do not necessarily entail self-present entities and identi-
ties demanding things of each other. In other words: media and culture 
must be part of what Laclau calls the (contingent and therefore political) 
‘discursive terrain’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985)—which means that media 
and culture are therefore strangely crucial for ‘politics’, even if political 
theorists rarely, if ever, seem to stop to think about them (Mowitt 1992; 
Bowman 2007a).
Accordingly, by focusing on the mediatization of martial arts, I want to 
highlight some differences between the ‘ways of looking’ (or paradigm) 
of political studies, on the one hand, and one possible paradigm of ‘politi-
cized’ martial arts studies, on the other. This exercise might be read either 
as signalling the extent to which disciplinary particularisms and limitations 
are inevitably involved in the building of any theory; or it might be read as 
the effort to establish a field, topos, or site of cross-disciplinary disagree-
ment, which could perhaps come to constitute a contact zone that might 
creatively modify both fields. In short, my overarching question is: What 
happens when we think about universalism and particularism, not in terms 
of ‘political processes proper’, but by way of things that traverse the puta-
tively distinct—but entangled (realms of media, culture, body, psyche) and 
which maybe even supplement politics—such as mediatized martial arts?
MEDia tiEs
How might mediatized martial arts supplement politics? Many commen-
tators have argued that Bruce Lee was immediately a pole of what Bill 
Brown calls ‘cross-ethnic identification’ (Brown 1997). Moreover, both T. 
M. Kato and Vijay Prashad argue that Lee functioned as a key player in de-
colonization struggles—specifically what Kato (following Jameson) calls 
the struggles to decolonize postcolonial consciousness (Kato 2007; Prashad 
2001). Lee’s amazing choreographies redirected transnational multiethnic 
desires towards an Asian set of activities (‘Oriental’ martial arts), and he 
was the first major male alternative to the ubiquitous white Western movie 
hero (Bowman 2010b, 2013a). Moreover, what Bill Brown calls Lee’s 
‘generic ethnicity’ and the emotive ‘ethnic-underdog-versus-the-oppressor’ 
plots of his Hong Kong films offered a kind of imminently politicizing 
(albeit fundamentally fantasy) vision of agency.
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Of course, Lee himself must be situated in the flows between a hyper-
capitalist Hollywood and a colonial Hong Kong. But the effects of his 
texts were arguably felt most powerfully in postcolonial and ghettoized/
racialized contexts. What was seen in the spectacle there was received as 
somehow political in ways that were not necessarily perceived elsewhere 
(Bowman 2013a). But what else was ‘seen’? What was ‘shared’ by most 
viewers? Virtually all viewers, the world over, were seeing what they be-
lieved to be ancient martial arts, from China and Japan.4 Of course, these 
were only ever, at most, ‘invented traditions’ (Anderson 1991; Said 2005), 
or even Baudrillardian simulacra (Baudrillard 1994). Indeed, the very ob-
ject or field called ‘martial arts’ was effectively invented in popular cultural 
discourses through these cinematic ‘(re)presentations’ or simulacra. In a 
sense, this mediatized discourse arrived fully formed and as if it were an-
cient and timeless. Moreover, it had our opening question already inscribed 
within it: Which style is best? This question was there from the start, and 
it remains the animating problematic of discourses about martial arts. But 
from the start, because of the initial and initializing (re)presentation of the 
discourse, it was always a question that was tacitly asking: Which national 
style is best? Which regional style is best? Which ethnic style is best?
On first glance, this kind of ethno-nationalist ordering may seem to be yet 
another variant of Western orientalism, or of the ‘area studies’ mindset (Said 
1995; Chow 2006). But, in fact, nationalizing martial arts can very often be 
traced to historical efforts to make the colony or the postcolony into the na-
tion, or to strengthen the nation, by producing ‘a people’ through structures 
of feeling involving national or cultural ‘pride’. In fact, one can look at more 
or less any currently or recently popular martial art style and uncover a close 
formative connection with some kind of state nationalism or nation-building 
cultural project of the twentieth century. Funakoshi’s Japanification and 
nationalization of ‘Okinawan’ Shotokan karate is perhaps the most famous 
example. But similar processes have taken place in countries like Korea 
(with taekwondo), Indonesia (with pencak silat), the Philippines (with arnis, 
kali, or escrima), Vietnam (with viet va dao), Thailand (with muay thai), and 
China (with Jing Wu), not to mention the famous case of capoeira in Brazil. 
It is easy to see how this can lead to essentialism and to all of the problems 
that flow from that. But I also want to propose that—more and more explic-
itly nowadays—martial arts practice can practically deconstruct and disrupt 
the ideas and the structures of nationalism and ethnic essentialism. This is 
because martial arts are irreducibly pedagogical and because their contexts 
are increasingly global, mediatised, and transnational.
Learning a particular martial art inevitably reveals that the supposed 
essence of the particular culture of the martial art is actually a property, 
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produced by particular training practices (Foucault 1977). In other words: 
physical cultural migrants (martial arts students) learn that essences are 
learned, and that anyone can learn anything (Rancière 1991)—anyone 
young enough, at least! Put more provocatively: perhaps The Last Samu-
rai (in which Tom Cruise effectively becomes a Samurai through a kind 
of ‘immersion course’ in feudal Japanese life) or even Bullet Proof Monk 
(in which the lead (white) character masters martial arts by mimicking the 
moves in films) could be regarded as offering profound insights into cul-
tural pedagogies and human propensities.
Admittedly, this is not the usual sort of interpretation of such ‘Euro-
centric’ Hollywood films (Tierney 2006). In fact, critics have always 
denounced the fact that Hollywood does things like whitening and domesti-
cating ‘Asian’ martial arts. For instance, after Bruce Lee, U.S. films quickly 
depicted more and more black and white actors as masters of martial arts 
(Krug 2001). The white Chuck Norris and the black Jim Kelly were among 
the first Westerners to be depicted by Hollywood as masters of Korean and 
Japanese martial arts. And the opening of one Steven Seagal film actually 
depicts him teaching aikido in Japan, in Japanese, to Japanese students, 
while Japanese elders look on, impressed. Now, Seagal has claimed that 
this movie scene is actually autobiographical (perhaps thereby making this 
film, or at least this part of the film, into a different case of what Rey Chow 
calls ‘false documentary’ (Chow 2013)).5 But it is easy to see why many 
critics read such texts as either orientalist or just plain offensive.6
However, what guides such offence taking, I think, is a problematic 
conceptualization of culture. Namely, culture seems to be conceived as 
the particular property of a particular group. So, when Hollywood de-
picts Uma Thurman as the best student of Pei Mei or Tom Cruise as more 
Samurai than the Samurai—some critics take offense. But I would propose 
that they do so because they tacitly hold the conviction that, really, only a 
Chinese person could (or should) be the superlative kung fu student, and, 
really, only a Japanese person could (or should) embody Samurai ideals. 
But which is the more problematic position: the one that shows anyone 
mastering anything, or the one that implies that only ethnic and national 
specimens can master ethnic and national practices?
As introduced in earlier chapters, Rey Chow calls this latter position ‘co-
ercive mimeticism’ (Chow 2002). She proposes that coercive mimeticism 
is an interpellative process, in which ethnic stereotypes are enforced or 
pushed onto a subject as if the ethnic stereotype is the ethnic subject’s obli-
gation. And I don’t dispute the widespread reality of this process (Bowman 
2013b). But I want to suggest that when culture is apprehended as being a 
property, it can initiate a range of interpretations and relations. Certainly, if 
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a property is regarded as an essence, then this ushers in essentialism. But if 
a property is regarded as something produced through contingent practices 
and relations, this is very different. For, as all martial artists know, you can 
only do and be what you have been taught and what you have practiced. 
Your being and your abilities are tied to your practices. And this means 
that, in such relations—pedagogical relations—properties are not conflated 
with essences. Rather, properties are regarded as proper-ties. And ties can 
be untied and retied, differently (Bowman 2001).
CuLturE unBounD
The diasporic dissemination of Asian martial arts around the world and 
the massive movement of martial arts pilgrims to centres like Hong Kong, 
Hunan, Tokyo, and Seoul can be regarded as two sides of one vast process 
of tying, untying, and retying (or indeed entanglement (Chow 2012)) that 
has inevitably produced the enormous proliferation and mutation of martial 
arts (and everyday lives) worldwide. Chow follows Vattimo and Nietzsche 
in regarding such flows and contacts as cultural translations, involving 
both the fabling and the weakening of traditions and borders (Chow 1995). 
But, I would add: such processes also provoke resistance (Bowman 2010a), 
and there are sometimes surprising twists, torques, inversions, and even 
startling property disputes, as in the curious case (mentioned in previous 
chapters) of one nominally Japanese martial art; when practitioners in Ja-
pan promoted someone, in Japan, to a tenth dan grade without asking the 
American-based authorities of the ‘institution’ for permission, the Ameri-
cans were furious! (Krug 2001) To echo Derrida in the essay ‘Différance’, 
the desire to build a kingdom is irresistible but so is the inevitability of 
that kingdom’s subversion (Derrida 1982). There will always be kingdom 
building and property disputes. But I want to add: property disputes are 
also proper-tie disputes, disputes about the proper as much as disputes 
about the ties. For, if properties are produced through the establishment of 
proper-ties, then to change the ties (the relations and contexts) is also to 
change the proper (‘the thing itself’).7
In martial arts, these transformations are tied perhaps now more to 
mediatization than to human movement and migration. One need no lon-
ger find a little old Chinese man to learn martial arts. One merely needs 
YouTube and a training partner. Moreover, even if one has been trained 
by an authentic/ethnic representative of some ‘ancient and traditional’ art, 
the very existence of the world of mediatized discourses cannot but impact 
upon one’s practice. But more fundamentally still: in any case, it is almost 
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certain that it was a film or a computer game that led most contemporary 
martial arts practitioners to seek out the nominally or notionally ‘authentic 
thing’ in the first place.8 To borrow a phrase from Donna Haraway, the 
mediatization of martial arts has led both to the deconstruction and to the 
intensification of particularisms (Haraway 1991). The desire for authen-
ticity and tradition (or ‘primitive passions’ (Chow 1995)) remains strong 
(in places—especially films). Accordingly, ‘traditional’ martial arts still 
flourish. However, there is no guarantee that so-called traditional styles (or 
should we now call them brands?) of regionally specific martial arts will 
(or could) survive forever (Judkins 2012–). Most were only ever invented 
traditions anyway (Chan 2000).
At the same time, the obverse desire—the desire for a different type 
of authenticity—a more authentic authenticity, free from culture—the 
desire to invent some ‘ultimate’ martial art, through iconoclastic and non-
traditional alchemy—has produced some dramatically detraditionalizing 
developments. My term for it in this book has been ‘Fight-Club-ization’. 
Most notable among this has been the trail blazed by the Ultimate Fighting 
Competition (the UFC) and the emergence of mixed martial arts (MMA) 
(Green 2011).
I discussed this in relation to MMA, the UFC, and KFM in the previ-
ous chapter. Pertinent here is the argument that the declared drive to get to 
the real and the ultimate reality—or indeed, the universals—of unarmed 
combat is in a sense tragically flawed by its being necessarily shackled 
and subordinated to the injunctions and imperatives of mediatization. The 
society of the spectacle wants its spectacles spectacular and hyper-real, 
and advertisers want their ad breaks every ten minutes (Debord 1994; 
Baudrillard 1994). So, MMA and the UFC—perhaps the most brutal and 
supposedly therefore ‘real’ of televized sport combat—were mediatized 
and hyper-realized from the start, in a way that echoes what happened with 
the celluloid mediatization of martial arts in the 1970s (Green 2011).9 Since 
the 1970s, at least, mediatization has always both fuelled and impeded—or 
skewed—the evolution or development of martial arts (like the Lacanian 
object-cause of desire). The drive to answer the question ‘Which style is 
best?’ via the institution of ostensibly no-holds-barred competitions, such 
as the UFC, first deconstructed and even seemed to jeopardize the very idea 
of particular styles surviving. But over time ‘mixed martial arts’ inevitably 
became just one style among others. Moreover, as brutal and efficient as 
MMA is, people now know that it is fundamentally a sport. And sport—
surely—is a very different thing to the martial. Accordingly, those looking 
for the ultimate martial art continue to look. And one place they look is to 
the unequivocally martial practices of the military.
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univErsaL soLDiEr, postCoLoniaL partiCuLarisM
The most well-known military martial arts styles currently available in 
some form to civilians include the U.S. Marine Corps Martial Arts Program 
(MCMAP), the Russian military style called systema, the Israeli martial 
art, krav maga, and Filipino martial arts, variously called arnis, kali, or 
escrima. And so on. There are others. However, none of these martial arts 
are anywhere near as well known as the arts popularized by cinema in the 
1970s.10 This is perhaps because the impact of that first exposure could 
never hope to be repeated subsequently. But the difference in popularity 
is also likely to have arisen because military styles are often ugly, bloody, 
brutal, necessarily painful, and unpleasant to practice, plus they have no 
immediate sporting interpretation or application, so they cannot easily be 
branded as either pleasant or uplifting. Indeed, to extend arguments made 
by both Bill Brown and Slavoj Žižek at different times: these arts cannot 
easily be existentialized or ideologically recuperated as ‘spiritually uplift-
ing’ or as ‘paradoxically peaceful’ (Reid and Croucher 1984) or ‘self-
improving’ practices (Brown 1997; Bowman 2010b, 2013a).
Nevertheless, one such military martial art was selected to be the style of 
fighting used by a Hollywood action hero in a film that immediately trans-
formed mainstream movie fight choreography by setting a new standard. 
This was the Filipino art of kali, or escrima. It was chosen as the style of 
fighting used by Jason Bourne in the Bourne Identity trilogy. The trilogy it-
self involved more than one director and a very varied crew; but along with 
the main character, Jason Bourne (played by Matt Damon), one other cru-
cial thing at least that remained constant in the production of the films was 
their fight choreography and the films’ fight choreographer, Jeff Imada. 
This is particularly pertinent because, arguably, it was in large part the fight 
choreography (along with the cinematography) that ‘made’ these films—
that made them stand out, that defined them, that made them so unique and 
memorable. The fight choreography certainly caused ripples that reached 
the very heart of mainstream movie production discourse, to the extent that 
even action staples like the eternally returning James Bond movies reacted 
by changing their cinematographic and action-choreographic styles in re-
sponse to the paradigm shift effected by the Bourne choreography.
With all this in the picture, there are two threads that I want to pick 
out. The first relates to the political theory terms that I used at the begin-
ning: universalism and particularism. In Laclau, the universal is an empty 
place that is variously hegemonized by words—by claims—or, in Laclau, 
demands (Laclau 2005). These words, claims, demands, and assertions 
are always traceable back to complexly articulated political wills. So a 
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demand can always be tied to a particular entity, an entity that Laclau re-
gards as having come into existence with and through, and in and as, the 
formation of the demand. The aim of the group/demand is to universalize 
or hegemonize the demand until it is satisfied and they/it can recede into 
the slumber of realization/satisfaction. ‘They’ will only persist as an entity 
to the extent that they are implicit, because hegemonic—or should they 
need to wake from the slumber of their satisfaction in order to defend their 
achievements.
So far, so logocentric. One can read virtually any passage of Laclau and 
see that his political theory is phonocentric, anthropocentric, and meta-
physical. However, what I hope to be able to suggest in the light of the 
cases of the mediatization of martial arts that I have mentioned is the way 
that what we might call mediatized universals (in our case, the performance 
of the superiority of various particular martial arts at particular times via 
complexly articulated technological platforms, relations, and contexts) do 
not necessarily arise as the result of some simple claim. Claims can be and 
are made. But the visual spectacle (and the textual complex) is not reduc-
ible to the logic of consensus or dissensus that hegemonizes political theory 
(Laclau 1992, 1996). Moreover, in relation to the political theory claim that 
universals are produced through the political constitution of the group, let 
us recall that all of the major popular fashions in martial arts of the world 
have a complex and shifting relation, not only to media but also to colonial-
ism and postcoloniality. However, they cannot be simply attached to any 
one identity or any one claim.
The kung fu craze of the 1970s emerged from what Rey Chow has 
taught us to regard as the highly complex location of colonial Hong Kong 
(Chow 1998) and it flared up first (and most) in a range of particularly 
politically and socioeconomically complex urban centres and ghettoes, the 
world over. The first U.S. martial arts actors were trained in the Japanese 
and Korean arts that they had learned as a direct consequence of American 
military action and occupation in these areas (it was Japanese and Korean 
arts that were first imported to America en masse by returning servicemen 
(Krug 2001)). Karate-do itself had already been reconstructed as Japa-
nese by its ‘founder’, Funakoshi Gichin, who actually took the art from 
Okinawa to Japan in the early twentieth century. In Okinawa, it had long 
been called, not ‘karate-do’ (which was Funakoshi’s Japanification of the 
name, meaning as it does empty-hand-way) but ‘China hand’—a name that 
registers the multiply-colonized status of the Ryukyu Islands themselves 
(Funakoshi 1975).
There are many other examples of complex processes and relations be-
tween martial arts and the moves from colony to postcolony to nation. In 
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Brazil, for instance, there is the case of capoeira—which was first an art of 
African slaves and then a martial art of the Brazilian underclass. All kinds 
of authorities have, by turns, tried to outlaw it, to sportify it, to gentrify it, 
to standardize it, and otherwise to domesticate or nationalize it (Assunção 
2005; Downey 2005). There have been similar cases in Shanghai with 
Jing Wu, in China generally with wushu, in Indonesia with pencak silat, in 
Europe with fencing, and so on and so on (Eichberg 1983; Wilson 2009).
The point I want to make here is that each of these arts clearly in some 
sense hegemonized various cultural, countercultural, and mainstream 
scenes, but no audible claim has been made arising in formation with them. 
This is doubtless why critics like Žižek and a number of people discussed 
by Bill Brown regard the constitution of identities via martial arts films to 
be symptomatic of failed class longing (Brown 1997). But, I would add: 
when we are dealing with the forces or flows of media and culture, the 
matter of collective or political identity constantly moves and recedes and 
never seems to be fully or properly present (like the parallax of a rainbow).
But (I hear the complaint) media and culture are not politics. Yet (I reit-
erate) they must have some relation to politics. As Laclau himself argues, 
the universal is an empty place, variously filled with hegemonic contents 
and contestations in the discursive terrain. Media and culture are the 
Laclauian discursive terrain. So what, then, might we make of the curious 
centring and erasing of Filipino martial arts in The Bourne Identity films? 
I say centring and erasing because at no point in the films is the Filipino 
character of Jason Bourne’s fighting style ever indicated. Quite the con-
trary, in fact: Jason Bourne is the ultimate product of the United States. His 
fighting style is presented as a pinnacle only attained by the most elite sol-
dier of the U.S. military. In other words, a Filipino particularism is passed 
off as American dominance.
In Laclauian terms, the universal is always a particularism that has be-
come hegemonic. But here, U.S. universalism is represented by a Filipino 
particularism (‘under erasure’ or ‘sous rature’, as they used to say). This 
is something that Laclauian theory seems ill equipped to deal with. Fur-
thermore, this hegemonic particularism does not literally or ‘really’ relate 
to or reflect the achievement of any kind of Filipino demand or to reflect 
any kind of Filipino political entity. Indeed, if we were to regard culture 
as property, then it would be easy to come to the conclusion that a nasty, 
white Hollywood has once again expropriated the cultural heritage of one 
of its own former colonies. This would be an anti-colonialist mode of read-
ing, again. And, again, it would be premised on a belief in property rights.
I do not want to disparage claims of lineage or heritage. Far from it. 
I am aware that the Filipino martial arts are in a complex and ongoing 
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dialogue with processes of nation building, community building, culture 
construction, heritage preservation, and so on, in much the same way as 
many other martial arts and sports the world over. I am equally aware that 
many Filipino martial arts masters have died in poverty and that unknown 
numbers of family schools and styles and lineages have vanished without 
trace (Wiley 1996). And it is for these reasons and more that I also feel un-
easy when I see clips on YouTube of martial arts classes in shiny clubs in 
the United States or Europe in which students are dressed up in traditional 
Filipino outfits to practice the art. But, at the same time, I have also heard 
Filipino masters state (again, on YouTube) that the situation is simply this: 
as soon as Westerners get into something, they dominate it, they master 
it—and not in a bad way; they dominate it through love, time, effort, and 
commitment. The vast majority of people in the Philippines do not have 
the money or time to devote to these arts. Affluent Westerners do. Which 
is why the martial arts themselves travel, become diasporic, and are much 
more mobile than the people of the places whence they come. They are 
often, so to speak, paradoxically disembodied bodily diasporas—physical 
practices moving from body to body without physical contact.
Reciprocally, in response to the mainstreaming of Filipino martial arts in 
Hollywood choreography, new drives have been initiated both in the Phil-
ippines and in diasporic Filipino communities to embrace and showcase 
their martial arts. Documentaries are being produced, traditions are being 
constructed, reconstructed, (re)invented, fleshed out, fabulated. The post-
colonial Philippines and Filipinos are not simply victims. No one has been 
duped or non-duped (Chow 1993). In fact, the translation between cultures 
that is occurring here, in and through and around—because of—the image, 
constitutes the bringing into visibility of that which may otherwise have 
remained occluded.
Of course, the main text of the Bourne trilogy makes absolutely no refer-
ence to the Filipino dimensions of Jason Bourne’s fighting style. But one 
need not be Sherlock Holmes (the archetypal fictional Western aficionado 
of an Anglicized Asian martial art, ‘Baritsu’ or ‘Bartitsu’) to find out 
about the choreographic style.11 A quick Google search will suffice. And 
as the many ‘making of’ clips on YouTube and the ‘how to fight like Jason 
Bourne’ websites that have sprung up all let us know: it is Filipino kali.12
So what can we see here—or not—in this simple action film? What is 
happening in it, through it, or because of it? I would suggest: we can see 
some ways in which non-literal, non-direct, and constitutively mediated 
transactions between cultures can both take place and not take place. West-
ern appropriation, here, may not be so unequivocally despicable. The fake 
image, the simulation, can also be a source of cultural encounter. Cultural 
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dialogues can be non-logocentric. The forging of cultural relations can be 
both between or across cultures, and between a culture and itself, and on 
both sides of the spectacle. The film can be read simultaneously as yet an-
other moment of the ‘internal’ relationship Hollywood has with itself, and 
with other cultures, and as a moment of the ‘internal’ relationship that a 
postcolonial culture can come to have with itself and its others and its own 
otherness through the processes of mediatization. It is a cultural translation. 
And in the words of Rey Chow: ‘If translation is a form of betrayal, then 
the translators pay their debt by bringing fame to the ethnic culture’ (Chow 
1995: 202).
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❖ ❖
Conclusion
Orders of Discourse
The previous chapters have attempted both to illuminate and disrupt and to orientate and disorientate. They have not tried to define or to 
delimit, preferring instead either to sidestep the inevitable traps of such 
an endeavour or to test and explore others’ attempts at definition and 
demarcation. The previous chapter, for instance, explored mediatized 
martial arts in terms of a certain poststructuralist definition of politics. 
Through this exploration, some of the limits of that definition of politics 
were exposed, so the study of martial arts ultimately both illuminated and 
disrupted another discourse. In the chapter before that, the desire for real-
ity in martial arts was explored via a modern Western case study (KFM) 
that opened out onto an older Eastern case study (taijiquan), and through 
the juxtaposition of these different cases, not only were certain discursive 
continuities introduced and illuminated, but hopefully they may also have 
been—or henceforth become—in some sense disrupted. Similarly, in the 
chapter before that, the guiding question was one of how to write martial 
arts studies; and, again, hopefully the discussion was not only illuminating 
but also disruptive, at least to the extent that subsequent work in the field 
might deliberately and self-consciously engage with the questions attendant 
to one’s own voice and one’s own orientations, not only as a scholar or 
researcher, but also as an institutor—as someone who not only represents 
or exists in and as one or another kind of institution, but as someone who 
actively (re)institutes and (re)orientates in every act of reading and writing 
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(Derrida 1992). All of which is why, of course, the introduction began from 
a focus on discipline and disciplinarity.
Prioritizing these questions and themes has necessarily been at the 
expense of others. Certain prominent—even dominant—themes in and 
around the burgeoning academic literature on martial arts are all but 
entirely absent. Gender, sexuality, the construction and performance of 
identity, sustained attention to class and/or ethnicity, and other questions 
common to both cultural studies and other contemporary fields, from so-
ciology to media and film to anthropology and even theology and beyond, 
may be regarded as distinctly underrepresented. This is not because I am 
ignorant of them. It is rather because my deconstructive training always 
(dis)orientates my gaze and leads me to the matter of the institutional for-
mulation and elaboration of matters. I regard this institutional focus as both 
creatively enabling and politicizing. Of course, politicizing does not mean 
political in a dry sense, but in the exciting sense of affirming that the way 
things are is not necessarily the way that they have to be, because things are 
the way they are because they have been and continue to be instituted and 
reinstituted in one way and not another. Yet reinstitution is possible. There 
are always opportunities to change things (Derrida 1996; Bowman 2007a; 
Morris and Hjort 2012).
Hence, in this work I have attempted to emphasize the institutional di-
mensions both of martial arts and of academic approaches, rather than to 
replay the instituted themes that structure either or both realms. Some of 
the best work in and around martial arts studies has explored both dimen-
sions at once—for example, Meaghan Morris’s exemplary discussion of 
martial arts pedagogy, ‘Learning from Bruce Lee’ (Morris 2001), which 
intermixes questions of the media formulation of debates on violence, 
questions of cross-cultural desire and encounter, gender and ethnic iden-
tity and identification, teaching and learning in a multicultural media age, 
and considerably more besides. Although I regard Morris’s essay, and her 
other work on martial arts fandom and popular cultural formations (Morris 
2004), as second to none, and although it gave me one of my first insights 
into what it might mean to think seriously about martial arts within media 
and culture, I do not believe I have tried to match the subtlety and com-
plexity of Morris’s kind of analysis. Rather, I have chosen—to borrow a 
phrase from Nietzsche—to philosophize with a hammer (Nietzsche 1919). 
I have sidestepped some matters, slipped or redirected others, and hit out 
at many more on the way to staging my engagements with concerns that I 
regard as the heart of the matter. The heart of the matter for me here hinges 
on discursive formulation and elaboration—the discursive formulation and 
elaboration both of martial arts and of martial arts studies. In what follows I 
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will attempt to clarify or reiterate, in one sense ‘again’, but in another sense 
differently, some more of what this textual and discursive approach means, 
and its significance. To do so, I will turn one last time to Adam Frank, re-
lating several key moments in his work to my arguments about martial arts 
and martial arts studies. The first moment in Frank’s work that is important 
here relates to academic discourse.
aCaDEMiC DisCoursE
Academic discourse may seem inconsequential. It is easy to think that 
academic work is not connected to anything (Bowman 2007a). However, 
because academic discourses constitute knowledge, they are central to 
many things, even if academic work is very often disparaged or underval-
ued (Bowman 2008a). Academic production, in all its many forms—from 
papers, articles, chapters, and books, to consultancy and advisory work, to 
sitting on panels and policy making think tanks, and so on—is something 
that seems especially open to two types of reception. At one extreme, it can 
be accepted as truth. At another extreme, it can be written off as wrong. But 
there are very many possible positions in between. In addition, as anyone 
who works in any field of academia will be able to attest, contrary to many 
of the myths of scholarship, an academic discipline is very rarely, if ever, 
a field of consensus. Academic disciplines and discourses are overwhelm-
ingly fuelled by disagreement. Academic discourses are precisely that—
discourses—and in the sense given to the term by theorists like Michel 
Foucault and Ernesto Laclau (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). Accordingly, as 
with all discourse, one will be able to look for hegemonies, made up of 
positions, each with different values and orientations, each constituting and 
investing in different entities and identities. Discourses and hegemonies 
often invent entities.
We must recall that John Mowitt calls the things that academic subjects 
focus on and talk about ‘disciplinary objects’ (Mowitt 1992). Disciplinary 
objects are important because they both derive from and feed back into 
wider discourses about the world. They may not necessarily be verifiably 
real (such as God, whose existence is a matter of faith but who exists within 
and structures theological academic discourses as well as the everyday 
practices of many people (Bowman 2012)), or they may be actually exist-
ing things in the world but given very different characteristics within an 
academic context (for instance, ‘subcultures’, as experienced and lived by 
members, may be a world away from the way subcultures are discussed and 
studied in academia (Gilbert and Pearson 1999)).
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Like any martial art, taijiquan can be regarded as a disciplinary object 
that exists within multiple discourses and senses. In some of them, it re-
flects and reinforces hegemony in certain ways. In others, it may subvert 
or change hegemonies. Focusing first on its academic treatment, if we 
recall Adam Frank’s argument that in much Chinese discourse, taijiquan is 
constructed and treated as a ‘master symbol’ of ‘China’ and ‘Chineseness’ 
(Frank 2006), then a consideration of the academic treatment of taijiquan 
will help us to see how academic discourses both derive from and feed back 
into wider discourses. The relations that Frank discerns between Chinese 
academic discourses about taijiquan and wider ideologies that circulate 
about taijiquan are illuminating and should be borne in mind in any martial 
arts studies that seek to be circumspect, self-reflexive, and critical.
Specifically because taijiquan is treated as a master signifier of China 
and Chineseness, Frank notes that its martial dimensions are downplayed 
or even erased in Chinese academic discourse about it. While the martial 
dimensions of taijiquan are downplayed, other aspects are foregrounded:
The subjugation of the martial, that is, ‘the real’, is no more readily apparent 
than in the substantial Chinese scholarly literature that has developed around 
martial arts in general and taijiquan in particular. In addition to the martial 
arts training manuals that are popular both inside and outside PRC, a substan-
tial literature has been generated through the sports universities’ martial arts 
departments. Most of these sports universities produce journals, and many of 
the journals have a section devoted to martial arts history and research. Sev-
eral independent journals are devoted entirely to either martial arts or sports 
history, a field that has grown out of the folk sports movement of the 1950s. 
(Frank 2006: 183)
Two points are worth emphasizing here. On the one hand, martial arts 
are institutionalized twice over: first, within universities; second, in terms 
of an ‘attending discourse’ of academic literature (Derrida 1981). On the 
other hand, the first discursive operation—the first working over of the 
raw material of martial arts—can be discerned. Frank notes this in the first 
sentence: the identity of the entity is worked over in the academic discourse 
such that its martial dimensions are subordinated to other foci. Then, when 
these other foci are established, specific (‘appropriate’) sorts of disciplinary 
questions and problematics are constructed: 
As in the United States, scholarly literature both keys in to existing discourses 
and generates its own discursive space. The hard science articles are generally 
devoted to the medical aspects of taijiquan and to issues of kinesiology and 
physiology. Wang Jinghao’s ‘Effects and Mechanism of Taiji Exercise on 
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Hyperlipidemia and Diabetes II’ (2001) is a typical example of this literature 
in that it trades on the language of modern science to validate and reify the 
‘traditional’ (taijiquan) as an essential feature of Chinese identity. (183)
Here, Frank’s contention is that even science can become ideological, 
first in its very orientation (the questions it asks) and, second, in its conclu-
sions (here, the connection between the idea that taijiquan has beneficial 
health implications and the wider discourse about ‘Chinese identity’). In-
deed, Frank observes, on the one hand, ‘few such articles attempt to refute 
the health claims made by taijiquan practitioners’, in contrast, on the other 
hand, ‘to the scholarly assault on the health claims made by Falun Gong 
practitioners’. The article by Wang, discussed by Frank, is no exception. 
‘The “effects” [Wang] speaks of are all positive ones’ (183–84).
This is an extremely enlightening set of observations. For, through this, 
we see that the very formulation of questions and approaches can be driven 
(both consciously and unconsciously) by wider ideological agendas. Thus, 
in a discursive environment sympathetic to or supportive of a practice, that 
practice will be treated accordingly with sympathy and approval. Similarly, 
the opposite is also true. Even though the borders between taijiquan, qi-
gong, and Falun Gong are often very grey indeed, in the political context of 
a China that has relatively recently cracked down on Falun Gong practice, 
these three practices can quite smoothly become formulated as (if) oppo-
sites in certain key regards. In other words, because of political pressures, 
or certain discursive orders, values, and imperatives, the questions and 
conclusions posed ‘scientifically’ about Falun Gong are negative.
Outside of the sciences in China, Frank observes that the humanities 
and social sciences, too, ‘tend to focus on the relationship of martial arts 
to other “traditional arts”’. This is so much the case that ‘the social science 
discourse is often explicitly linked with the project of Chinese nationalism’ 
(184). In other words, once again, scholarly discourse marches—con-
sciously or unconsciously—to the beat of wider socio-political discursive 
drums. Ultimately, in the Chinese context, Frank proposes that humanities 
approaches to Chinese martial arts are structured by essentialism after es-
sentialism. For instance:
[One] essay accepts the Herderian notion of das Volk without question, 
adapting Herder’s position of a single-class society where ‘the folk’ are on 
equal footing with elites. [The] discussion of martial arts in the article treats 
such arts as uniformly ancient, as if they are neither modern inventions nor 
arts that undergo constant evolution. [Another] takes a diffusionist approach 
to Chinese martial arts as a means of preserving and spreading fundamental 
Chinese values. (184)
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Frank also points to the frequent circulation within supposedly scholarly 
work of widely refuted myths and legends about martial arts. What is most 
pertinent to martial arts studies is not myth busting in itself, but rather the 
insight that it gives us into the relations between popular or folk ‘knowl-
edge’, mediatized ‘knowledge’, and academic ‘knowledge’. Frank points 
out that this tendency to recapitulate myths both comes from and feeds back 
into wider discourses, in a number of ways:
Scholarly literature on martial arts in Chinese journals also legitimizes tourist 
sites as master symbols of the nation-state. Historical and scientific articles 
often repeat taijiquan origin stories, for example, and thereby lend them the 
weight of authority. The state has thus been able to requisition martial arts 
in general and taijiquan in particular as ur-symbols of Chinese culture. The 
production of this image can be quite precise: for example, the symbol that 
the Chinese Olympic Committee adopted in its successful bid for the 2008 
Olympics is an abstracted depiction of the taijiquan move ‘Downward Pos-
ture’ (xia shi). This symbol appears everywhere in reference to the upcoming 
Olympics. (184)
With this type of conjunctural analysis, Frank is able to show the com-
plex interactions between different ‘levels’ and contexts of discourse, 
including its place and role as an ingredient in nation building, in institu-
tions, and even in bodies, as ideology dissemination for various ends—na-
tionalistic, again, but also touristic. The trade in essentialisms is as good for 
national myths as it is for stimulating tourism. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, this 
is all condensed in both the symbol and the institutional reality of the Shao-
lin Temple: ‘The temple had seen its share of trouble’, writes Frank, ‘so 
the governmental support was crucial, even if the price was a certain shift 
in identity from religious order to national symbol’ (180). He continues:
Since the mutual decision of the Shaolin order’s abbot, Shi Yongxin, and 
the Party to promote the Shaolin Temple as one of the chief tourist spots in 
China, local people had found a steady, if not earth-shaking, source of income 
(Jakes 2001). The short- and long-term foreign students at the temple schools 
numbered in the thousands. Single-day tourists like me added thousands 
more. And the Chinese students who passed through the hundreds of large 
and small martial arts schools that surrounded the temple and spilled out into 
the countryside numbered in the tens of thousands. Like the boys who learned 
Chen style taijiquan in Wenxian County, many of the students in these Shaolin 
schools were poor peasant children fulfilling a dream come true. (179)
Domestic nationalistic dreams and foreign touristic dreams thus coincide 
in chiasmatic locations like the Shaolin Temple, as well as in the related 
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circuit of international taijiquan and kung fu competitions. These events 
are disseminated as news and as the focus of television programmes, thus 
amplifying their reach and significance, argues Frank:
The sensual language of the Shaolin Festival in Dengfeng would, within 
a matter of hours, be communicated nationwide, and even internationally, 
through the foreign martial arts media present. The color, the music, the pres-
ence of Ganesh, and the unified, martial movement of dozens or hundreds of 
bodies combined to make a powerful statement about an ideal typical Chine-
seness. (178)
With such observations, we see the complexity of the ideological- 
institutional traffic between the subject, the nation, the state, and its poli-
cies, institutions, and practices, as well as academic orientations, media 
discourses, and the wide ranging traffic in essentialisms that produce and 
organize ‘kung fu dreams’ which merge interchangeably with ‘dreams of 
Chineseness’ and/or ‘Chinese kung fu dreams’.
MEDiatizED DrEaMs
Indeed, one might say that the ultimate object of politics is dreams. What 
this means might be expressed thus. One way of characterizing the sig-
nificance of Edward Said’s many works, particularly those on orientalism 
(Said 1995), but also those on the ideological conflict over Israel/Palestine 
(Said 2005), and so on, would be to say that Said repeatedly shows certain 
connections between dreams and politics. Specifically, in Said, Western 
dreams and fantasies about the Orient organize thinking, writing, and ac-
tion vis-à-vis countries and peoples deemed to be Oriental; and this think-
ing, writing, and action feeds back into the production or perpetuation of 
orientalist dreams. The political implications are perhaps even clearer in 
his work on the conflicting dreams and fantasies about ‘the Holy Land’ 
that are held in common by Jews, Muslims, and Christians. These con-
flicting dreams have fuelled conflict in and around, and over and about, 
a territory—a territory that is for many of those involved more symbolic 
than physical—since the Middle Ages, and it continues today (Said 2005).
This kind of relation between dreams and lived practices has many di-
mensions. For instance, Cohen has shown the strong connections between 
nationalist ideological discourse and martial arts practices such as krav 
maga in Israel (Cohen 2009). These connections are not surprising in such 
a context. But Frank focuses on case studies that may be said to be a world 
away from the pressures of such intensely militarized, securitized, and 
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ideologized contexts as those studied by Cohen. Frank looks at the ideo-
logical circulation and mutations of taijiquan as a signifier of Chineseness 
(Frank 2006) in a study which relates more closely to the earlier work of 
Said than Cohen. But, to be clear, Frank’s work is in no way a mere repeti-
tion or replaying of arguments made by Said in the 1970s—even though it 
is not uncommon for academics to continue to reinvent the wheel that was 
first rolled out in Said’s 1978 work, Orientalism. Rather, Frank combines 
Said’s insights with those of thinkers like Benedict Anderson and a focus 
on lived, sensual, experiential relations, in order to configure the relations 
between dreams and macropolitical forces:
The world of imagination offers an alternative means for understanding 
identity as something that is both socially and sensually constructed. Imag-
ined identities, like imagined communities, can rise and fall through textual 
vernaculars. Again, I extend Benedict Anderson’s notion of vernaculars here 
to include more than just print. In the realm of martial arts, they also include 
film, television, and poetry that is written in classical forms but intended to 
be recited aloud. (190)
This is why, in addition to focusing on the ethnographic scene of the 
moment of cross-cultural interaction, Frank shows how even the physical-
sensual interplay and senses of identity are supplemented by history and 
society. He does this by ‘tracing a history of how martial arts texts, in-
cluding visual texts, have contributed to the imagining of self in China’ 
(191). Crucially, Frank shows how easily and frequently there is a slippage 
between texts of different orders and registers: historical fact is conflated 
with legends of all orders, whether from folklore, literature, or even con-
temporary film, in order to give accounts of the present. He observes:
I often asked practitioners in Shanghai to tell me about the origin of the art. 
With very few exceptions, they began with Zhang Sanfeng. However, as time 
went on, I noticed that the version of the Zhang Sanfeng story I was hearing 
bore a striking resemblance to a popular Jet Li film called Taijiquan Zhang 
Sanfeng. Whether the story spawned the movie or the movie spawned this par-
ticular version of the story is difficult to determine, but the story, told through 
film, passed on orally, and passed on through the ‘ancient’ Forty Chapters 
evokes, in Frederic Jameson’s terms, conflicting modes of production that 
coexist and struggle within the same artistic process. (Frank 2006: 193)
All of the modes of inscription—writing, oratory, folklore, film, and 
even video games and comics—‘serve as teaching devices in the present’. 
But ‘because they are of the past, they also transmit experiences of Chine-
seness for both Chinese and non-Chinese people. They offer a framework 
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for imagining the past’ (193). The imagination of the past has an effect on 
the present, and can be manipulated. This is what Derrida referred to as 
teleiopoeisis (Derrida 1997): the manipulation of understandings of the past 
to orientate fantasies, dreams, imaginings, understanding, and practices in 
the present. As already briefly mentioned in earlier chapters, Frank gives a 
stark example in the case of the emergence of mulanquan:
The ca. 1937 film The Legend of Mulan, for example, depicts the famous tale 
of a devoted daughter who takes the place of her aged father when troops are 
called to arms to fight invading barbarians. Within the context of 1937 China, 
The Legend of Mulan may be read both as a resistance to the incursions of 
the Imperial Japanese Army and as a modernist representation of Chinese 
womanhood. To echo Douglas Wile’s sentiment about the popularity of tai-
jiquan among nineteenth-century elites as a re-masculating process, Mulan 
might represent a call for social action to men who had become politically 
and militarily impotent under the double weight of colonization and Japanese 
militarism (Wile 1996). For the modern Shanghai person, however, neither 
the film nor the legend on which it is based is allowed to inspire resistance. 
Instead, in the midst of the anti–Falun Gong crackdown of 1999, the story of 
Mulan inspired the creation of a state-sponsored set of sword-and-fan dances, 
called mulanquan, practiced primarily by women. Mulanquan became the 
very symbol of legitimacy. (197)
As such a glaring example of institutional-ideological intervention illus-
trates, it is not simply beliefs about the past that are modified and manipu-
lated when history is reinvented along different axes. It is also belief and 
practice in the present. The ideological control of historical knowledge can 
be used to great political effect. In these examples, we are seeing the state 
management of Chineseness.
If Frank is right that the construction—or at least popularization—of 
mulanquan was a concerted effort to fill up the space formerly occupied 
by Falun Gong in China, then it is clear that the political management of 
imagination in this case is a matter of national cultural policy, one that is 
likely to have involved deliberation and a calculation that Westerners and 
other foreigners may be attracted to come as tourists to China to learn a 
(new) ‘ancient’ martial art, related to or inspired by the Disney film they 
had recently seen. Of course, despite its international and touristic dimen-
sion, the primary context of such an intervention is in a strong sense inter-
nal to the Chinese state. Nevertheless, the internationalism of taijiquan and 
other Asian martial arts—their inevitable drift and migration—is a matter 
that raises a related question: What is the status of ‘taijiquan dreams’ else-
where, outside of China?
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journEy to thE WEst
Frank discusses martial arts migrants, pilgrims, and tourists throughout his 
study. At one point he notes the time he disputed his own Chinese teach-
ers’ opinions about students of taijiquan. According to Frank, his teachers 
would often voice the opinion that foreign students were becoming not only 
the most diligent students but also the majority of students (202). Frank 
questioned this claim. But, he reports, in the context of a discussion of the 
emigration of martial arts teachers from China, there was ‘a sense’ among 
the practitioners ‘that the little old Chinese man of yore, a symbol that 
appeared in novels and in films, a symbol of what was wisest and best in 
Chinese martial arts, had perhaps emigrated to America’ (203). He reports 
that one of the oldest and most senior taiji masters of the association he 
was involved with in Shanghai, Ma Yueliang of the JTA, ‘had apparently 
noted the change earlier than most’ (203) and speculates that Ma’s insight 
arose ‘perhaps because he understood both the orientalizing and the self-
orientalizing quality of the little old man image all too well through first-
hand experience’:
foreigners venerated him through racialized lenses, and Chinese people ven-
erated him as some sort of unfrozen mammoth from an idealized past. Yet, 
in the JTA, it was Ma who frequently commented that over-mystification of 
the art detracted from teaching it and learning it. Now, in the face of what 
they considered the new reality of Chinese martial arts, the caretakers of the 
JTA saw that Ma was right, for the former easy opposition of Chinese and 
foreigner melted away before their eyes as a new category of ‘transnational 
taijiquan practitioner’ emerged. In the face of such change, was it possible that 
taijiquan was no longer Chinese at all? (203)
The question of transnationalism is pertinent to considerations of any 
martial art. Certainly today Chinese martial arts are both national and 
international. They cross borders and are hence transnational. However, 
as Frank emphasizes, and to reiterate a phrase from Donna Haraway 
(Haraway 1991) that we have already deployed: the global dissemination 
(Derrida 1981) of Chinese martial arts involves a double process of the si-
multaneous erosion and intensification of nationalism wherever they occur. 
Thus, outside of China, taijiquan and other ‘traditional’ Chinese martial 
arts carry the traces and weight both of the Chinese discourse of cultural 
nationalism and the discourse of Western orientalism (Chow 1993), and 
these forces often play themselves out in what Frank characterizes as ‘the 
orientalizing and the self-orientalizing quality of the little old man image’ 
(Frank 2006: 203).
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But the movement of any solitary signifier (Derrida 1981) or even of 
any interlocking cluster of signifiers, functioning as a series or discrete and 
self-replicating serial form (Mayer 2014), will not stay exactly the same, 
when moving from one context to another. Whether it is one signifier or 
one cluster of interlocking and interacting signifiers, the movement from 
one scene of discourse (say, China) to another (say, the United States) will 
involve a degree of modification, or ‘cultural translation’ (Chow 1995; 
Bowman 2010a), affecting both the ‘text’ and the ‘context’ (Krug 2001). 
As Frank puts it,
as a transnational practice, martial arts become a conduit for not only the 
movement of people but also the movement of identities. The localities that 
move from one space to another, through film, through products, through 
practices, and through individuals, constitute and reconstitute many forms of 
Chineseness. (Frank 2006: 207)
In the face of the problem of the phantasies that structure cross-cultural 
desire, Frank notes that the unquestionably good thing about martial arts 
tourism or pilgrimage—or even, arguably, cross-cultural pedagogical 
relationships of any kind—is this: ‘For foreign martial artists who travel 
to China in search of not just skills but wisdom, acquired from not just a 
teacher but a master, participation in the back-and-forth flows of the trans-
nation becomes an unveiling process, a process of peeling away preconcep-
tions’ (207). However, as Rey Chow’s discussion of cross-cultural desire in 
‘The Dream of a Butterfly’ (Chow 1998) suggests, the problem is that it is 
often the phantasy of the other culture as being something absolutely and 
enigmatically other that sustains the desire or interest in that other. Once 
the phantasy has been ‘unveiled’, the desire of and for either the other or 
the secret presumed to be possessed by the other, may vanish, dissipate, or 
at least become jeopardized.
Admittedly, this could be said to depend on the nature of the desire, or 
the nature of the phantasy of the desirer. In Chow’s reading of Cronen-
berg’s film M. Butterfly, she notes that one of the protagonists ensnared in 
the cross-cultural romance is able to continue to love and desire the other 
even after all has been ‘unveiled’. The other party, however, is unable 
to. So, rather than essentializing any of the components involved in such 
debates—desire, cultural difference, essentialism, and so forth—it seems 
safer to begin from the observation that it all depends. In M. Butterfly, the 
French diplomat who (apparently) falls in love with a Chinese spy clearly 
has a completely different relationship to his relationship than does his 
partner. And this makes all the difference.
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The connections between Chow’s discussion of the asymptotic, ‘im-
peded’, and constitutively ‘imbalanced’ character of cross-cultural desire 
in ‘The Dream of a Butterfly’ and any consideration of martial arts qua 
cross-cultural phenomenon are many. For instance, Frank hints at the prob-
lems of cynicism and the demise of desire that can both arise when myths 
have been demystified or ‘unveiled’. Discussing the perpetual absence of 
the mythical ‘little old Chinese man’ that so many martial arts students 
may have once desired to meet and learn from, Frank observes that the 
practitioners are forced to re-evaluate their desires and construct a new re-
lationship with them, to them, or for them—even to revise and reconstitute 
their desires tout court. Either this, or risk the burning out of their martial 
arts passions.
In psychoanalytic terms, it is phantasy that structures desire and sustains 
relationships, whether interpersonal relationships or relationships with an 
activity. Slavoj Žižek paints a very vivid picture of the place of desire in 
any sexual relationship: as he puts it, the truth of sexual desire is not two 
people copulating and looking into each other’s eyes and truly seeing or 
being with each other; it is rather in the fact that even when in the closest 
physical relationship, protagonists are each still indulging in a phantasy of 
the other (and indeed a phantasy of themselves as they imagine they are 
imagined by the other). That is to say, for Žižek, even when two lovers are 
engaged in passionate sex, they are not exactly or entirely ‘with’ each other. 
Ultimately, indeed, each is isolated in their lone onanistic phantasy.
In martial arts desires, phantasy is arguably also in play in a similar 
way. However, according to Frank’s argument, over time this necessarily 
must change if desire is to transform into love or identity and to persist. 
As Frank reiterates, ‘identity moves’. And perhaps the movement required 
is that of a movement from desire to belief. Anyone who has ever been 
involved in activities like neigong exercises—which involve standing 
completely still for protracted periods of time every single day—should be 
able to attest to how crucially important belief is to our continued involve-
ment in the activity.
From phantasy to practice, it seems clear that the international circula-
tion of martial arts requires an analysis that spans or traverses many realms 
and registers. For Frank, it ‘requires moving beyond the macrolevel dis-
course through which globalization is usually theorized and instead maneu-
vering fluidly between history, political economy, and the personal stories 
of people who are both globalized and conduits of globalizations’ (207). 
This is why it is crucial to remember that, in the case of a Chinese prac-
tice like taijiquan, ‘the actual movement of the art across borders through 
real human beings, involves a mutually constitutive dialogue between 
 Conclusion 161
transnational images of Chineseness and the actual experience of practice’ 
(208). The actual experience modifies, moves, and perhaps fundamentally 
transforms the initial state of phantasy, desire, and identity.
I say ‘perhaps’ because it is not at all clear that such relations (hinging on 
phantasy) are, so to speak, constitutively ‘translated’, in the sense of modi-
fied in both directions, when taijiquan crosses from China to the United 
States or the West more generally. To clarify what this means, and to try to 
weigh it up, it is helpful to ponder two different types or registers of cultural 
encounter that Frank discusses. One is interpersonal. The other is linguistic 
and conceptual. The two are connected. In the first sort of example that 
Frank gives, we clearly see the dynamics of a potential transformation of 
preconceptions (aka ‘prejudices’). But it quickly segues into the second, 
which is far more knotty. Consider the following:
Non-Chinese students come to Wong’s studio to experience Chineseness 
through taijiquan or other martial arts, to actually become Chinese for a few 
hours during their day. They expect Wong to enact a certain brand of Chine-
seness. Wong, in turn, both gives them what they want and confronts them 
about this expectation. The non-Chinese student comes looking for the little 
old Chinese man (even though Wong is young). Wong, on the other hand, 
wants no part of it, but he and other teachers who suffer similar instances of 
orientalization often feel that ‘resistance is futile’. After all, taijiquan and qi-
related media have become readily recognizable features in American popular 
culture over the last twenty years. (215)
Thus, in Frank’s interpretation, a kind of orientalist desire initiates or 
plays a constitutive part in the non-Chinese choice of kung fu or taijiquan. 
The desire is to play at becoming Chinese, or to find out what it’s like to 
be immersed in Chineseness. The teacher may want no part in this, but is 
nevertheless able both to capitalize on it, to a greater or lesser extent, and 
to challenge the cultural presumptions, again to a greater or lesser extent. 
Reading between the lines (but referring to other moments in Frank’s 
discussion), we might say that various forms of the overcoming of iden-
tity take place in the lessons, whether taking the form of ‘realizing’ that 
‘we’re not so different after all’ or, indeed, forgetting about identity and 
difference. Accordingly, we are in the terrain of the possibility for cultural 
transformation, or at least modification. However, we must remember the 
twist at the end of the paragraph: ‘he and other teachers who suffer similar 
instances of orientalization often feel that “resistance is futile”. After all, 
taijiquan and qi-related media have become readily recognizable features in 
American popular culture over the last twenty years’ (215). In other words, 
no matter what interpersonal encounters there may be, perhaps these are 
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overdetermined in advance by the attending discourse of Chinese martial 
difference or specificity, which boils down to one word: qi. And so many 
issues condense in and around the discourse of and on qi that it warrants 
our attention.
thE ConDEnsation anD DispLaCEMEnt of Qi
Frank homes in on the significance of the term ‘qi’ for the discourse of 
Chinese martial arts. This is because in it is condensed arguably everything 
about the difference and specificity of Chineseness. Of course, it is perhaps 
the case that in the West arguably all forms of Chinoiserie make some in-
eradicable reference to qi—from discourses about feng shui (which encom-
pass both interior design and urban planning) to discourses about health, 
calligraphy, and sexuality. Thus, to discuss qi is to discuss Chineseness in 
condensation and displacement.
The terms condensation and displacement derive from Sigmund Freud’s 
epochal analyses in The Interpretation of Dreams. However, although 
Freud remains important in academic discourse, it was his student Jung 
who caught on in the popular imagination of counterculture America and 
Europe. And with the popularity of Jung came a certain reading of Chinese 
classics such as the Tao Te Ching. Frank points out that even a brief history 
of the treatment of Chineseness in the West reveals ‘that the popularization 
of taijiquan as a product of Daoism has been closely linked with larger his-
torical and geopolitical forces that have had a special resonance for particu-
lar generations’. He continues by noting that ‘in the Europe and America of 
the 1920s and 1930s, Jung’s and Wilhelm’s work reached a large audience 
of intellectuals and artists’ (212). However, in a crucial passage, Frank 
encompasses the range of ways in which the ‘real explosion of Daoism as 
popular culture in Europe and America . . . occurred in the 1960s, when 
Daoism, along with Zen Buddhism and various Maharajiisms, spread in 
the United States’ (213). He observes that taijiquan was ‘very much a part 
of this resurgent interest in spiritual practices’, not least because, owing to 
changes in U.S. immigration laws, ‘for the first time in American history, a 
critical mass of enthusiastic “native” teachers coalesced to support existing 
interest, as well as generate new interest among a well-educated middle 
class’ (213). Moreover—and crucially—‘Daoism was one among several 
exotic philosophies that offered alternatives to existing paradigms, and 
thus it made an important contribution to counterculture ideology’ (213). 
With this came a crucial ‘institutional’ response in the West, one that had 
a significant disruptive discursive impact:
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Popular presses like Shambala Books heavily weighted their catalogs toward 
Eastern mysticism. Editors at Shambala, Yoga Journal, Tricycle, and New 
Age magazine not only published on the basis of what they thought their 
public wanted to read, but often led the way in explicitly or implicitly linking 
practices like taijiquan to Daoism. It is not that the link between Daoism and 
taijiquan was ‘invented’ during this period. Douglas Wile (1996) argues con-
vincingly that the Chinese literati made the link as early as the mid-nineteenth 
century. But the hunger for alternative spiritual paths, combined with the mar-
keting of taijiquan as a ‘path to ancient wisdom’, created a perception among 
American taijiquan aficionados that there were appropriately ancient little old 
Chinese men out there waiting to share their secrets. Together with the pow-
erful, iconic image of Charlie Chan, the popularity of Confucian sayings in 
fortune cookies (which were invented in California), folkloric iconography in 
Chinese restaurants (e.g., Chinese zodiac placemats), and the actual increase 
of elderly Chinese in the United States that resulted from relaxed immigration 
laws, the racialized image of the wizened old Chinese man firmly attached 
itself to the American imagination. True, some of the knowledgeable teachers 
who came to America at this time were in fact elderly and male. Zheng Manq-
ing, the first great popularizer of taijiquan in the United States, embodied this 
image for many American practitioners, and that in turn fed the social-sensual 
construction of Chineseness for many Americans who studied taijiquan. (213)
Moreover, as is widely known, the start of the 1970s brought Richard 
Nixon’s Shanghai Communiqué, Bruce Lee films, and the TV show Kung 
Fu (212). But in addition to this, Frank spends some time pondering the 
significance of the first major sighting of taijiquan in a U.S. film: namely, 
the improvized version of what appears to be the short Zheng Manqing taiji 
form in Easy Rider (1969). He writes:
Easy Rider, starring Peter Fonda, Jack Nicholson, and Dennis Hopper, con-
tained not only signs of flower children looking for America and free love, but 
also the earliest cinematic reference to taijiquan in an American film. Hopper 
and Fonda are hanging out at a desert farming commune. A theatre group (the 
Gorilla Theatre) has just finished performing for the community. Fleetingly, 
we see a man going through what appears to be a half-improvised version of 
Professor Zheng Manqing’s taijiquan form on the stage. No mention is made 
of what is happening in the scene. The characters watching the scene appear 
to know what they are seeing, and the taijiquan all seems very normal to them. 
What we are left with is an indeterminate exoticization of ‘the Chinese’, sand-
wiched between images of sharing, free-spirited wandering, and nature. While 
the scene has no direct significance to the story line of Easy Rider, it is in 
retrospect the symbolic seed of an emerging New Age discourse. As a coun-
terculture symbol, Easy Rider also raises the question of whether or not we 
can read American taijiquan as resistance to state control of the body. (215)
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With this, Frank hits on a clear discursive mutation occurring around 
taijiquan in its migration from China to the United States. From having ac-
quired a kind of ‘nationalist’ (at least in the sense of ‘folk’/‘traditionalist’) 
valence in China, in the United States it loses this connotation, is stripped 
of nationalism, and becomes a kind of anti-nationalist symbol of ‘nature’. 
This reflects its overdetermination by a West-produced ‘Daoist discourse’. 
It is thus as something ‘natural’ (and not as something ‘communist’) that 
taijiquan comes to somehow ‘oppose capitalism’ in the 1960s counter-
culture of the United States. As Frank puts it, ‘The communal setting of 
the taijiquan scene in Easy Rider and the overall message of resistance to 
capitalism and of a return to nature coalesce to associate taijiquan with that 
resistance’ (216). Then, later:
For the Easy Rider generation, cultivating qi, along with free love and war 
protests, was equated with cultivating resistance to the domination of the 
body. In short, the 1960s in America can be seen as a return to good old-fash-
ioned Daoist resistance to authority. In later American media representations, 
acts of resistance became closely equated with martial arts. (216)
Because ‘qi-related practices are ultimately concerned with cultivating 
health in the body’, this prompts Frank to ask the following question: If, 
first, ‘as Foucault argues, the modern state exerts control over our bodies’, 
and if, secondly, ‘it is in the interest of the state to keep them healthy’, then 
might ‘the practice of taijiquan in America constitute a moment of agency 
beyond state control’ (231)? The answer to this question would certainly 
be yes, were it not for the complexities of transnational exchanges and their 
vertiginous macropolitical significance and status. For instance, Slavoj 
Žižek (as we have seen), has argued that precisely this kind of countercul-
tural ‘resistance’, all wrapped up in a ‘Western Taoism’ or ‘Western Bud-
dhism’ is in fact nothing more nor less than what he calls the ‘hegemonic 
ideology’ of postmodern capitalism (Žižek 2001). I have engaged with this 
debate many times so I will not do so again here (Bowman 2007b, 2010b, 
2013a). Indeed, the Žižekian argument is of little decisive relevance in 
considering questions of martial arts and cultural migration and transla-
tion. So, I will explore further what I earlier introduced as the more knotty 
dimension of cross-cultural migration and the question of cultural trans-
formation related to that term of great condensation and displacement for 
Chineseness, ‘qi’.
As already mentioned, while it seems theoretically possible for practical 
encounters between people from different cultures to precipitate identity 
and discourse-modifying transformations, the problem is that these en-
counters are already, so to speak, pre-constituted or preliminarily ‘mapped 
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out’ by historical discourses which have provided expectations and preju-
dices, which mediate the encounters of individuals. Frank proposes that the 
structuring term of ‘taijiquan encounters’ is the second-order semiotic term 
‘Chineseness’. But in the last chapter of his book, he refines this to propose 
that the key discursive operator in all of this is the term ‘qi’.
So, what happens when ‘qi’ is translated from Chinese to English, or 
from China to America? Frank proposes the following:
When a speaker ‘borrows’ a word, that act may involve specific strategies to 
communicate social messages beyond the meaning of the word. In the case of 
qi, the attempt to define the word actually provides one of the chief contexts 
for using it. In addition, even while the definition of qi remains unclear to the 
members of this community in which it appears, it is the very act of using 
the word that produces social solidarity, enhances the speaker’s status, and 
evokes a shared image of an exoticized Chinese Other that supports a larger 
transnational discourse about qi. (220)
Thus, English language discourse about qi is always also going to be 
‘about establishing status and solidarity within a community of like-minded 
specialists’ (220). This is because, ‘As nonnative speakers, as borrowers, 
we . . . rely on higher-status members of our peculiar speech community 
(the community of taijiquan and qigong practitioners) to elaborate the pa-
rameters of how and when the word can be used’. He continues: ‘We also 
rely on these high-status members to serve as our conduits to a transglobal 
cultural phenomenon—the spreading of qi-related practices beyond China’ 
(223). The ‘translation’ or even just the employment of the term is never 
neutral. It involves all sorts of hierarchizing and affiliating operations:
As instances of transglobal cultural exchange, borrowed words can take on 
larger roles as measures of interests and values that cross geographic and po-
litical boundaries. Qi is one such instance. The increasing use of qi in English, 
especially in the last twenty years, provides us with a small window into how 
values, tastes, and beliefs in American culture—at least predominantly white, 
middle-class American culture—have paralleled, to some degree, those in 
Chinese culture. Qi, therefore, serves as an example of a living, moving Chi-
nese identity, an instance of borrowing that goes well beyond language. (224)
Where else does it go? As Frank explains, such ‘code switching’ can 
relate to ‘asserting political power or emphasizing social factors such as 
class, educational level, and race’ (220). So it also goes into the forming 
of new group identities, hierarchies, and types of relation. Some of these—
perhaps, indeed, the vast majority—are inevitably going to be commodified 
relations. And it is here that processes of pitching, branding, marketing, 
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packaging, and repackaging come into intimate sensual-social contact with 
‘identity’. Frank himself discusses the aesthetics of the taiji and yoga ex-
ercise VHSs and DVDs of the 1980s and 1990s, but we can clearly easily 
bring this up to date with our own examples; and what Frank observes of 
these products remains important:
The tapes, through words and images, tie taijiquan to New Age practices and 
to American conceptions of physical fitness. Spandex-clad aerobics bunnies 
emphasize, in our minds, the importance of looking good over an esoteric 
Daoist quest for immortality. Images of the exotic Chinese also persist, 
though in a somewhat jumbled form. The Buns of Steel tape, for example, 
is filmed in a Japanese Garden, evoking nature and ‘Orientalness’, with the 
implication that Japanese and Chinese gardens share precisely the same aes-
thetic values. (227)
As such, in the face of such crass cultural/commodity hybrids, we might 
enquire into what has changed. On the one hand, images of the ‘East’ re-
main orientalist through and through. The representations of ‘Chineseness’ 
are saccharine, crude, and both geographically and conceptually incoher-
ent, as with so much pure orientalism. But, on the other hand, everything 
has changed: the language, the elements involved, the juxtapositions and 
relations, the presence of so much that is Western, and so on. This is both 
hybridity and simulacrum. It presages the emergence of the arguably cur-
rently hegemonic ‘oriental aesthetic’ in Hollywood action cinema that was 
perhaps born with Blade Runner and that was certainly mature by the time 
of The Matrix (Park 2010). Certainly, during the 1990s and early 2000s, 
‘the “sublime, exotic Orient” aesthetic is a regular feature in martial arts 
instructional videos that address qi’ (225). In such texts, we often see
the picaresque, exotic China: obligatory traditional architecture, astonishingly 
beautiful gardens, traditional Chinese instrumental music playing underneath 
[the] images, and all the while, the skyscrapers, overpasses, subways, KFCs, 
and McDonalds that make up modern Beijing and especially Shanghai are 
hidden from view, or at least minimized. (225)
However, as the twenty-first century marches on, and as the vast, spiral-
ling constructions of Chinese urban (post)modernity come more and more 
into the foreground of what Park calls the ‘oriental style’ of not only action 
and martial arts films, East and West, but also instructional DVDs and mar-
tial arts discourse more widely, one question may now become that of the 
future of the contours of the representation of qi in the new urban aesthetic 
of the representation of Chineseness. This question returns us to matters of 
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tradition, on the one hand, and discontinuity, on the other. It seems likely 
that this matrix will continue to intensify, through future rearticulations of 
what Rey Chow calls ‘primitive passions’, or symptoms of the transna-
tional and the urban (Chow 1995).
Discourses of martial arts register cacophonic and contradictory contin-
gencies, exigencies, and desires. Consequently, martial arts studies must 
explore the entanglements of its own objects with the cultural, media, aca-
demic, political, interpersonal, and sensual realms and registers that flow 
into and out of what any kind of study of martial arts enables and disrupts. 
To recast a phrase from Petrus Liu, the object of study ‘martial arts’ is 
itself, in a sense, a stateless subject, one that knows no borders or boundar-
ies. Whatever it becomes, martial arts studies must be fit for the chase and 
able to keep up with the challenges scattered far and wide of this stateless 
subject, these stateless subjects.
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ChaptEr 1
1. The self-styled radicalism of some cultural studies would tend to place busi-
ness or management studies in opposition to the ethical and political concerns of 
cultural studies. However, many have argued that any interest or investment in 
culture and/or society cannot be divorced from an interest or investment in the 
questions of its management.
2. Channon and Jennings themselves call for future research to look into various 
‘political’ matters (15–16), for instance—and the determination of any kind of ‘po-
litical field’ cannot exclude the theoretical, hermeneutic, and interpretive because 
politics is essentially an argumentative relation.
3. Ironically, the authors do mention Frank’s PhD thesis (in footnote 26), a work 
from which his monograph is most likely derived and developed. Given this, it 
makes the omission of his subsequent monograph all the more peculiar.
ChaptEr 2
1. ‘The tournament itself adhered to international rules’, notes Frank, ‘rules 
that had largely been developed as part of a transnational effort led by the Chinese 
government’s sports bureaucracy to add Chinese martial arts events to the already 
existing Olympic repertoire of Japanese judo, Western-style boxing, fencing, and 
various forms of wrestling’ (158).
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2. ‘At the conclusion of the Zhengzhou tournament, a few days remained to 
visit the Shaolin Temple and to attend one of the largest martial-arts-oriented per-
formances in the world: the Shaolin Festival in Dengfeng, a key conduit for both 
the national and transnational transmission of Chinese identity as it is conceived 
through martial arts’ (175).
3. My thinking here is informed by Derridean deconstruction, but also by the 
Introduction and the chapter ‘Where Have All the Natives Gone?’ in Rey Chow’s 
Writing Diaspora (Chow 1993).
4. Derrida famously regards such a desire as ‘metaphysical’ and ultimately 
‘European’. Needless to say, many theorists and philosophers have taken Derrida 
to task for his undeconstructed assertion here—including Spivak and Chow. See 
(Derrida 1976; Chow 2002; Zhang 1992).
5. In modern kung fu and wushu or wuxia film, this fantasy is often elaborated as 
or transformed into a nationalist fantasy, à la Bruce Lee’s ultranationalist character 
Chen Zhen in Jing Wu Men, and the subsequent incarnations of this character by 
Jet Li in Fist of Legend and Donnie Yen in Return of the Fist: The Legend of Chen 
Zhen, as well as the slight displacement and transformation of Chen Zhen into Ip 
Man in the first Ip Man films of the current cycle. However, as we saw above, Pe-
trus Liu has argued that, along with ‘mandarin duck and butterfly’ literature, martial 
arts literature was often anathema to any nationalizing discourse (Liu 2011).
6. For instance, in a recent interview, the filmmaker Xu Haofeng—one of the 
screenwriters of The Grandmaster—states that for some years, Hong Kong and 
Chinese filmmakers would copy Western styles in filmmaking because these styles 
were regarded as being of the highest and most desirable quality (Xu 2013).
ChaptEr 3
1. I have deconstructed the widespread obsession with ‘the street’ before, with 
specific reference to ‘politicized academia’. There I referred to it as ‘street fetish-
ism’ (Bowman 2008b). Many similar obsessions circulate in martial arts discourses. 
Indeed, in all manner of discourses—academic, political, activist, martial arts, and 
so on—the term ‘the street’ works as a metonym of and for ‘reality’.
2. There are other reasons, too: I spent some time over a period of years ‘learn-
ing KFM’, with no formal instructor and only some downloaded MPEGs, some 
training partners, and a load of enthusiasm and excitement. During this period, my 
former taijiquan and kung fu instructor asked whether I had ‘gone Ronin’. I agreed 
that I had.
3. My focus here is clearly very Western. However, my hypothesis is that simi-
lar logics and processes operate in all contexts and that differences are differences 
of degree and temporality, rather than of kind. For further consideration of Chinese 
contexts, see Lorge (2012), Shahar (2008), Palmer (2007), Wile (1996, 1999), or the 
very important ethnographic work of Frank (2006). For Japan, see Chan (2000). For 
 Notes 171
Korea, see Gillis (2008). For the relations between Japanese and U.S. institutions 
and transformations in that context, see Krug (2001).
4. For recent contributions to the long-running debate about how and why 
practitioners come to ‘believe in’ their martial arts training activities, see Wetzler 
(2014), Berg and Prohl (2014), and Downey (2014), in the ‘Martial Arts Studies’ 
issue of JOMEC Journal. Kath Woodward has also provided an alternative recent 
engagement with this problematic, exploring a wide range of ways to understand 
practitioner belief and investment in pugilistic training, specifically boxing—but 
her insights extend beyond boxing (Woodward 2014).
5. Ironically, so-called traditional martial arts pedagogies are rarely older than 
the twentieth century (Krug 2001). It was certainly during the twentieth century that 
karate was institutionalized into the forms recognizable today.
6. For an influential, albeit controversial, discussion of the theoretical relations 
between stultification and emancipation in pedagogy, see Rancière’s book, The 
Ignorant Schoolmaster (Rancière 1991). I have discussed Rancière’s work in rela-
tion to martial arts elsewhere (Bowman 2009), but return to it again here because 
it is extremely stimulating in thinking about pedagogy and institution. I discuss it 
further below.
7. But this is a simplification: consider the common scenario of children being 
taken to martial arts classes by their parents. Their motivations can hardly be as-
sessed in the same way as those of, say, a victim of assault who is seeking a way 
to ward off its recurrence.
8. This interview no longer appears to be available online. Its original location, 
The Martial Edge, appears to have mutated from a mono-website-based format into 
a more multiple form, Hydra-like, with no one location, but rather several: Face-
book, Twitter, YouTube, and so on. Older material, such as this interview, seems to 
have been a casualty of this mutation.
9. At the time of writing, parts of these DVD-extras about KFM can also be 
found online. For instance, here: www.youtube.com/watch?v=wFQWXn0MVtU.
10. Jane Park deems Batman Begins to be part of a movement in Hollywood 
aesthetics that is borrowing increasingly from the visual styles of Hong Kong cin-
ema (Park 2010).
11. For a discussion of some of the implications of DVD-extras, see Leon Hunt’s 
article ‘Enter the 2-Disc Platinum Edition: Bruce Lee and Post-DVD Textuality’ 
(Hunt 2014).
12. For an interesting discussion of the intertextual relations between the UFC 
and gladiatorial films, see Bolelli (2014).
13. Subscribing to such a position is surely what prevents change from happen-
ing legitimately or publicly within traditionalist martial arts. To innovate or alter an 
inherited tradition implies that ‘you think you know better than the founders or past 
masters’. Combat sports, such as MMA, fare better as innovation and improvement 
are fundamental to their discourse. We will return to the significance and implica-
tions of such discursive differences below.
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14. On the fascinating connections between capoeira and the origins of break 
dancing, see Assunção’s work on the history and spread of this Afro-Brazilian art 
(Assunção 2005).
15. In both martial arts studies and cultural studies, I have often suggested that 
this point connects things as diverse as general academic criticisms of ‘interdisci-
plinarity’ and criticisms of Bruce Lee’s innovations (JKD). This is because inter-
disciplinary innovations of all kinds receive the same kind of reception: hostility 
and a claim that the innovators don’t know enough about what they are doing to 
do it ‘properly’.
16. These terms come from Derrida (1994) and are helpful for (among other 
things) rethinking ontology in a media-saturated world.
17. For instance, for the shady case of the simultaneous invention and obscuring 
of the invention of taekwondo in the 1950s, see Gillis (2008). For the twentieth-
century evolution of taijiquan into its present forms, see Frank (2006). For the 
mythological rewriting of modern Japanese arts as ‘ancient’ see Chan (2000).
18. For an illuminating discussion of the cultural significance and effects of 
instructional videos on the dissemination of martial arts, see Frank (2006: 225–27).
19. For a discussion of pedagogical sharing and community building via You-
Tube, see Spencer (2014).
20. On the notion of ‘performative interpretation’—and its connection with a 
theory of ontology, indeed the ontology of the event—see Derrida (1994).
21. I have discussed this at length elsewhere (Bowman 2010b).
22. Notions like ‘enculturation’ or ‘habitus’ do not to my mind offer either 
the descriptive or the analytical possibilities that Foucault’s focus on institutional 
discourses enables. So in the following, preference will be given to a Foucauldian 
approach to the relationship between institutions and bodies.
23. See Farrer and Whalen-Bridge (2011b) for a collection of essays, each in its 
own way addressing the question ‘Of what is a body capable?’ vis-à-vis martial arts.
24. For an account of this notion of ‘disagreement’, in which disagreement is 
formulated not as a dispute in which one party argues white while another argues 
black, but rather as a situation in which both parties argue white but mean different 
things by it, see Rancière (1999). See also Arditi (2008).
25. For a precise sense of what is meant by ‘discursive construction’, see Laclau 
and Mouffe (1985) and work informed by this school of poststructuralism.
ChaptEr 4
1. Over twenty years ago, John Mowitt asked cultural studies to hesitate before 
adopting what was then called the ‘post-Marxist discourse theory paradigm’ that 
had become popular in the wake of Laclau and Mouffe’s 1985 book, Hegemony 
and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (Laclau and Mouffe 
1985; Mowitt 1992). He asked us to hesitate before diving into the conceptual 
universe organized by terms like discourse, hegemony, articulation, antagonism, 
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equivalence, difference, and the particularity, Contingency, Hegemony, Universal-
ity, and so on, that ultimately followed (Butler, Laclau, and Žižek 2000). He did so 
because—to put it into extremely simplified terms—there is a lot that this sort of 
paradigm is constitutively incapable of seeing.
2. One beauty of Laclauian theory is that the argument about hegemony can 
so readily be translated into so many other realms, fields, and registers. This is 
because hegemony is a relational concept. It offers a way of conceptualizing rela-
tionships and hierarchies, values, norms. Thus, there can be hegemony in styles, in 
fashions, in sartorial norms; in conventions; there can be hegemony in activities, 
in interpersonal relationships, and of course—indeed, first and last—hegemony in 
representations. Which is where the notion of cultural politics comes into its own 
or where the notion of hegemony at once illustrates and conceals or flattens out an 
entire field. Another way of saying this is that Laclauian theory is literalist and real-
ist. For instance, it says that an antagonism will produce an entity or identity in and 
through and as the production of a demand. Or, it says that cultural particularities 
will contest and compete with each other for dominance or universalization, aka 
hegemony. All of which implies a very anthropological understanding of a group 
having its own proper identity—no matter how deconstructed and deconstructive 
this approach seeks to be. They may not be permanent, and they may not be total, 
but Laclauian theory’s ultimate interest is in the fact that political identities are 
constituted through the antagonism and the demand. Accordingly, a postcolonialist 
scholar or theorist may worry that therefore this paradigm remains deaf and blind to 
all but the noisiest and most present of entities and identities. What of the subaltern? 
What of the silent or silenced? The unseen? The unheard? The postcolonial media 
theorist might want to ask: What if the element expropriated from the silent or the 
silenced is actually showcased and moved centre stage? What if what becomes uni-
versalized—what becomes hegemonic—in the mainstream of the mainstream—in 
other words, hegemonic in the hegemony—is something from the subaltern place, 
context, people, community? Needless to say, I’m thinking of the incorporation of 
Filipino martial arts into the choreography of The Bourne Identity trilogy.
3. Of course, it is perhaps obvious (once it has been noted) that, just like any 
other signifier, the meaning of any and all of these terms of philosophy, theory, and 
politics—universalism, universality, particularism, particularity, and so on—are 
to a greater or lesser extent up for grabs anyway. Nevertheless, as soon as they 
are ushered in as a cluster of terms (rather than individual isolated words), their 
clustering means that they may tend to predetermine, to imply, to associate with, 
pre-empt, conjure up, and reciprocally reinforce each other’s likely meanings. 
But still, their precise or particular meanings remain up for grabs. There certainly 
seems to be very little evidence of any universal or even particular consensus on 
the meanings of universalism and particularity. Disagreement, slippage, play, drift, 
virement: all are inevitable. According to Jacques Rancière, such is the nature of 
disagreement: disagreement is not necessarily when two people argue different 
things, argues Rancière; it is more fundamentally when two people argue the same 
thing but mean very different things by the same words. We see this, for instance, 
in the pages of the millennial collaboration between Butler, Laclau and Žižek—the 
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co-authored book, which became a series of quite serious disagreements between 
erstwhile putative theoretical allies, entitled Contingency, Hegemony, Universal-
ity: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left (Butler, Laclau, and Žižek 2000). One 
of the main consequences of this book was that what had beforehand appeared 
to be a kind of theoretical collectivity, or community, pretty much fractured and 
fragmented—not least because they couldn’t agree on their own apparently central 
terms and concepts.
4. Of course, no matter how ‘old’ or ‘young’ these arts may ‘really’ have 
been, the martial traditions, first of China and then of Japan were thoroughly 
mediatized—by Hollywood, Hong Kong, Japanese, and other regional film indus-
tries—throughout the 1970s. But the term ‘real’ is problematic here: for, with Lee, 
we were not really seeing ancient Chinese arts, but rather his own hybrid style; just 
as with the Japanese enemies in his films, we were not really seeing real Japanese 
arts, but rather those arts as imagined in Hong Kong.
5. See Rey Chow, ‘After the Passage of the Beast: “False Documentary” As-
pirations, Acousmatic Complications’, in Paul Bowman, ed., Rancière and Film, 
Edinburgh University Press, 2013, pp. 34–52.
6. One version of the complaint takes the form of asking why, in the films and 
fictions of the West, the West is always depicted as the best. But to me this is a ‘no 
brainer’—and it makes me wonder whether such complainants have ever seen the 
depiction of Westerners in Hong Kong or Japanese martial arts films (especially 
those that were made with Asian rather than global markets in mind). The same 
rules of simplifying and stereotyping apply, just using different (but equivalent) 
cultural material.
7. In martial arts, since their mass mediation, there has been a massive mash-
ing and mushing and slewing and slushing of martial arts practices, often trading 
under a relatively limited number of names. There have of course been new names 
coined, and new amendments, modifications, hyphenations, and supplementations 
to erstwhile entities and identities; but mostly this circulation of the same few 
names conceals profound loosening, weakening, translation, and transformation in 
practices themselves. Of course, as Nietzsche pointed out, we always use one word 
(‘leaf’) for things that are always different from each other (‘leaves’). But I mean 
something specific: these transformations are tied to mediatization.
8. Put differently: it is equally remarkable to note that in the age of increasingly 
precise digital audio-visual capture and reproduction, martial arts styles and forms 
and practices still drift away from former states and mutate. Alteration over time 
was surely inevitable in the past, when pedagogy was almost exclusively a process 
of ongoing mimesis—of copying the master in an ever-ongoing, ever-doomed effort 
to constrain the drift away from the desired pure repetition/replication and towards 
the loathed impurity of imperfect reiteration/alteration. But the capture of masters 
performing routines and moves perfectly on DVDs and MP4s has not halted the 
inexorability of this. If anything, it has amplified it. For, as Derrida wrote (or reiter-
ated) in Dissemination, now any sign is cut off from its guarantors, its stabilizers, 
its ‘proper ties’, and can be picked up and used by anyone.
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9. The UFC was the brainchild of Rorion Gracie, who proposed a martial arts 
competition with no rules, to truly establish which style was best. The first competi-
tion took place in 1993, and the first competitions were in many respects hideously 
brutal. However, what these first few bloodbaths nevertheless seemed to establish 
was that the ultimate martial art appeared to be nothing other than Rorion Gracie’s 
own family style of jiujitsu—Gracie Barra jiujitsu. And moreover, the strangest 
thing about this was that while all the other competitors would batter and bloody 
and break each other, Gracie jiujitsu competitors, by contrast, would essentially just 
shoot in, take their opponent to the ground and then, either quickly or slowly, but 
always with the ominous inexorability of a boa constrictor encircling some hapless 
mammal, they would choke and lock and squeeze the life out of them.
So, was this ‘ultimate fighting’ really the ultimate? Was this the particular-
ism that would be universalized? If so, then the reality of real fighting—and the 
ultimate of ultimate fighting—seemed to be rather disappointing—or at least con-
siderably less dramatic than many had hoped. Certainly the essential inscrutability 
of a ground fight—the lack of clarity to the viewer of what is going on when two 
fighters are locked apparently motionlessly in a clinch, and why nothing appears to 
be happening—was a problem for a television product that had from the start posi-
tioned itself as a compelling media spectacle—the spectacle of modern gladiatorial 
unarmed combat. The society of the spectacle wants its spectacles spectacular. 
Crestfallen martial artists from styles other than Gracie jiujitsu tended to console 
themselves with the argument that neither the UFC ‘octagon’ nor any other sporting 
arena could really be regarded as reality. Reality takes many forms, they would say, 
and in very few of them is it wise to take your opponent to the ground: the ground 
may be covered in broken glass, for instance, or, as is highly likely, your opponent’s 
friends will be delighted to kick and stamp on you once you are down. But the 
UFC itself had a far greater problem: how to solve the problem of ultimate fighting 
being boring. The result was that so-called reality martial arts became thoroughly 
mediatized—from the ground up. Fighters won points for dramatic moves and lost 
points if clinches and holds took too long to develop into something more interest-
ing. Rounds were introduced, to enable advertising breaks. In other words, MMA 
and the UFC—perhaps the most brutal and supposedly therefore ‘real’ of televized 
sport combat—was mediatized and hyper-realized, in a way that reiterates, albeit in 
displaced form, the mediatization of celluloid martial arts in the 1970s.
10. Kung fu and karate and the spectacular kicking art/sport which rose to 
prominence in their wake and which remains a children’s favourite, taekwondo.
11. Now, even though I am aware that the perceived quality of any fight or 
action choreography in a film may be predominantly a product of the quality of 
direction and cinematography, I will emphasize the element of fight choreography 
here, and not that of cinematography. I know this to be anthropocentric and a focus 
that risks missing the fact that what we are dealing with is a filmic text. Neverthe-
less, I will maintain this focus because what Walter Benjamin pointed out so sagely 
many years ago still rings true: when it comes to moving images, it evidently re-
mains the case that the moving images that fascinate humans the most are moving 
images of humans. And, I would add, when there is fighting in films, what people 
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are watching—or trying to see (if only the cinematography, the camera angles and 
movements and all of the other editing techniques will allow)—is the fighting. It 
is certainly the case that I have never seen any spin-off or ‘making of’ films about 
Bourne that focus on anything other than the fighting. And there are many of these 
films, all over YouTube and elsewhere online: clips from the ‘making of’ docu-
mentaries in the DVD-extras; clips about the techniques and moves of Bourne’s 
signature fighting style—which we learn from the behind-the-scenes footage and 
interviews with fight choreographer Jeff Imada to be ‘Filipino kali’; clips made into 
montages of fight scenes from the film; commentaries and demonstration videos 
made by martial artists trying to clarify or cash in on the craze; even whole new 
websites called things like ‘How to Fight like Jason Bourne’ (offering clips, essays, 
instructional DVDs and other training products) have sprung up.
12. The fight choreographer, Jeff Imada, tells us: Bourne does kali combined 
with some military stuff and—in his words—‘some Bruce Lee stuff’. Is this the ca-
sual, blasé indifference of ethnic specificities of an arrogant Westerner who simply 
regards all this ‘stuff’ as ‘stuff’, and conflates it indiscriminately? Maybe. But Jeff 
Imada is himself the protégé of Dan Inosanto. Dan Inosanto is both ethnically Fili-
pino and a close friend and senior student of Bruce Lee. Indeed, Inosanto is one of 
the very few people authorized directly by Bruce Lee to teach his martial art. After 
Bruce Lee’s death in 1973, Inosanto continued to teach both Bruce Lee’s jeet kune 
do and the Filipino martial arts, before going on to work in fight choreography. Jeff 
Imada, a contemporary and friend of Bruce Lee’s son, Brandon, followed Inosanto 
into this work.
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